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Abstract 
 
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) leads to cognitive, behaviour, and social functioning 
difficulties.  It has also been associated with offending behaviour.  The common area of damage 
is to the fronto-temporal brain regions (Salmond et al, 2006).  These are considered important 
for moral reasoning.  Moral reasoning is believed to be important for upholding social function 
and preventing delinquent behaviour (Gibbs, 2010).  It is suggested that TBI may disrupt moral 
reasoning and contribute to social and behaviour deficits (Anderson & Catroppa, 2006).  Studies 
to date have indicated that there are greater difficulties in moral reasoning following a childhood 
TBI than adulthood TBI.  Studies have been small and have not examined the impact of 
childhood TBI in early adulthood.  Fewer studies have explored the neurocognitive processes 
underpinning moral reasoning.   
This study compared moral reasoning, measured by the Sociomoral Reflection Measure - 
Short Form (SRM-SF, Gibbs, Basinger & Fuller, 1992) in a group of 20 survivors of TBI aged 
between 17 and 25 years and a group of 34 healthy individuals.  It also explored the relationships 
between moral reasoning and executive functions, cognitive flexibility, inhibition; empathy and 
emotion-based decision making.      
The healthy comparison group demonstrated significantly higher moral reasoning.  This 
was maintained when the groups were matched on age, sex, socioeconomic status and when 
intellectual functioning was controlled.  The study revealed significant relationships between 
moral reasoning and cognitive flexibility, inhibition, executive function difficulties and empathy 
in the healthy comparison group.  Only one significant correlation was revealed in the TBI 
group; between cognitive flexibility and moral reasoning.  This was attributed to insufficient 
power to detect other significant findings.   
The study concluded that TBI sustained during childhood does disrupt moral 
development.  It also indicated that executive function processes and empathy may be involved 
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in moral reasoning.  These findings were considered in relation to theories of moral reasoning, 
brain development and methodological rigour.  Further research is suggested.     
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview  
 
“Moral reasoning promotes and enhances socially appropriate behaviours whilst regulating and 
inhibiting inappropriate or negative behaviours” 
     (Dooley, Beauchamp & Anderson, 2010, pp. 152) 
 Moral reasoning is believed to develop through cognitive, emotional and social 
maturation.  The frontal region of the brain is considered important for these cognitive and 
emotional processes and is activated during moral reasoning tasks (Raine & Young, 2006).  It is 
widely recognised that the frontal lobe is one of the brain regions commonly affected in a 
traumatic brain injury (Bigler, 2007).  Traumatic brain injury (TBI) causes deficits in several 
areas of functioning and has a great impact on individuals, families and wider society.  These 
difficulties may in part be explained by moral reasoning deficits.  The study aims to explore the 
impact of TBI on moral reasoning.    
Research to date has reported difficulties in moral reasoning after a brain injury in 
childhood.  Most studies have, however, been small and the larger studies have tended to focus 
on examining the impact on moral reasoning in childhood.  To date, no studies have examined 
the impact of child brain injury on moral reasoning in late adolescence-early adulthood.  This 
period of development is important for several reasons.  It is the period during which the frontal 
areas of the brain complete their maturation and, therefore, the cognitive and emotional 
processes believed integral to moral reasoning are completing development.  In addition, it is 
considered to be at this time that individuals are reaching the stage of mature moral reasoning 
(Gibbs, Basinger & Fuller, 1992).  Moreover, it captures a period when individuals are gaining 
their independence – starting careers, forming relationships and living independently (Morton & 
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Wehman, 1995; Turkstra, Williams, Tonks & Burgess, 2008) and, therefore, are more 
responsible for making important decisions.  There is a consensus in the literature that the true 
impact of a brain injury is only known when the individual approaches these crucial stages 
(Chapman & McKinnon, 2000; Eslinger, Grattan, Damasio & Damasio, 1992; McKinlay, Grace, 
Horwood, Fergusson & MacFarlane, 2009).   
This requires closer examination as deficits in moral reasoning may contribute to social 
and behavioural problems commonly reported following a TBI.  Furthermore, moral reasoning is 
considered to prevent delinquent behaviour as it involves an appreciation of wider society and 
others in decision making (Gibbs, 2010; Dooley et al., 2010).  So if there are deficits in moral 
reasoning after childhood TBI, this may in part, explain the emerging research suggestive of an 
increased vulnerability to offending behaviour following a TBI.  A greater understanding will 
facilitate the development of effective interventions for neuro-rehabilitation programmes.    
This study plans to examine moral reasoning in individuals who have survived a TBI and 
are currently aged between 17 and 25 years of age.  In addition, this study intends to address 
another important area.  Research studies have provided mixed evidence to support the notion 
that moral reasoning is associated with cognition (executive functioning), empathy, and emotion 
based decision making or intuition.  This requires closer examination as a better understanding 
of the processes that underpin moral reasoning would inform targets for interventions.  This 
study, therefore, plans to explore the relationship between moral reasoning and these processes.    
This chapter will introduce the background to the study.  It will begin with a brief 
overview of TBI inclusive of definition, causes, and epidemiology.  It will next discuss the 
impact of TBI with a particular focus on injury sustained during childhood.  It will briefly 
describe the cognitive, emotional, and behavioural deficits associated with TBI.  Following this 
the relationship between moral reasoning and offending will be considered.  It will then 
summarise theories about moral reasoning and highlight the processes which are considered 
important; including executive function, empathy and emotion-based decision making/ intuition, 
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before highlighting their neural correlates which are vulnerable to damage in a TBI.  Following 
this the literature which has explored the impact of childhood and adulthood brain injury on 
moral reasoning will be reviewed.  Finally, the rationale and aims for this current study will be 
presented: to focus on the impact of brain injury on moral reasoning in early adulthood; and to 
explore the processes that underpin moral reasoning. 
 
1.2 Traumatic brain injury  
 TBI refers to damage to the brain from an external force (Donders, 2006).  The most 
common causes of TBI are road traffic accidents, assaults, and falls.  They are also sustained 
during sports and recreational activities (Langlois, Rutland-Brown, & Thomas, 2004).  It has 
been reported that there are 10 million incidents a year worldwide which result in death or 
hospitalisation (Langlois, Rutland-Brown, & Wald, 2006).  This is, however, an underestimate 
because the majority are mild TBIs so many people do not seek help and in the military, help is 
provided but not recorded (Langlois et al., 2006).  Additionally, TBI can often become a hidden 
disability due to an absence of any obvious physical problems, despite many cognitive 
difficulties (Khan, Baguley, & Cameron, 2003; Langlois et al., 2006). 
The highest prevalence of TBI is reported in children and adolescents aged between 0-4 
and 15-19 years of age (Langlois et al., 2004; Yates, Williams, Harris, Round & Jenkins, 2006).  
TBI is believed to be the leading cause of disability or death for children, adolescents and young 
adults across the world (World Health Organisation, 2009).  It often leads to impairments in 
cognitive, behavioural, physical and psychosocial domains and has a large impact on the 
individual and wider society.  However, the impact of a TBI is mediated by a number of factors 
including the extent and location of the injury, rehabilitation, family support and possibly 
genetic factors and pre-injury function e.g. cognitive reserve (Turner‐Stokes, Nair, Sedki, Disler, 
& Wade, 2005).  It is also associated with the development of other co-morbid conditions (e.g. 
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mood disorders and Alzheimer’s disease; Langlois et al., 2006) and epilepsy in younger children 
(Yeates, 2010).   
 
1.2.1 Neuropathology of TBI 
 TBI results in damage to the brain by primary and secondary injuries (Noppins & 
Brambrink, 2004; Yeates, 2010).  Primary injuries result from the direct trauma to the brain and 
through the acceleration-deceleration force of the incident (Donders, 2006; Yeates, 2010).  This 
can cause contusions and lesions to focal points as well as deformation of the skull.  In addition, 
rotational trauma can occur when the skull stops on impact but the brain moves due to angular 
acceleration.  This action can result in tearing of blood vessels leading to focal lesions or 
haemorrhage and shearing which give rise to diffuse axonal injury (Donders, 2006; Yeates, 
2010).  Studies using advanced structural magnetic resonance and diffusion tensor imaging have 
consistently demonstrated damage to bilateral frontal and temporal lobes after TBI (Salmond et 
al., 2006; Wallesch, Curio, Galazky, Jost, & Synowitz, 2001).  Bigler (2007) suggested that this 
may be due to their proximity to the bony aspects of the skull.  It may also be because it is the 
common impact point in an assault and road traffic accidents.  In addition, the acceleration-
deceleration force of a TBI can cause diffuse axonal injury (Donders, 2006; Yeates, 2006).  This 
is because the human brain is unable to withstand the impact of the rapid rotational mechanisms 
(Smith, Meaney & Skull, 2003).  The stretching results in damage to the axonal cytoskeleton 
resulting in disconnected axons (Smith et al., 2003).  This disconnection disrupts the 
communications between the cells and is believed to correlate with functional recovery and 
clinical outcomes.  The most common area for disconnection is in the frontal lobe (Lillie, Urban, 
Lynch, Whitlow & Stitzel, 2013).  The frontal lobe is believed responsible for control, 
organisation and monitoring of the information from the other parts of the brain (Stuss & 
Alexander, 2007; Stuss & Knight, 2002).  Disruptions to connections between the frontal lobe 
and other areas of the brain will disrupt this function (Smith et al., 2003).  For example the 
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limbic system is responsible for emotions and these are managed and controlled by the frontal 
lobe.  Disruptions in the frontolimbic pathway, therefore, may lead to agitation and behavioural 
difficulties (Smith et al., 2003).     
TBI gives rise to secondary injuries through consequential complications of brain 
swelling e.g. haemorrhage, and increased cerebral blood volume resulting in increased 
intracranial pressure and hypoxic injury (Bruce, 1995; Rao & Lyketsos, 2000; Werner & 
Engelhard, 2007).   
   
1.2.2 Measurement of Severity 
There are three main methods for measuring severity.  One method is using the Glasgow 
Coma Scale (GCS; Teasdale & Jennett, 1974).  A score is derived through assessment of eye 
opening, motor and verbal function to various stimuli.  The scores correspond to severity: 13-15 
(mild); 9-12 (moderate); and less than 9 (severe).  The alternative is the duration of Post-
traumatic Amnesia (PTA), the period of time post-injury that the brain is unable to hold 
continuous memories (Russell & Smith, 1961).  In addition, the loss of consciousness for more 
than 30 minutes is considered indicative of a moderate-severe brain injury (The Mayo 
classification system; Malec et al., 2007). 
 
1.2.3. Outcomes of TBI 
Survival rates from TBI have improved as a result of advances in neurosurgery and 
intensive care (Khan et al., 2003).  Nevertheless, damage to frontal-temporal limbic structures 
(Bigler, 2007) often leads to emotional, cognitive, and behavioural difficulties.   
Traditionally it was believed that a brain injury during childhood resulted in less residual 
difficulties.  The Kennard Principle (Finger & Wolfe, 1988) suggested damage was overcome by 
the plasticity of the young brain, the structural and functional adaptations made to counteract the 
lesions (Buchwald, 1990).  This theory was supported by findings from earlier studies of 
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recovery in young chimpanzees (Kennard, 1938) and younger children with focal lesions (Aram 
& Enkleman, 1986). 
In contrast to this view, Catroppa, Anderson, Morse, Haritou and Rosenfield (2008) 
highlighted the vulnerability of the developing brain.  They suggest childhood TBI may cause 
more diffuse damage due to the smaller size of neck to head ratio, more flexible cranial bones, 
and thinner cortex.  In addition, the injury would occur at a time when there are limited cognitive 
reserves and, therefore, less to draw upon to aid recovery (i.e., compensatory strategies; Savage, 
2009).  This alternative view has been supported by advances in neuroimaging and a better 
understanding of brain development.  Brain development occurs through myelination and 
pruning.  Myelination adds a fatty sheath to enable neurons to transmit signals quicker and allow 
better communication between the brain regions (Belsky & de Haan, 2011; Paus et al., 1999).  In 
addition, communication between neurons occurs across synapses and the synaptic density 
increases rapidly after birth (Lenroot & Giedd, 2006).  Pruning enables a reduction in synapses 
thereby stabilisation of the important networks of neurons (Belsky & de Haan, 2011).  These 
processes continue into the third decade of life (Gogtay et al., 2004; Lenroot & Giedd, 2006).  
They begin in the motor and sensory areas associated with most basic functions and finish in the 
more complex areas; the frontal areas which are responsible for executive function, and emotion 
processing (Belsky & de Haan, 2011; Sowell et al., 2004).  The last structures to mature, in the 
mid twenties, are the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC), consistent with maturation of executive function skills (Gogtay et al., 2004; Sowell et 
al., 2004).  Given the prolonged nature of this process of development, damage inflicted during 
this period may adversely affect brain structure, by distorting creation of new structures or 
pathways and limiting elaboration and usage of earlier ones (Black, Jones, Nelson, & 
Greenough, 1998; Cicchetti, 2002).  In addition, damage may cause disruption to the processes 
of myelination and pruning.  It is also likely to have a particular impact on later maturing 
structures, mainly the frontal lobe (Reinis & Goldman, 1980).  Therefore, instead of preserved 
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function after early brain injury, it may result in “neuro-cognitive stall” which slows the rates of 
cognitive, social and motor development (Chapman, 2007) and limits development to the pre-
injury skills (Ewing-Cobbs, Barnes, & Fletcher, 2003).  The plasticity of the brain may cause 
further problems by recruiting other areas to perform roles and hinder development of the 
specified region (Klintsova & Greenough 1999).  This is known as the “crowding hypothesis” 
(Teuber & Rudel, 1962) which has suggested the young brain compensates through maximal 
rewiring of available neural space.  This theory suggests this may help initially but it proposes 
greater difficulties emerge later in the developmental trajectory as these early adaptations 
“crowd” out the brain, and compromise the later developmental of new skills and adaptations.  
Furthermore, genes and experience are also implicated in brain development.  Brain structural 
development is considered to be reliant on the complexity of the environment and the ability to 
interact with this (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998; 2006; Westermann et al., 2007).  An early brain injury 
is likely to alter life experiences, thereby presenting another cause for disruption to brain 
development.  In keeping with this, a paper has reported increased synapse connections, cortical 
thickness and weight, and better cognitive function in rats reared in more stimulating 
environments (Sale, Berardi & Maffei, 2009).  Interestingly, an enriched environment has not 
been shown to lead to the same improvements in cortical thickness or enhanced cognitive 
performance, in rats that have sustained an early TBI (Fineman, Giza, Nahed, Lee, & Hovda, 
2000).  This is supportive of disruption from TBI on brain development, regardless of 
environment.   
These theories concur that whilst it may appear there is initial recovery; this is preceded 
by a plateau or decline in functioning relative to peers, ultimately manifesting itself in 
individuals not being able to reach future milestones (Savage, 2009).  Further difficulties may 
arise in adolescence when protection from familial structure disperses, there are greater social 
challenges, and independent functioning is expected (Eslinger et al., 1992).  Hence children may 
develop cognitive, behavioural and language difficulties later (McKinlay et al., 2009).  In 
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keeping with this, Tonks, Williams, Yates, and Slater (2011) revealed a significant difference 
between child survivors of TBI, aged between 10 and 16 years, and their peers on cognitive 
assessments but did not reveal discrepancies in a group at a younger age.  In light of these issues, 
Chapman and McKinnon (2000) warn against premature judging of recovery in children.     
In summary, there appears to be much evidence to support the view that early damage to 
the brain results in numerous residual difficulties.  Indeed Catroppa et al. (2008) have shown that 
very young preschool children have worse outcomes in terms of greater disability in later life.  
This section will now summarise these difficulties. 
 
1.2.3.1 Cognitive impact 
Cognitive difficulties often present the most troublesome outcomes from a TBI, with 
possible problems in areas of attention, processing speed, memory, and language (Schiff, Plum, 
& Rezai, 2002).  These can occur alongside further difficulties in areas of executive functioning 
including cognitive flexibility, problem solving, impaired judgement, inhibitory control, 
planning, and working memory (Khan et al., 2003; Levin & Hanten, 2005; Yeates, 2010).  It is 
considered that cognitive skills that have not been developed pre-TBI are the most affected 
(McKinlay, 2012).  Childhood TBI of differing severity has been seen to result in issues with 
memory, processing speed, and attention deficits (Catroppa & Anderson, 2003; Catroppa, 
Anderson, Morse, Haritou & Rosenfield, 2007; Donders, 2006; Yeates et al., 2005).  Anderson, 
Catroppa, Morse, Haritou and Rosenfield (2000; 2005) revealed difficulties in intellectual 
functioning in children several years post injury.  Cognitive deficits are considered to be 
moderated by injury severity and greater damage is expected when there has been greater 
acceleration-deceleration action (Levine, 2012).  Moderate and severe TBI have been associated 
with cognitive deficits, poor social outcomes, and behaviour problems (Crowe, Catroppa, Babl, 
& Anderson, 2012; Stambrook, Moore, Peters, Deviaene, & Hawryluk, 1990).  However, mild 
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severity has also been associated with neuropsychological deficits (Catroppa & Anderson, 2003; 
Catroppa et al., 2007; Donders, 2006; Mathias, Beall & Bigler, 2004; Yeates et al., 2005).   
 
1.2.3.2 Behavioural and Psychosocial impact 
Anderson et al.  (2000; 2005) suggested the residual deficits from childhood TBI impact 
negatively on social, emotional, and academic development, placing a considerable burden on 
families and the wider context (Anderson & Catroppa, 2006).  Childhood TBI is believed to 
disrupt emotional and behavioural regulation (Yeates, 2010).  A study revealed the same levels 
of emotional distress, measured by the strengths and difficulties questionnaire (SDQ; Goodman, 
1997), in an acquired brain injury group compared to a mental health group (Tonks, Yates, 
William, Framptom, & Slater, 2010).  More recently, a study revealed significantly more 
psychiatric difficulties in a brain injury group compared to an orthopaedic comparison group 
(Max et al., 2012).  These differences were not accounted for by pre injury characteristics such 
as socioeconomic status, family adversity, family psychiatric history, adaptive function, or injury 
severity.   
Furthermore, there has been an association between TBI and difficult peer relationships 
for children and adolescents (Bohnert, Parker, & Warschausky, 1997; Tonks et al., 2010).  In 
young adults, Morton and Wehman (1995) reported a significant reduction in friendships, social 
support, and leisure activities.   
 
1.2.3.3 TBI, conduct problems and offending behaviour 
Childhood TBI has been associated with conduct problems (Anderson & Catroppa, 
2006).  A prospective study has reported greater instances of attention-deficit disorder and 
oppositional defiant disorder /conduct disorder in children who had sustained a mild TBI, which 
required hospitalisation, than those which did not require hospitalisation and a healthy 
comparison group (McKinlay et al., 2009).  Schwartz et al. (2003) reported significantly higher 
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behavioural deficits in severe and moderate TBI groups when compared to a healthy comparison 
group.  In keeping with these findings, a study revealed greater behavioural difficulties in a 
group of children who had sustained brain injuries of varying severity compared to a matched 
healthy comparison group (Catroppa, Godfrey, Rosenfield, Hearps & Anderson, 2012).  
Furthermore, Damasio (1996) reported children with frontal lesions demonstrated high levels of 
violence and antisocial behaviour.  In addition, a study reported higher levels of self reported 
interpersonal violence, in individuals who sustained a head injury prior to adulthood, compared 
to a healthy comparison group (Stoddard & Zimmerman, 2011).   
Further research has emerged suggesting a link between brain injury and criminal 
behaviour.  Luiselli, Arons, Marchese, Potoczny-Gray, and Rossi (2000) reported that a third of 
children, adolescents and young adults attending a community neuro-rehabilitation centre 
admitted to participation in a criminal activity, and of these 75% had offended more than once.  
In support of this view, Timonen et al. (2002) found in a sample of male adults, TBI during 
childhood was associated with a four-fold risk of offending behaviour.  An interesting finding by 
Leon-Carrion and Ramos (2003) found that history of childhood untreated head injury was able 
to discriminate between a group of non violent and violent offenders in a prison population.  
Furthermore, the prevalence of a history of TBI in selected prison samples was 86.4% in New 
Zealand (Barnfield & Leathem, 1998), 87% in America (Slaughter, Fann, & Ehde, 2003) and 
more recently 65% in Britain (Williams, Cordan, Mewse, Tonks, & Burgess, 2010).  In addition 
from a sample of 720 youth offenders, 18.3% reported a significant head injury in earlier life 
(Perron & Howard, 2008).   
 Several psychosocial factors mediate the brain’s adaptation after an injury including 
social support (Chapman & McKinnon, 2000).  There is an argument that conduct problems may 
arise either due to pre-injury behavioural and family characteristics or alternatively from the 
burden on the family and systems around the child caused by the brain injury.  Increased levels 
of stress, burden and mental health difficulties have been reported in families with children with 
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TBI (Stancin, Wade, Walz, Yeates & Taylor, 1996; Wade, Taylor, Drotar, Stancin & Yeates, 
1996).  A study by Rivera et al. (1994) revealed that family cohesion, social support, and 
parental control were associated with better adaptive behaviour and functional outcomes after 
TBI.  The importance of the family environment for moderating outcome after TBI has been 
emphasised more recently by Yeates, Taylor, Walz, Stancin, and Wade (2010).  Similarly, 
Crowe et al. (2012) revealed that intellectual, social, and behavioural function post injury was 
influenced by socioeconomic status, family burden, and parental mental health.  In addition, 
Moffitt (2005) has suggested a role of genetic factors, in particular the interplay between genetic 
factors and environmental factors on anti-social behaviour.  Some studies, however, have 
indicated cognitive and behavioural difficulties remained when pre-injury differences and 
familial factors have been accounted for (Anderson et al., 2005; McKinlay et al., 2009).  Other 
factors may mediate these difficulties including the biological pathophysiology of the injury and 
the stage of development at the time of injury.  Severity, size of lesion and frontal damage has 
been associated with greater behavioural difficulties (Chapman & McKinnon, 2000; Levin et al., 
1993).  In addition, it is suggested behavioural difficulties may be explained by 
neuropsychological difficulties in particular deficits in executive functioning, social problem 
solving, understanding of emotion and pragmatics, caused by damage to brain regions involved 
in social cognition (Yeates et al., 2004).  Tonks et al. (2011) have reported greater social 
difficulties, measured by the SDQ, in a group of children who had sustained a TBI compared to 
their peers and also reported some correlations between these difficulties and measures of 
executive functions and processing speed.  
In summary TBI causes several residual deficits which impact on the individual, their 
families, and society.  The traditional view that TBI sustained during childhood may reduce 
these deficits has been contradicted by more recent findings.  Instead the developing brain 
appears more vulnerable to greater damage and deficits resulting from a TBI.  Cognitive, 
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emotional, behavioural, and social difficulties have been reported.  There is growing research 
suggesting a link between childhood TBI and offending.   
 
1.3 Moral Reasoning  
 
1.3.1 Definition of moral reasoning 
 Moral is defined as “concern with principles of right and wrong behaviour” and 
“examining the nature of ethics and the foundations of good and bad character” (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2004, pp.922).  Moral reasoning is the process of considering what is right and 
wrong in thoughts, behaviours and actions (Moll, Zahn, Oliveira-Souza, Krueger & Grafman, 
2005; Wainryb, 2004).  It is considered crucial for adaptive and appropriate social function 
(Dooley et al., 2010) and interpersonal interactions (Moll et al., 2005). 
 
1.3.2 Moral reasoning and offending behaviour 
One of the factors underpinning offending behaviour is moral reasoning.  Moral 
reasoning “promotes and enhances socially appropriate and positive behaviours while regulating 
and inhibiting inappropriate or negative behaviours” (Dooley et al., 2010, pp. 152).  Mature 
moral reasoning involves an appreciation of wider society and is considered to prevent 
delinquent behaviour (Gibbs, 2010).  Palmer (2003) theorised that immature moral reasoning 
leads to a generation of cognitive schemas used by individuals to support their illegal behaviour.  
Palmer (2012) reported that offending behaviour usually occurs at the less mature stages of 
moral reasoning.  Gibbs (2010) suggested that “developmental delay in moral judgement” 
(pp.135) coupled with distorted cognitions and social skills were common across perpetrators of 
illegal behaviour.  Gibbs (2010) suggested that cognitive distortions may contribute to the 
relationship between moral reasoning and offending behaviour and may enhance the egocentric 
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reasoning.  These cognitive distortions may include attribution biases, minimisation, and 
mislabelling.    
There is some inconsistency in the literature surrounding this relationship.  There are 
some studies which have not found any difference in moral reasoning, measured by the 
Kohlbergian Moral Stories, between female offenders and non-offenders (Watt, Frausin, Dixon, 
& Samuels, 2000) or between male offenders and normative data from the general population 
(Griffore & Samuels, 1978).  A positive correlation was reported between moral reasoning and 
psychopathy; however, this appeared to be mediated by intellectual functioning (O’ Kane, 
Fawcett, & Blackburn, 1996).  Despite this, performance on a moral reasoning measure has 
predicted behavioural disturbance (Blair, Monson, & Frederickson, 2001).  In addition, a greater 
number of studies have demonstrated lower moral reasoning in adult offenders (Stevenson, Hall, 
& Innes, 2003; Thornton & Reid, 1982) and delinquent adolescents (Blasi, 1980; Campagna & 
Harter, 1975; Chandler & Moran, 1990; Gavaghan, Arnold, & Gibbs, 1983; Gibbs, 2003; Gregg, 
Gibbs, & Basinger, 1994).  Palmer and Hollin (1998) revealed significantly lower reasoning in 
delinquents across all of the moral constructs.  They also reported a gender difference, with 
higher reasoning in female offenders.  However, Raijmakers, Engels, and Van Hoof (2005) 
reported a negative correlation between moral reasoning and offending behaviour in young 
adults, irrespective of gender.  Meta-analyses have revealed lower levels of moral reasoning in 
delinquents which are unexplained by levels of intelligence or socioeconomic status (Nelson, 
Smith, & Dodd, 1990; Stams et al., 2006).  In addition, lower levels of moral reasoning have 
been shown to correlate with reoffending (Van Vugt et al., 2011).  In summary, it appears, 
therefore, that there is a direct correlation between moral reasoning, legal order, and society 
function (Beauchamp & Anderson, 2010).    
Manual based treatment programmes for antisocial behaviour have targeted moral 
reasoning.  The EQUIP programme, designed to “teach youth to think and act responsibly 
through a peer helping approach” (Gibbs, Potter, & Goldstein, 1995), focuses on three areas: 
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teaching pro-social skills; altering pro-aggressive beliefs; and moral development.  A study 
demonstrated EQUIP’s effectiveness in reduction in antisocial beliefs and aggressive in a group 
of 57 males juvenile offenders (Leeman, Gibbs, & Fuller, 1993).  This supports the relationship 
between moral reasoning and antisocial behaviour.  In a smaller study, Manchester, Wall, 
Dawson, and Jackson (2007) adapted this programme and delivered it to three TBI survivors 
with high levels of aggression and bullying behaviour and demonstrated some reductions in 
aggression and bullying.  These programmes are in their infancy but suggest a focus on moral 
reasoning led to improvements in antisocial behaviour.  
Furthermore, cognitive and emotional processes which depend on the frontal areas of the 
brain are believed to underpin moral reasoning and are, therefore, likely to be disrupted 
following a TBI.  This argument lends weight to the existence of a relationship between TBI and 
offending behaviour.  This chapter will review the literature examining the relationship between 
brain injury and moral reasoning, after a consideration of the theories and assessments of moral 
reasoning.   
 
1.3.3 Moral reasoning theories 
Theoretical accounts of moral reasoning differ in the way in which they view the 
underlying processes, in particular the involvement of cognition and emotion.  Cognitive 
developmental theories have suggested moral reasoning development is dependent on cognitive 
development and socialisation.  Piaget (1968) emphasises the importance of logical reasoning 
and socialisation for progression through the two stages of moral development.  In the first stage, 
heteronomous, moral decisions are based on rules, obedience, and the perceived consequences of 
an act.  In the next stage, the autonomous stage, reached by adolescence, decisions are made by 
incorporating others perspectives and agreed rules designed to promote justice and fairness.  
This theory was criticised as it did not explain development beyond childhood (Langdon, Clare, 
& Murphy, 2011). 
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Kohlberg (1969; 1976) expanded this interpretation to incorporate the social perspective 
taking theory (Selman, 1971).  He argued that this was paramount to moral reasoning as it 
provided opportunities for conflict, resolution, and consideration of other people’s views which 
develops mature moral reflection.  Cognitive maturity supports this process (Walker & Taylor, 
1991).  Kohlberg (1969; 1976) proposed a three stage theory each with two levels.  In the early 
stage, preconventional, moral reasoning is based on an individual’s perspective and their own 
wishes before progressing to the next level which incorporates others’ wishes in a mutual 
pragmatic encounter.  In the next stage, conventional stage, the individual begins to appreciate 
the groups’ collective view.  Finally, in the post conventional stage, the individual makes moral 
decisions by merging the different values of others with the overarching rules, before developing 
and applying the consideration of universal ethical principles.  Kohlberg and Gilligan (1971) 
proposed that 80% of boys meet the stage of pre-conventional moral reasoning by adolescence.  
This theory has, however, received criticism in that it did not appear applicable across cultures 
(Simpson, 1974).  The higher stages were absent in some cultures and this was attributed to the 
focus on western philosophies (Snarey, 1985).  It was also not a reliable measure across genders 
(Gilligan, 1982) and neglected emotions (Sullivan, 1977).   
The theory was refined to overcome these criticisms by Gibbs et al. (1992; Gibbs, 2003; 
2010) in the Sociomoral Stage Theory summarised in Table 1.  This proposes that moral 
maturity develops in four stages over two levels.  In the first level, immature moral reasoning, 
the individual focuses on salient features of a situation and then progresses to make decisions 
based on pragmatic reciprocity e.g. help someone then they will help you (stage two).  With 
further development, they reach mature moral reasoning, where they consider pro social 
understanding of care, emotional states, and good conduct to make decisions.  In the next level 
they consider society and incorporate social structures, conscience, and social justice.  Gibbs et 
al. suggested the mature stage was reached by late adolescence/ early adulthood.  It is argued 
that cognitive maturation encourages a more balanced and wider perspective in managing and 
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resolving the conflict that arises in social situations.  It enables a process of decentration 
whereby the individuals can move their focus from salient features to incorporate the wider 
societal and cultural context (Gibbs, 2003; 2010; Gibbs et al., 1992).  This theory of moral 
reasoning has demonstrated validity across several different cultures, age groups, and offending 
populations (Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007).  This is important given the argument 
that moral reasoning is context dependent (Krebs & Denton, 2005).  
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Table 1: Gibbs Sociomoral Stage Theory (Gibbs, 2003; 2010; Gibbs et al., 1992) 
Level  Stage Description 
Immature  Stage 1: Unilateral and 
Physicalistic  
Reasoning is driven by salient here and now 
factors.  They are driven by appeals to 
authority and physical status.  Rules are 
viewed in absolute terms.  Justifications are 
based on avoidance of physical consequences. 
 Stage 2: Pragmatic exchanges Moral decisions are made in relation to 
interactions with others.  They are concerned 
with pragmatic deals or exchanges, and 
practical benefits. 
Mature  Stage 3: Mutual and pro-
social 
Reasoning is concerned with the interpersonal 
expectations of empathic role-taking, intrinsic 
concern, pro-social intentions, and generalised 
caring or valuing.  Decisions incorporate 
intrapersonal factors. 
 Stage 4: Systemic and 
Standard 
Moral reasoning is concerned with social 
structure in life including; requirements, basic 
rights; values, responsibilities, and obligations.  
Individuals consider their character and 
conscience. 
 
In support of this, Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma (1999) suggest that moral schemas 
exist in the long term memory store and are developed through re-occurrence of sociomoral 
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situations and cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957).  The experience of situations which 
cannot be understood with current schemas encourages a more complex integrated way of 
thinking.  Education, age, social stimulation (Rest, 1986) and cognitive flexibility are all vital in 
this process (Endicott, Bock, & Narvaez, 2003) to consider alternative solutions, tolerate 
ambiguity, and reach a decision.   
Overall, these theories agree that moral maturation is influenced by cognitive factors and 
social experience.  Cognitive flexibility, part of executive function, is considered particularly 
important alongside other executive functions such as inhibition, the utilisation of 
representational knowledge and the generation of different response possibilities (Eslinger, 
Flaherty-Craig, & Benton, 2004).  In support of this, studies have reported correlations between 
moral reasoning and cognitive development (Lee, 1971; Tomilinson-Keasey & Keasey, 1974), 
inhibition, and abstract reasoning (Cottone, Drucker, & Javier, 2007).  Furthermore, large 
samples of children from the general population have demonstrated a significant positive 
relationship between intelligence and moral reasoning development (Hoffman, 1977; Johnson, 
1962).  These developmental theories have been criticised as they have focused more on 
cognitive factors and less so on emotional developmental factors (Dooley et al., 2010).   
Gibbs et al. (1992; Gibbs, 2003; 2010) suggest emotion processes, in particular empathy, 
are also important to moral reasoning, alongside cognitive factors.  Hoffman (2000, 2008) also 
highlights the importance of empathy; as the human concern for others through vicarious 
reactions to others’ experiences; as if you are in their shoes.  He suggests moral behaviour is 
driven through the bonding of moral principles and empathy, where cognitive representations 
become charged with empathic affect (e.g., in cognitive conflict) and individuals think about the 
impact on others.  He indicates, therefore, that empathy is the primary motivator of moral 
behaviour (Miller, Eisenberg, Fabes, & Shell, 1996).  Whilst these theories may place differing 
amounts of emphasis on the role of empathy, they both consider the relevance of empathy in 
conjunction with cognitive factors.  Theoretically, as cognitive factors are important for the 
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development of empathy, alongside biological readiness, cognitive factors remain important for 
moral reasoning.  Hoffman is consistent with previous theories that cognitive decentration 
enables the wider appreciation of others’ distress as separate to own (Hoffman, 2000; 2008).  A 
study has revealed correlations between empathy and moral reasoning in a learning disability 
population (Langdon, Murphy, Clare, Stevenson, & Palmer, 2011). 
 An alternative perspective is the social intuitionist model of moral judgement (Haidt, 
2001).  This proposes moral judgements and actions are based on intuition, a sudden automatic 
and effortless decision, and that cognitive processes are only required to construct the post-hoc 
justifications.  This is often referred to as the “hot” system.  Intuitions are believed to emerge 
without language, are culturally shaped and become sharper and more accessible with 
experience (Haidt, 2001).  Haidt (2001) proposes that moral judgement is effective even in time-
limited situations when effortful, slow, cognitive processes are not possible.  In support of this, 
according to the somatic marker hypothesis, Damasio (1994) suggests that during socio-
emotional decision making, signals from the body indicative of emotional response, somatic 
markers, trigger rapid decisions in the absence of cost-benefit analysis.  The somatic marker 
hypothesis also proposes that decisions can be made using “as if” representational emotional 
states.  This emotion-based decision-making considered to depend on the insula and the VMPFC 
(Damasio, 1994; 1996).  The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT, Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & 
Anderson, 1994) is believed to be an experimental analogue of real-world emotion-based 
decision making.  A study has revealed anticipatory skin conductance (SCRs) in risky 
advantageous decisions, on the IGT, in a healthy comparison group, supporting the somatic 
marker hypothesis (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997).  Conversely, the study 
revealed absent SCRs and poor decisions on the IGT in individuals with VMPFC damage, which 
suggested that the VMPFC is important for emotion-based decision making (Bechara, Damasio, 
Tranel, & Damasio, 2005).  This perspective suggests that the cognitive processes, often referred 
to as the “cold system”, are considered to occur secondary, to block intuitive responses (Blasi, 
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1990) and develop alongside frontal lobe maturation.  These mirror the two systems of decision 
making; the intuitive, automatic and rapid mode; and the controlled, deliberate and slow mode 
(Kahneman, 2003).  An opposing view, however, may be that intuition is created as a 
consequence of historical effortful cognitive processes.   
There appears, therefore, to be inconsistency in theories regarding the processes 
underpinning moral reasoning.  Greene and Haidt (2002) propose both cognitive and emotional 
processes are important in their dual processing theory.  Controlled cognitive processes are 
important in utilitarian decisions, in the promotion of the greater good; whereas personal 
decisions are driven by emotional processes.  
In summary, the theories do not reach a consensus about what specific processes 
underpin moral judgements.  Instead they propose two processes may be at work, on the one 
hand, controlled cognitive processes such as cognitive flexibility and inhibition, and on the other 
hand emotional processes such as, empathy and intuitive processes.  The next section will 
consider the research findings from neuroimaging and studies of brain injury in relation to the 
theories discussed above.  First of all, consideration needs to be given to the different ways of 
assessing moral reasoning. 
 
1.3.4 Assessments of Moral reasoning 
There are different ways of measuring moral reasoning.  The main difference is between 
recognition and production measures.  Traditionally, moral reasoning was assessed using 
recognition measures, where the respondent is asked to choose a justification that matches their 
own reasoning in relation to a moral dilemma.  Examples of recognition measures are Defining 
Issues Test (Rest, 1975), Sociomoral Reflection Objective Measure (SROM, Gibbs et al., 1984), 
and Moral Theme Inventory (MTI, Narvaez, Gleason, Mitchell, & Bentley, 1999). These are 
compared to production measures, where the respondent has to verbalise their own reasoning in 
response to a moral question.  It is thought that production measures provide a more valid 
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measurement and reduce the social desirability responding bias (Langdon, Murphy, Clare, & 
Palmer, 2010).  Examples of production instruments are the Moral Judgement Interview / 
Standard Issue Moral Judgement (MJI / SIMJ, Colby & Kohlberg, 1987), the Sociomoral 
Reflection Measure-Short form (SRM-SF, Gibbs et al., 1992) and So Moral and So Mature 
(Dooley et al., 2010).     
Langdon et al. (2010) demonstrated that a production measure, SRM-SF, had greater 
utility than a recognition measure, MTI, in a group of individuals with intellectual disabilities.  It 
was proposed that the MTI may have been more complex and placed greater cognitive demands 
than the production measure, SRM-SF (Langdon et al., 2010).  The SRM-SF corresponds to 
Gibbs et al. (1992) theory.  It has 11 questions about moral values and asks respondents to 
describe the importance of each value and justification.  These are examined to determine moral 
stage.  It can be administered as a questionnaire or an interview.  It is a favoured production 
measure as it is shorter and less complex than others (Langdon et al., 2010).  It distinguishes 
between delinquent and non-delinquent children of differing ages and correlates with the MJI, 
indicating good validity alongside high levels of internal consistency, test-retest reliability, and 
cross cultural validity amongst different age groups (Gibbs et al., 1992; Gibbs et al., 2007).  It 
has also been used to assess moral reasoning in individuals with brain injury (Couper et al., 
2002). 
Another measure is hypothetical scenarios (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley & 
Cohen, 2001).  These have been used with individuals who have survived a brain injury and 
include personal moral, non-personal moral and non-moral scenarios.  This measure asks 
respondents to state what they would do in the scenario but does not ask for justification.  The 
absence of justification may reduce the reliability of this measure, as incorporating justifications 
in assessment are considered to reduce the social desirability bias (Langdon et al. 2010).   
More recently a measure, So-Moral and So-Mature, has been developed to be used with 
individuals who have survived a brain injury (Dooley et al., 2010).  The task presents moral 
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dilemmas and individuals are asked to respond and explain their reasoning which is scored based 
on Kohlberg’s theory.  It has high internal consistency, ecological, and construct validity.  This 
measure, however, determines moral reasoning ability according to a theory which has been 
criticised.  In addition, it is still in its infancy and it has yet to demonstrate the level of 
effectiveness in measuring moral reasoning demonstrated by long established measures such as 
the SRM-SF. 
   
1.3.5 Moral reasoning and neuropathology 
This chapter so far has highlighted that moral reasoning is believed to involve two brain 
processes: intuition; and more deliberate effortful cognitive processes (Greene, Nystom, Engell, 
Darley & Cohen, 2004).  It is widely accepted that the proposed executive function and 
emotional processes rely on the PFC.  The DLPFC is recruited for executive functions including 
working memory, planning, cognitive flexibility and inhibitory control which are important 
when solving complex decisions (Knabb, Welsh, Ziebell, & Reimer, 2009; Rankin, 2007).  The 
VMPFC is important for emotional responsitivity (Koenigs et al., 2007) and emotion-based 
decision-making (Damasio, 1994).  Furthermore, the VMPFC continues to develop into early 
adulthood and reaches maturation after completion of DLPFC at about 25 years (Samango-
Spouse, 2007).  This is in keeping with the later maturation of moral reasoning (Gibbs et al., 
1992) and possibly supports the view of cognitive and emotional processes in moral reasoning.   
In addition, the neuroimaging findings of activation in the PFC during moral reasoning 
(Raine & Young, 2006), alongside posterior cingulate, and amygdala/angular gyrus support the 
role of these processes in moral reasoning.  In support of this, further studies have highlighted 
the role of PFC in moral or prosocial behaviour and a study has reported correlations between 
PFC impairment and antisocial behaviour (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio 
1999).  Furthermore, deception has been associated with activation in PFC and anterior cingulate 
(Abe et al., 2006).  In addition, a correlation between PFC grey matter volume and ratings on the 
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psychopathology checklist has been reported (Yang et al., 2005).  Paxton and Greene (2010) 
have reviewed neuroimaging studies which have provided support for the involvement of 
cognitive processes in moral reasoning.  The DLPFC has been activated whilst making moral 
judgements (Borg, Hynes, Van Hom, Grafton, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006; Reniers et al., 2012), 
and during personal and difficult moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2004).  Additionally, there has 
been a correlation between activation of DLPFC and moral judgement competence (Prehn et al., 
2008).  Furthermore moral decisions, in particular utilitarian decisions, were seen to be slowed 
down when engaged in a task requiring cognitive load (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystom, & 
Cohen, 2008).   
In summary these neuroimaging studies have indicated that the PFC is important for moral 
reasoning.  The activation of the PFC, known to be important for executive function and emotion 
processing in moral reasoning, are supportive of the involvement of executive function and 
emotion processes in moral reasoning.  It may be that damage to different areas of the PFC 
impacts on moral reasoning in different ways.  It has been proposed that VMPFC damage causes 
deficits in emotional responding, damage to the anterior cingulate causes deficits in cognitive 
conflict and damage to the DLPFC causes deficits in abstract reasoning, and that overall this 
disrupts moral reasoning (Greene et al., 2004; Koenigs et al., 2007).   
The findings of increased activation of the PFC in moral reasoning may explain the 
association between TBI and offending behaviour.  It is widely accepted that frontal temporal 
damage including damage to the PFC is common after TBI (Bigler, 2007) and therefore disrupts 
the functions of the VMPFC and DLPFC in moral reasoning.  In addition, the frontal lobe is 
believed to be particularly vulnerable to diffuse axonal injury following a TBI.  Diffuse axonal 
injury disrupts the connections between the frontal lobe and other areas of the brain and has 
negative implications as the frontal lobe is important for control and organisation of messages 
from other areas of the brain.  Increased behavioural difficulties are expected when there is 
disruption between frontal and limbic regions of the brain (Lillie et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2003).  
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The relationships between the frontal lobe, in particular PFC, and moral reasoning may explain 
in part, therefore, the findings of higher prevalence of offending behaviour following TBI 
(Perron & Howards, 2008; Timonen et al., 2002; Williams et al., 2010).   
The exploration of the impact of TBI on moral reasoning warrants further exploration, as 
does the possible involvement of executive function and emotion processes, as an integrated 
view is yet to emerge (Knabb et al., 2009).  A greater understanding of the cognitive and 
emotional processes underpinning moral reasoning is important for economic and criminal 
interest (Zak, 2004) as it will influence psychological, medical and environmental interventions 
to promote prosocial behaviour in wider society (Moll et al.,  2005) which may predict and 
prevent criminal behaviour (Knabb et al., 2009).  This chapter will now continue by reviewing 
the findings from studies exploring the impact of brain injury on moral reasoning and highlight 
any co-morbid deficits.  
 
1.4 Moral reasoning and acquired brain injury 
 
1.4.1 Literature review 
A literature search was performed separately on Medline and PsycInfo to identify studies 
which had explored moral reasoning after acquired brain injury.  Initially the search was “brain 
in*” and “head in*” combined with “moral*” to encompass all derivatives.  This was 
streamlined combining “moral*” with “traumatic brain injury (TBI)” or “acquired brain injury 
(ABI)” or “brain”, “head” or “cerebral” AND “injury”, “insult”, “damage”, “trauma” or 
“lesion”.   
The search was performed within certain parameters, the selected language was English; 
and only peer reviewed journals were included.  No parameters were set on age or on year of 
publication.  The search revealed 66 articles on Medline and 46 articles on Psychinfo.  The titles 
were reviewed and selected if there was mention of acquired brain injury and social/ behaviour 
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function.  The abstracts were read to select the articles that measured moral reasoning after brain 
injury.  Eleven studies were identified and a search of their reference lists revealed further two 
articles.  A summary of the studies are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2 Studies measuring moral reasoning in survivors of brain injury 
Author  Type Sample size  
(localisation)  
Group 
(Lesion: N) 
Mean age 
(SD) 
Age at 
injury 
(years) 
Assessment Moral 
reasoning 
outcome 
Price, Daffner, 
Stowe, & 
Mesulam (1990) 
 
Case 
Studies  
2 
(PFC) 
Non 28 
24 
Birth 
4 years 
SIMJ Impaired  
Gratton & 
Eslinger (1992) 
 
Case study 
 
1 
(FL) 
Non 33  7  Abbreviated 
MJI  
Impaired 
Anderson, 
Bechara, 
Damasio, Tranel, 
& Damasio 
(1999) 
Case 
studies 
2 (PFC) Non 20 
23 
15 months 
3 months 
SIMJ Impaired 
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Couper et al. 
(2002) 
Cross 
sectional 
group 
comparison 
28 FL:16 
HC:12 
13.3 (2.6) 
11.5 (2.7) 
>3 years 
prior. 
SRM-SF FL group 
significant  
lower moral 
reasoning 
(p<.001) 
Dooley et 
al. (2010) 
Cross  
Sectional 
Group 
Comparison 
51 TBI: 25 
HC: 26 
13.8 (2.1) 
15.2 (2.6) 
Child So-Moral and 
So-Mature 
TBI group 
scored lower, 
not significant. 
Effect size = 
0.17 
Beauchamp,  
Dooley, & 
Anderson (in 
press) 
Cross 
sectional 
group 
comparison 
91 TBI: 25 
HC: 66 
13.34 (1.63) 
13.95 (1.27) 
11-19 So-Moral and  
So-Mature  
TBI group 
significantly 
lower moral 
reasoning (p < 
.0001).  Effect 
size = 0.45. 
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Sayer & Damasio 
(1991) 
Case study 1 
(VMPFC) 
 
Non 35 Adult SIMJ Preserved 
Ciaramelli, 
Muccioli, 
Ladavas, & di 
Pellegrino (2007) 
Cross 
sectional 
group 
comparison 
19  VMPFC:7 
HC:12  
55(6.8) 
57.3 (6.3) 
Adult Hypothetical 
scenarios  
(Greene et al., 
2001) 
VMPFC group: 
more violations 
on personal 
dilemmas 
(p<.05). 
 
Anderson, 
Wisnowski, 
Barrash, 
Damasio, & 
Tranel (2009) 
Case 
studies 
7  
(PFC) 
Non 4-32 early 
childhood 
Behavioural 
assessment 
6 with severe 
impairment 
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Moretto, 
Ladavas, 
Mattioli, & de 
Pellegrino 
(2009) 
 
Cross 
sectional 
group 
comparison 
33 VMPFC: 8  
BDC: 7  
HC: 18 
 
53.1 (10.8) 
52.7 (16.6) 
  
 
adult  Hypothetical 
scenarios  
VMPFC group 
faster for 
personal moral 
(p<.05) 
 
Koenigs et al. 
(2007) 
Cross 
sectional 
group 
comparison 
30 VMPFC: 6 
BDC: 12  
HC:12  
Adult Adult Hypothetical 
scenarios  
VMPFC group 
more violations 
in personal 
moral (p<.05). 
 
Thomas, Croft & 
Tranel, (2011) 
Cross 
sectional 
group 
comparison 
29 VMPFC: 9 
BDC: 9  
HC: 11 
 60.2 (8.0) 
60.2 (11.2) 
59.8 (8.5) 
Adult Hypothetical 
scenarios  
VMPFC group 
made more 
violations in 
personal moral 
(p<.05) 
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Martins, Faisca, 
Esteres, Muresun 
&  Reis, (2012) 
Cross 
sectional 
group 
comparison 
70 TBI: 29 
HC:  41 
29.31 (5.89) 
27.98 (5.73) 
Adult Hypothetical 
Scenarios 
More violations 
in personal 
moral (p<.05) 
in the TBI 
group. 
HC = healthy comparison group; BDC = brain damaged comparison group; FL = frontal lesion; VMPFC = ventromedial PFC; MJI = Moral 
Judgement Interview (Kohlberg, 1969); SIMJ = Standard Issue Moral Judgement (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987); SRM-SF  = Sociomoral Reflection 
Measure Short Form, (Gibbs, Basinger & Fuller, 1992); So Moral, So Mature (Dooley et al., 2010); p = level of statistical significance  
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 1.4.2 Child onset 
 
1.4.2.1 Cases studies 
Gratton and Eslinger (1992) described the case of DT, who had normal development 
but experienced an injury to her frontal lobe at 7 years of age.  She was assessed at 33 years 
of age. She had difficulties in areas of psychosocial development, social functioning, 
interpersonal relationships, and conforming to rules.  Her performance on the abbreviated 
MJI showed reasoning, at pre-conventional stage.  She also had difficulties in self regulation, 
executive function, and empathy.  In everyday life she engaged in interpersonal conflicts, 
demonstrated poor judgement, and failed to conform to social rules.  The authors 
hypothesised that the deficits in developing and applying knowledge were a consequence of 
the self regulation and executive functioning difficulties.  Given her low empathy, they did 
not discount the role of emotion in moral reasoning.  The omission of psychometric 
properties of the abbreviated measure limited reliability of the study findings.  
Price et al. (1990) reported cases, GK and MH who had experienced frontal lobe 
damage at birth and 4 years old respectively.  When they were assessed at 33 years and 26 
years respectively, both had histories of delinquent behaviour and poor interpersonal 
relationships.  The assessments revealed impaired moral reasoning on the SIMJ.  They had 
average intelligence but impairments in empathy and executive functioning particularly 
mental flexibility.   
Similar findings were revealed by Anderson et al. (1999) in their assessments of ML 
and FD who had experienced PFC damage at 3 and 15 months retrospectively.  They 
experienced difficulties including poor academic achievement and interpersonal relationships 
alongside disruptive, socially unacceptable, and criminal behaviour.  Despite average 
intelligence, performance on the SIMJ revealed impaired moral reasoning when assessed in 
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adulthood.  Neuropsychological assessment revealed deficits in rule learning and working 
memory.  They also failed to demonstrate anticipatory skin conductance responses (SCRs) in 
a gambling task indicating disruption in emotion processing.   
Overall, these case studies enabled in-depth exploration of social and cognitive 
development in relation to specific lesions (Graffton & Eslinger, 1992) and captured 
individual complexity and uniqueness (Barker, Pistrang & Elliot, 2002) which would have 
been lost in a group design (Shallice, 1979).  Across the studies early frontal damage has 
been associated with deficits in moral reasoning in later adulthood.  The deficits have 
occurred within a context of preserved intelligence, stable backgrounds and normal 
development pre-injury.  Furthermore, the difficulties have emerged a few years post injury 
which is consistent with the current neuropsychological theories about protracted deficits.   
The studies have revealed additional deficits in assessments of executive function and 
emotion processes.  These findings, therefore, support the dual processing theory.  However, 
these studies reported individual cases and, therefore, this limited the generalisability to the 
wider population.  In addition, measurements were at a single time-point and longitudinal 
studies examining changes over the development period may be more useful.  Also, the 
selected measures may have reduced the reliability of the findings.  The particular production 
measures selected in these studies have been criticised for their length and complex coding, 
and have not been standardised in a brain injury population (Dooley et al., 2010).  
Furthermore, adaptations to the measures compromise comparisons between the studies and 
further impact on the generalisability of the results to the wider population.  
 
1.4.2.2 Group designs 
Some studies have examined moral reasoning in group designs to increase 
generalisation.  Anderson et al.  (2009) assessed seven individuals who had experienced PFC 
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damage between prenatal and 5 years of age.  They were assessed between 4 and 30 years of 
age and despite average intelligence, six individuals were severely impaired on social 
function which included ability to comply with moral standards, laws, and rules.  Judgements 
were made by a neuropsychologist based on parental interview as well as academic, medical, 
and mental health history.  Methodological weaknesses may have affected the reliability and 
generalisability of this finding as the measure was not standardised and did not focus on 
moral reasoning specifically.  Furthermore, there may have been researcher bias as the 
judgements were made by a single person, aware of the purpose, in the absence of inter-rater 
reliability. 
Other studies have replicated these findings using recognised measures and a 
comparison group.  Couper et al. (2002) have reported significantly lower moral reasoning 
stage in a group of children who had experienced frontal lobe injuries compared to an aged 
matched healthy comparison group.  Methodological aspects strengthened the generalisability 
of these findings, including explicit inclusion criteria and no significant differences between 
groups on socioeconomic status and age.  The study also used the SRM-SF which is a shorter 
production measure than the MJI.  The study did not control for injury severity and the 
comparison group had higher intelligence.  Also, the study did not report inter-rater 
reliability, vital to ensure reliable scoring of the SRM-SF.  These factors may, therefore, have 
limited the reliability of the results.   
Dooley et al. (2010) suggested that the length and complexity of existing moral 
reasoning measures reduced the ecological validity for the TBI population.  They examined 
moral reasoning, using their own measure, in adolescents with TBI of differing severity in 
comparison to a healthy aged matched group.  The comparison group scored higher on the 
task indicating a small to medium effect size, but this was not significant.  Strengths of this 
study were the matched comparison group, no significant differences in maternal occupation, 
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age, or intelligence.  Nevertheless, whilst the study revealed differences between the groups, 
this was not reported to be significant.  The authors attributed the non significant finding to 
the over-representation of mild TBI in the sample.     
A recent study revealed significantly lower moral reasoning in adolescence with TBI, 
using the same measure (Beauchamp et al., in press).  This study indicated that the TBI 
groups, mild and moderate-severe, gave fewer moral responses and demonstrated a lower 
level of maturity in their justifications compared to a matched healthy comparison group.  
The TBI groups also displayed significantly lower levels of empathy.  In addition, the study 
revealed positive correlations between moral reasoning and intellectual functioning, and 
empathy.  This study provides further evidence that moral reasoning is impaired after a TBI 
in adolescence of differing severity.  It also revealed a relationship between moral reasoning 
and empathy.  However, in both studies, they have not yet demonstrated that this measure is a 
reliable measure of moral reasoning, including inter-rater reliability, nor evidenced that the 
measure placed fewer demands on cognitive load e.g. working memory and information 
processing compared to other measures.  This may reduce the reliability and generalisability 
of these findings.  The studies indicated areas for further research in examining the impact of 
moral reasoning later in the developmental trajectory and examining the relationship between 
moral reasoning and cognitive factors, such as executive functioning. 
Overall, most of the group and case studies concur that moral reasoning is affected 
following a brain injury in childhood.  Some of the studies also highlight co-existing deficits 
on assessments of executive functioning and emotional processes.  This finding may support 
the theories which have suggested that both executive functioning and emotion processes are 
involved in moral reasoning (Greene & Haidt, 2002) alongside other factors such as social 
experience (Kohlberg, 1976).  The generalisability of these findings is limited by 
methodological weaknesses.  Furthermore, they captured single time-points in childhood/ 
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adolescence.  Whilst a longitudinal study would be helpful to track the trajectory, in the 
interim, an assessment of moral reasoning later in the developmental trajectory, for example, 
at a time of more independence, such as in early adulthood may be useful for understanding 
the impact of TBI on moral reasoning.   
  
 1.4.3. Adult studies 
Studies examining moral reasoning following injury in adulthood have revealed 
different findings.  Saver and Damasio (1991) reported case EVR, who at 35 years of age 
experienced VMPFC damage, in the presence of an unremarkable developmental history.  
Assessments revealed no difficulties in moral reasoning (SIMJ) and reasonable performance 
on neuropsychological assessments.  The generalisability of this finding to the wider 
population is limited as it is a single case study. 
Group studies have supported these findings.  Ciaramelli et al. (2007) compared seven 
individuals with VMPFC injury in adults to matched controls.  When presented with 
hypothetical personal and impersonal moral dilemmas, the clinical group were significantly 
faster, suggesting impulsivity, and endorsed more moral violations in personal dilemmas.  
This impairment was attributed to a failure to predict self focused and emotional 
consequences of the decisions, consistent with VMPFC importance in emotion-based 
decision-making (Damasio, 1996).  Methodological strengths included the matched control 
group on age, education and gender, adaptations to the method to manage fatigue, and a 
significant finding; these support reliability and subsequently generalisability.  A weakness 
was that the measure was converted to Italian with no standardisation and the study focused 
on one lesion area. 
Koenigs et al. (2007) have replicated these findings in their comparison of six 
individuals with VMPFC damage to 12 individuals with damage to other areas of the brain.  
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Using similar scenarios, the study found significantly greater inappropriate responses in 
personal moral dilemmas in the VMPFC group in comparison to the other groups.  It was, 
therefore, proposed that overall moral knowledge was intact, but that the absence of 
emotional reaction in the VMPFC group impaired their performance on personal scenarios.  
Further improvements could be made by having an equal number of participants in both 
groups, by assessing time since injury, and by a more detailed description of the inclusion/ 
exclusion criteria for the clinical control groups.  
These findings were further replicated by Moretto et al. (2009) in their comparison 
between eight individuals with VMPFC injury, seven individuals with damage to other brain 
areas and seven healthy controls.  The study demonstrated increased anticipatory SCRs in the 
personal moral dilemmas in the control and “other lesion” group but, not in the VMPFC 
group.  The authors concluded brain injury, specifically damage to the VMPFC, may disrupt 
moral reasoning, but only in relation to scenarios which require affective evaluation.  Clear 
methodological strengths included the use of brain injured comparison groups, and no 
significant differences in age, gender, education or clinical features, which enhanced the 
generalisability of these findings.  The study did not, however, examine the impact of damage 
to other areas of the frontal lobe or discuss the differences observed in age since injury and 
lesion volume.   
Thomas et al. (2011) made adaptations to the dilemmas to create indirect personal 
scenarios from first and third person perspective.  Samples included individuals with VMPFC 
damage (n=9), those with damage to other areas of the brain not considered involved in 
emotion processing (n=9), and 11 healthy controls.  The pattern of performance was 
replicated in the VMPFC group, regardless of whether direct or indirect personal dilemmas, 
indicating that the VMPFC is vital for making high conflict personal moral decisions.  
Methodological strengths included equal number matched control groups (age and 
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education), and set inclusion criteria of months since injury.  This homogeneous sample 
increased internal validity of the study but may however, have reduced the generalisability of 
the findings to the wider population.     
More recently, Martins et al.  (2012) hypothesised that the findings of abnormal 
utilitarian decisions in personal moral dilemmas following brain injury were due to 
impairment in emotional processing, causing moral decisions to be made via cognitive 
processes.  They compared 29 individuals who had experienced a TBI on the hypothetical 
personal moral scenarios with a healthy comparison group.  They reported a larger number of 
inappropriate, utilitarian responses in the TBI group compared to the healthy comparison 
group, in the personal dilemmas.  There were less inappropriate responses in the TBI group 
with damage to the DLPFC compared to a group with damage to the other parts of the PFC.  
Furthermore, the comparison group appeared to take longer than the TBI group when giving 
a utilitarian response, which the authors suggested was due to resolution of the conflict.  They 
also revealed a negative correlation between number of utilitarian responses and performance 
on a social emotion recognition task.  Martins et al. (2012) attributed their findings to 
diminished responsitivity to emotional load accompanying the personal moral dilemmas 
following a TBI.  The TBI group did not display any difficulties on cognitive tasks. 
Overall, there was a consistent finding that brain injury in adulthood does not impair 
all aspects of moral reasoning (Anderson et al., 1999).  However, impairments are observed 
following VMPFC damage in personal moral dilemmas and this was attributed to impairment 
in emotional functioning.  The significant findings and the good methodological quality of 
these studies support generalisability of the findings to the wider population.  Improvements 
are possible, however, as the studies did not report reliability or validity of the measures, for 
a brain injury population.  The studies did not incorporate the varying lengths of time since 
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injury in the analysis.  All studies reported matched groups, but not all incorporated measures 
of economic status or family background, factors known to be important in moral reasoning.   
 
1.4.4 Summary of literature review  
In summary, there was more evidence for deficits in moral reasoning after a brain 
injury in childhood than in adulthood.  In addition, co-morbid difficulties were observed in 
domains of executive and emotional functioning in adults following childhood injury.  These 
deficits may underpin moral reasoning deficits, which support the dual processing theory 
(Greene & Haidt, 2002).  The generalisability of these findings is limited as the evidence is 
mainly from case studies.  Furthermore, some of the group comparison studies did not find 
significant differences.  The group studies have also focused on assessment during 
childhood/adolescence; they have not examined the impact on an injury later in the 
developmental trajectory.  They also have not investigated the relationship between moral 
reasoning and specific executive function and emotional processes.  The absence of moral 
reasoning deficits after injury sustained in adulthood may suggest that after years of decision 
making and applying social rules, with preserved cognitive and emotional development, most 
moral decision making is automatic and, therefore, robust following brain injury (Anderson et 
al., 1999).  This is aside from decisions about personal moral dilemmas which appears reliant 
on emotional processing and the VMPFC (Anderson et al., 1999).   
 
1.5 Summary, rationale, and aims of the current study 
This chapter began by presenting the impact of TBI on brain pathology, cognitive, 
social, emotion, and behaviour functioning.  There seems to be a consensus that a TBI during 
childhood has a greater impact than the original understanding.  One of the main areas 
highlighted was the deficits in behaviour; particularly the association between TBI and 
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offending behaviour.  This chapter highlighted the importance of moral reasoning to the 
criminal justice system and societal welfare.  Theories of moral reasoning have suggested a 
dependence on cognitive and emotion processes.  These processes rely on areas of the brain 
that are commonly damaged in a TBI and, therefore, moral reasoning may be impaired after a 
TBI.  Such moral reasoning difficulties may explain the behavioural and social difficulties 
commonly reported following a TBI (Beauchamp et al., in press) including the increased risk 
of offending following a brain injury (Williams et al., 2010).  If this is found, it may suggest a 
clinical need to assess moral reasoning following paediatric brain injury to guide early 
intervention to improve social and behavioural functioning both in community and clinical 
justice settings.  It would also contribute to theoretical understanding of moral reasoning and 
the processes underpinning it.  In addition, it would enhance the wider understanding of the 
impact of TBI on brain development and moral reasoning.  There has been growing interest 
in this and some studies have examined the association between brain injury and moral 
reasoning.  The literature review included in this chapter revealed that deficits may exist 
following a brain injury, with greater disruption following a childhood onset.  However, there 
have been only a few group studies with small sample sizes and methodological weaknesses.  
Given the potential clinical and theoretical implications, the relationship between brain injury 
and moral reasoning needs to be explored further so that more robust conclusions can be 
drawn.   
No group studies have examined the impact of a brain injury at a later stage in the 
developmental trajectory.  This is important given the growing research suggesting that the 
true extent of a TBI is not understood until early adulthood.  A particular period of interest is 
17-25 years of age when moral reasoning should be entering the mature stage (Gibbs et al., 
1992).  This is also a stage of crucial development in terms of independence, developing 
meaningful relationships, and making choices about the direction of their future lives.  In 
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addition, the literature to date has failed to reach a consensus about what particular processes 
are important to moral reasoning (Knabb et al., 2009).  To address these gaps in the field, this 
study aims to explore the impact of a brain injury on moral reasoning in early adulthood.  To 
this end, it will compare a group of individuals between 17 and 25 years who have 
experienced a TBI with an aged matched healthy comparison group on measures of moral 
reasoning.  Studies have used different measures to capture moral reasoning.  This study will 
use the SRM-SF.  This measure has been chosen as it has good reliability and validity and has 
been used within the brain injury and learning disability populations.  Furthermore, it reduces 
the social desirability bias as it asks for justifications, and can be administered as an interview 
which will be helpful in overcoming cognitive difficulties.  The study will also explore the 
relationship between moral reasoning and empathy, emotion-based decision making, and 
executive function (inhibition and cognitive flexibility). 
It is hoped that this study will provide a greater understanding of possible deficits 
after a TBI, alongside the factors underpinning moral reasoning.  This will contribute to our 
theoretical understanding of moral reasoning, and will have clinical implications for brain 
injury services.  In addition, a better understanding could help inform and develop targeted 
interventions for immature moral reasoning, for example, programmes such as EQUIP, and 
could contribute to enhance outcomes.  There could also be financial benefits for society in 
the long term, if identification and improvements in moral reasoning were supported.   
  
1.6 Research Question and Hypotheses 
 
1.6.1 Primary 
The primary question is whether individuals with TBI aged 17 to 25 years have lower 
moral reasoning (measured by the SRM-SF) relative to the comparison group.  The literature 
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has indicated that TBI is commonly associated with damage to the fronto-temporal regions 
(Bigler, 2007, Salmond et al., 2006; Wallesch et al., 2001).  Given the involvement of the 
PFC in moral reasoning (Raine & Young, 2006), the late maturation of these structures 
(Samango-Sprouse, 2007), and the findings from the literature review, the first hypothesis is 
that survivors of TBI (aged 17-25 years) will have lower scores on the SRM-SF (moral 
reasoning) than the comparison group.  Moral reasoning has been shown to correlate highly 
with intellectual functioning (Langdon et al., 2010), and brain injury can disrupt intellectual 
functioning (Levin, 2012).  This study predicts, however, that the difference between the 
groups will remain when intelligence is controlled in the analysis.   
 
 1.6.2 Secondary 
Research studies have provided mixed evidence to support the notion that moral 
reasoning (measured by SRM-SF) is associated with executive functioning and emotion.  
After the consideration of the literature, this study predicts that moral reasoning will be 
associated with these processes.  Exploratory questions will, therefore, be addressed in both 
groups. 
The study will address whether moral reasoning is associated with executive 
functioning performance.  A second hypothesis is made that individuals with higher moral 
reasoning will have less executive functioning difficulties in everyday situations (negative 
correlation). 
Another question will assess whether moral reasoning relates to cognitive flexibility. 
It is hypothesised that individuals with higher moral reasoning will have higher cognitive 
flexibility (positive correlation). 
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A fourth question aims to explore whether moral reasoning relates to inhibition.  A 
fourth hypothesis is made that individuals with higher moral reasoning will have higher 
inhibition (positive correlation). 
A fifth question is whether moral reasoning relates to empathy.  A fifth hypothesis is 
made that individuals with higher moral reasoning will have greater empathy (positive 
correlation). 
A final question is whether moral reasoning relates to emotion-based decision 
making.  This study proposes a sixth hypothesis, that individuals with higher moral reasoning 
will have better performance on an emotion based decision making task (positive 
correlation). 
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Chapter Two 
Method 
 
This chapter details information on the design, participants, measures, procedure, 
analyses plan, and ethical considerations for the study. 
 
2.1 Design 
This was a cross-sectional study with a between groups design. The independent 
variable was group (with two levels: brain injury vs. no brain injury), and the dependent 
variable was moral reasoning.  It also utilised a within-subjects correlational design to 
conduct exploratory analyses of the relationships between moral reasoning and performance 
on measures of executive functioning, empathy, and emotion-based decision-making.  The 
correlations were conducted in the TBI group and then separately in the healthy comparison 
group.   
The study attempted to match the groups on age and sex by recruiting participants 
from the same age range and gender.  Any differences in age, sex, IQ, socioeconomic status 
revealed post hoc were controlled for.  Furthermore, the range in severity of injury was also 
included as a confounding variable where appropriate. 
 
2.2. Participants 
2.2.1 Sample size 
To estimate sample size, for Hypothesis 1, a power calculation was conducted on G 
Power 3.1.  The effect size was determined using the means (TBI M = 225.6; Healthy 
comparison group M = 250.14) and standard deviations (SD = 25.9; SD = 34.4) from moral 
reasoning scores in a clinical group of children with frontal lobe lesions and healthy controls 
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(Couper et al., 2002).  An effect size of .81, power of .80, alpha significance level of .05 with 
one tailed hypothesis revealed a sample size of 20 in each group required to reach statistical 
significance in an independent t-test, or a total sample size of 52 for an ANCOVA with IQ as 
the covariate.   The power calculation used large effect sizes and therefore the sample size 
was conservative. 
For the secondary exploratory hypotheses (2-6), correlations reported between moral 
reasoning and cognitive functioning were r=.58 (Tomlinson-Kearsey & Kearsey, 1974) and 
between r=.20 and r=.53 with aspects of executive functioning (Cottone et al., 2007).  Using 
the same parameters this indicated a sample size of between 14 and 153 participants.  The 
generalisability of these correlations may be compromised by use of a selective religious 
group and there were higher correlations in other studies.  In a non offender and offender 
population with and without intellectual disabilities correlations between SRM-SF and 
similarities, digit span and other WAIS subtests ranged between r=.52 and r=.86 and with 
empathy, r=.33 (Langdon et al., 2011).  A medium to large effect size of .45 was, therefore, 
used and indicated a total sample size of 58 participants with 29 in each group which was 
rounded to 30.  Given the small sample size, these correlations were preliminary and 
exploratory and caution was taken in interpretation.    
 
2.2.2 Inclusion criteria 
The following inclusion criteria were set to ensure internal validity of the study.    
 This study was interested in examining the impact of TBI on moral reasoning ability 
in individuals who are aged between 17 and 25 years.  This is an interesting period in 
development as the frontal lobes are still developing and maturing in structure and 
function (Samango-Sprouse, 2007) and these are believed to be important for the 
cognitive and emotion processes underlying moral reasoning. 
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 Individuals who have experienced a TBI.  This was chosen as the study aimed to 
explore the impact of frontal lobe damage on moral reasoning and TBI is commonly 
associated with fronto-temporal damage (Bigler, 2007).  It was not possible to recruit 
individuals with specific frontal damage as this information is rarely available after a 
brain injury.  In particular, CT scan data is often available and it can detect gross 
lesions and swelling but it does not have sufficient spatial resolution to detect discrete 
grey/ white matter changes, diffuse axonal injury, frontal, or temporal damage 
(Salmond et al., 2006).  Research with more advanced technology has suggested TBI 
is associated with damage to frontal and temporal areas (Salmond et al., 2006) and 
therefore, this study was interested in the impact of TBI on moral reasoning ability.   
 Individuals with English Language as their first language.  This was to ensure they 
were able to participate and comprehend the test instructions.    
 Individuals able to understand the study information and give informed consent. 
 Individuals who were at least six months post-injury and were medically stable.  This 
was consistent with other studies in the literature, providing time for initial recovery, 
for example, to ensure brain swelling may be resolved (Noppens & Brambrink, 2004) 
 
 2.2.3 Exclusion Criteria 
The following exclusion criteria were set to reduce confounding variables.   
 A diagnosis of a developmental disorder, attentional disorder, a learning disability, 
mental health difficulties, drug or alcohol dependency.  Individuals with these 
conditions had to be excluded as these factors are known to interfere with cognitive 
and emotional processing (Brown, Tapert, Granholm, & Delis, 2000; Rucklidge & 
Tannock, 2002) 
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 Severe aphasia which would disrupt their ability to participate or understand test 
instructions, which in turn may cause distress for the individuals. 
These criteria were discussed with the teams and were verified by the researcher during initial 
meetings. 
 
2.2.4. Recruitment 
Participants for the TBI group were recruited from NHS and voluntary Brain Injury 
organisations in East Anglia.  These included Addenbrookes Hospital, Cambridgeshire; Brain 
Injury Rehabilitation Trust, Ely; Colman Centre for Specialist Rehabilitation, Norwich; 
Community Brain Injury Team, Peterborough; Cambridge Centre for Paediatric 
Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, Cambridge; Evelyn Community Head Injury Service, 
Cambridge; and Headway, Norfolk and Waveney; and Cambridgeshire; and Oak Farm 
Neurological Rehabilitation Centre, The Select Care group, Norwich.  Participants were also 
recruited via health professionals that work within the Child Brain Injury Trust. 
The researcher contacted each team.  They were informed about the study and offered 
the opportunity for their site to be a participant identification site.  Once the teams had agreed 
and the researcher had received ethical and NHS permission, they were asked to distribute the 
participant information sheets to individuals who met the study criteria (Appendix C).  
Individuals who expressed an interest were asked to sign a consent form (Appendix D) which 
enabled their contact details to be shared with the researcher.  The researcher also recruited 
other participants in the TBI group using the volunteer database at the Developmental 
Neuropsychology Research Group, University of East Anglia.  She contacted individuals who 
had given their permission for their details to be held on this register and to be contacted 
about research studies.  The researcher made contact with all eligible and willing participants, 
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via telephone or email, reassessed eligibility and arranged a date and time suitable for the 
data collection.     
The researcher contacted several schools and colleges in the surrounding area about 
the study to recruit the healthy comparison group.  The researcher received support from 
Springwood High School, Kings Lynn, and the University of East Anglia, Norwich (UEA).  
Students at these establishments were informed about the study and interested individuals 
were encouraged to contact the researcher.  Participants were recruited from the UEA via an 
undergraduate psychology student database, adverts on the Medical school website, and 
posters.  To enhance recruitment, posters about the study with further contact information 
were placed in public areas (Appendix E).  When the researcher was contacted through either 
method, eligibility was reassessed and a suitable time and place to meet for the assessment 
session was arranged.  
 
2.2.5 Sample Characteristics. 
 34 individuals were recruited to the comparison group.  Participants were screened 
prior to the assessment session to ensure they met the eligibility criteria.  20 survivors of TBI 
were recruited to the TBI group.  They were recruited from brain injury organisations and 
NHS trusts in East Anglia.  Clinicians used their clinical judgement when approaching 
potential participants.  An additional six individuals declined participation in the study.  The 
total sample was recruited from The Brain Injury Rehabilitation Trust, Fen House, Ely, 
(n=1); Addenbrookes (n=1); Colman Centre for Specialist Rehabilitation, Norwich (n= 3); 
Evelyn Community Head Injury Service, Cambridgeshire (n= 7); Headway, Cambridgeshire 
(N= 1); Headway, Norfolk and Waveney (N= 5); Oak Farm Neurological Rehabilitation 
Centre, Select Healthcare group (n=1), and UEA volunteer panel (n=1).   See Tables 3, 4 and 
5 the sample characteristics of both groups. 
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Table 3 Sample characteristics of both groups.    
 
Group N Mean age (SD) Sex 
(M:F) 
Socioeconomic status (n: %) 
1 2 3 4 5 
HC 34 20.76 (2.51) 14:20 12 
(35.3) 
6 
(17.6) 
4 
(11.8) 
7 
(20.6) 
5 
(14.7) 
TBI 20 21.75 (2.27) 10:10 6 
(35.3) 
3 
(17.6) 
3 
(17.6) 
2 
(11.8) 
3 
(17.6) 
Socioeconomic status categories (Office of National Statistics, 2010): 1= Managerial, 
administrative and professional occupations; 2= Intermediate occupations; 3= Small 
employers and own account workers; 4= Lower supervisory and technical occupations; 5 = 
Semi-routine and routine occupations.  SES missing data in TBI n=2. 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics for age at testing for TBI group.  Data are frequency and 
percentage values 
 
Age  Frequency Percentage 
17 0 0 
18 1 5 
19 3 15 
20 4 20 
21 2 10 
22 2 10 
23 2 10 
24 4 20 
25 1 5 
26
1
 1 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 25 years of age when approached about the study. 
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics for age at testing for HC group.  Data are frequency and 
percentage values 
Age Frequency Percentage 
17 3 8.8 
18 5 14.7 
19 4 11.8 
20 4 11.8 
21 7 20.6 
22 1 2.9 
23 3 8.8 
24 4 11.8 
25 3 8.8 
 
  
 2.2.5.1 Injury characteristics 
 Information was collected on the nature of injury (for a summary see Table 6 and 7).  
The majority of the participants sustained their injury between 15 and 19 years of age.  This 
was consistent with previous research which has indicated this was one of the high risk times 
for sustaining a TBI (Langlois et al., 2004; Yates et al., 2006).   
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Table 6 and 7 Descriptive statistics for age at injury and time since injury for the TBI group.  
Data are frequency and percentage values.  Age at injury (frequency of time since injury) 
 
 Age (years) 
 0 – 4 5 – 9 10-14 15 – 19 20-25 
Frequency (N) 2 1 0 14 3 
Percentage (%) 10 5 0 70 15 
N = 20 
 
 Time since injury 
 < 1 year 1-2 years 2-5 years 5-10 years Over10 years 
Frequency 2 2 8 4 4 
Percentage 10 10 40 20 20 
N = 20. 
 There was a variation in the cause of the injury.  The majority were as a result of a 
road traffic accident but other injuries were sustained by falls, assaults and as a result of a 
fairground ride.  Two participants were still within the first year of recovery.  It was not 
possible to comment on the localisation of the injury due to the absence of MRI data.  
 Severity was captured by the GCS.  This was available for 11 participants.  The 
majority, 10, had GCS scores consistent with a severe TBI.  One participant was recorded as 
having a mild TBI due to the GCS.  Determination of severity from GCS can be limited as 
there is variability in the stage it is recorded.  The GCS scores were not available for the other 
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participants, but each participant reported loss of consciousness for over 30 minutes which 
satisfies the Mayo classification for a moderate to severe head injury (Malec et al., 2007).   
 
Table 8 Descriptive statistics for severity and type of TBI.  Data are frequency and 
percentage values. 
  Frequency Percentage (%) 
Severity 
(GCS) 
Mild 1  5 
Medium   
Severe 10 50 
Unreported 9 45 
Type RTA-Driver 3 15 
RTA- Passenger 3 15 
RTA – Pedestrian 4 20 
RTA – Motorbike 2 10 
RTA – Cyclist 1 5 
Fall 4 20 
Assault 2 10 
 Other 1 5 
N = 20.  GCS = Glasgow Coma Scale; Severity score: Mild (13+), Moderate (9-12) and 
Severe (3-8).  RTA = road traffic accident 
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2.3 Measures 
This section describes the measures which were used in this study.  Measures were 
selected that assessed moral reasoning, cognitive flexibility and inhibition, everyday 
executive functioning difficulties, empathy, and emotion-based decision making.  Further 
information was collected to capture other relevant variables.  The researcher recorded 
demographic information and conducted an assessment of intellectual functioning.    
 
2.3.1 Demographic Information 
 Participants were asked their age and sex.  Additional information about the injury 
was requested from the individuals in the brain injury group.  They were asked the date of the 
injury and for their permission to contact the service to obtain information about the severity 
of the injury.  The services were contacted and asked for GCS (Teasdale & Bennett, 1974) or 
duration of loss of consciousness or PTA(Russell & Smith, 1961).   
 
2.3.2 Socioeconomic status  
Socioeconomic status was calculated using the National Statistics Classification 
System (Office of National Statistics, 2010), the National Statistics socioeconomic 
classification, self coded version.  Participants were asked their occupation and details on the 
size of organisation, supervisory, and management responsibilities.  Participants in the TBI 
group were asked their occupation at the time of the injury.  If they were a student they were 
asked information on their parents’ occupation and if they were unemployed they were asked 
information on their previous employment.  This information was then placed onto a grid to 
provide the National Statistic Social Economic Classification Class code.  These codes 
related to five classes - managerial, administrative, and professional occupations; 
intermediate occupations; small employers and own account workers; lower supervisory and 
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technical occupations; and semi-routine and routine occupations.  This method has been 
designed to improve the previous methods of identifying classification.  It aimed to produce a 
standardised tool to be used in government and academia with improved population 
coverage.  The previous methods have been criticised as being outdated and lacking in 
conceptual rationale and clear allocation rules (Rose & Peralin, 2005).  The self coded 
version is clear and rigorous.  Although it is quicker it has an agreement level of .87 with the 
full interview version (Rose & Peralin, 2005).  
  
2.3.3 General Intellectual functioning 
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – Second Edition II (WASI II; 
Wechsler, 2011) assesses intellectual functioning.  It is a revised version of the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence I (Wechsler, 1999).  The revisions have enhanced the 
likeness to the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale- fourth edition (Wechsler, 2008), user-
friendliness and psychometric properties (Wechsler, 2011).  It is standardised for individuals 
aged between 6 and 89 years.  It comprises of four subtests; vocabulary, similarities, block 
design and matrix reasoning which yield the full scale IQ.  There is a manual that provides 
standardised instructions for administration and scoring of the subtests.  The scores are then 
compared to age related norms to derive the individuals suggested level of intellectual ability.  
The assessment takes between 20 and 30 minutes to administer.  It has good internal 
consistency ranging from .95 to .97, good test-retest correlation of .91, and good validity 
correlating with WAIS IV, .92 (Wechsler, 2011).   
 
2.3.4 Moral reasoning 
The SRM-SF is an interview based assessment of moral reasoning.  It comprises of 11 
questions related to moral values; Contract, Truth, Affiliation, Life, Property, Law, and Legal 
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Justice.  Respondents are asked to rate the importance of these as very important, important, 
or not important e.g. “In general how important is it for someone to tell the truth?” and their 
justifications.  There are instructions and rules in the manual.  These are used to score the 
justifications.  The scores are combined, averaged and multiplied by 100 and related to moral 
stage, ranging from 1 (100) to 4 (400).  Stage 1 = 100-125; Transition Stage 1 (2) = 126-149; 
Transition Stage 2 (1) = 150-174; Stage 2 = 175-225; Transition Stage = 2 (3) 226- 249; 
Transition Stage 3 (2) = 250-274; Stage 3 = 275-325; Transition Stage 3 (4) = 326-349; 
Transition Stage 4 (3) = 350-374; Stage 4 = 375-400.  The measure has demonstrated good 
internal consistency of .92, test-retest reliability of .88 and cross cultural validity of .69 
(Gibbs et al., 1992).  The researcher undertook several hours of self-training, provided in the 
manual, to ensure reliability.  In addition, an expert rater provided inter-rater reliability.  
Inter-rater reliability was conducted on 19% of the data set indicated an intraclass correlation 
r = .94, p < .001.  This exceeded the value of .80 suggested by Gibbs et al. (1992).  A copy of 
the SRM-SF can be found in Appendix G. 
 
2.3.5 Executive function  
These are standardised assessments appropriate for this age range.  Each has a manual 
with set instructions which ensures reliability.  Each manual also has age related norms which 
are used to convert the raw scores into scaled scores with a mean of 10.   
 
2.3.5.1 Cognitive Flexibility [Verbal Fluency (VF); Delis-Kaplan Executive 
 Function System; Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001 (DKEFS)] 
Individuals are asked to generate as many words in a minute under three different 
conditions; beginning with a set letter (verbal fluency), from a set category (category fluency) 
and alternate between two set categories (category switching).  The category switching was 
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used to measure cognitive flexibility.  It has reasonable internal consistency, ranging from .43 
to .85 (Delis et al., 2001) and validity (Swanson, 2005).   
 
2.3.5.2 Inhibition [Color-word inference (CWI); DKEFS] 
This assesses an individual’s ability to inhibit an over-learned verbal response of 
reading a written colour word to name the colour of the ink.  The time taken was calculated to 
compute the raw score.  It has good internal consistency .75-.82 and validity (Delis et al., 
2001).  The scores on a separate subtest, colour reading were recorded to control for this 
variable.   
 
2.3.5.3 Dys-executive questionnaire [DEX, Behavioural Assessment of the 
 Dysexecutive Syndrome (Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, Emslie & Evans, 1996)]. 
The DEX assesses difficulties associated with everyday executive dysfunction and 
comprises 20 questions.  Examples of the questions include “I act without thinking, doing the 
first thing that comes to mind” and “I do or say embarrassing things in the company of 
others”.  Respondents are asked to rate frequency of behaviours on a 5 point likert scale from 
0 “never” to 4 “very often”.  The items are added to give the total score.  It is considered a 
sensitive measure of executive functioning difficulties (Bennett, Ong, & Ponsford, 2005).  It 
has good concurrent and ecological validity (Chamberlain, 2003).  There can be problems 
with insight following a brain injury and as a consequence there is sometimes a distortion in 
an individual’s awareness of difficulties (Bond, 2008).  The DEX, therefore, has an additional 
form to be completed by an independent rater and this was sent to carers of the participants in 
the TBI group to complete with appropriate consent.  Recent research involving Rasch 
analysis has suggested the DEX does not measure one dimension construct and instead 
captures three domains of executive function (Simblett & Bateman, 2011; Simblett et al., 
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2012).  The three constructs included: Executive Cognition functions, which captures the 
higher level processes responsible for controlling and directing automatic function through 
planning, monitoring and switching; Behavioural-emotional self-regulation, is believed to 
capture processes implicated in emotional and reward processing in the absence of cognitive 
resources; and Metacognition function, is responsible for integrating the other domains to 
shape personality and social interaction.  The correlation between moral reasoning and total 
DEX and these domains will be explored.     
 
2.3.6 Empathy (Empathy Quotient, Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) 
The Empathy quotient (EQ) is a self report measure comprising of 60 items, 40 which 
pinpoint empathy and 20 filler items (Appendix G).  Responses are on a four point likert 
scale ranging from definitely disagree to definitely agree.  The 40 items are given a score of 1 
or 2 based on strength of empathic response.  It has good validity correlating with other 
measures of empathy (Lawerence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004) and is able to 
identify Aspergers Syndrome (Baron Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004).  It has good reliability 
with internal consistency correlation of .85 (Muncer & Ling, 2006).  It was valid for brain 
injury population (Adlam, Dunn, Gracey, Menon, & Adams, 2009; de Souza et al., 2010) and 
has good reliability.  Furthermore, Adlam et al. (2009) reported no difference between the 
empathy scores reported by survivors of the TBI and the EQ completed about them by 
relatives/spouse/carers/partners.  De Souza et al. (2010) reported good reliability without 
proxy ratings. 
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2.3.7 Emotion-based decision making (Intuitive Reasoning Task, Dunn et al. 
2010) 
The IRT has evolved from the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994).  The computer screen 
displays four decks of cards at the top and a card in the centre of the screen.  Participants 
have 3 seconds to pick a card from four possible decks at the top of the screen and guess 
whether it will be the same colour as the card in the centre.  Participants receive feedback and 
money increases or decreases if correct or incorrect respectively.  There are 100 trials and 
final score range from -100 to 100.  The outcomes of each deck are predetermined by the 
computer; Deck A and B are more profitable as six out of ten responses are correct and Deck 
C and D are less profitable as four out of 10 responses are correct.  To succeed on the task, 
participants have to select cards from the profitable decks and avoid the unprofitable decks.  
The intuitive ability is determined by their ability to learn this strategy and calculated by the 
total number of selections from the two profitable decks minus the total selections from 
unprofitable decks over the 100 trials.  These can also be broken down into five blocks of 20 
selections to examine the learning over the trials.  The higher scores indicate better emotion-
based decision making.     
The reinforcement schedule is designed to be out of the participant’s conscious 
awareness and this was confirmed by a validation study (Dunn et al., 2010).  Participants 
were asked several questions to explore their conceptual and hunch understanding of the 
reinforcement schedule.  This revealed minimal conscious awareness of the reinforcement 
schedule despite an increased tendency to select more profitable decks indicative of intuitive 
learning.  Also, bodily responses differentiated between profitable and unprofitable decks.  It 
revealed more anticipatory bodily responses associated with selection from profitable decks.  
This relationship, therefore, was consistent with the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 
1994) and indicative of a test of emotion-based decision making. Dunn et al. (2010) designed 
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this task to overcome some of the criticisms of the IGT uncovered in the review (Dunn, 
Dalgleish & Lawrence, 2006).  These included reduced cognitive load (e.g. working 
memory).  It has included different versions with positions and cards counterbalanced to 
control for biasing effects and set up to allow as many selections from each deck.   
 
2.6 Ethical Considerations 
The main areas for ethical considerations will be summarised below (Field & Hole, 
2003).  The research study was reviewed by the Hertfordshire NHS Ethical Committee in a 
proportionate review and granted favourable ethical approval (Appendix A).  Permission was 
sought from the relevant Research and Development Departments.  This was granted by 
Cambridge University Hospitals NHS foundation trust (Addenbrookes), the Cambridge 
Community Services NHS Trust (Community Brain Injury Team, Peterborough; Evelyn 
Community Head Injury Service, Cambridge), Cambridge and Peterborough NHS 
Foundation Trust (Cambridge Centre for Neuropsychological Rehabilitation Team) and 
Norfolk Community Health and Care NHS Trust (Colman Centre for Specialist 
Rehabilitation, Norwich).  Copies of these approval letters can be found in the Appendix B.  
Further ethical approval was sought from Brain Injury Rehabilitation Trust (Appendix A).  
Following NHS and ethical approval, the researcher liaised with the managers of the services 
and from other non-NHS services to ensure they were happy for the study to run in their 
service.   
 
2.6.1 Informed consent 
This study took several procedural steps at recruitment and assessment stages to 
ensure each participant gave informed consent.  The researcher asked teams to provide details 
about the study to individuals or alternatively asked schools to distribute information about 
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the study in an email to students who were able to give informed consent.  Individuals who 
contacted the researcher after seeing the poster advertisement were sent further information 
on the study.  Every participant was given a participant information sheet to provide more 
information and invite them to participate in the study.  This explained that participation 
would be voluntary and their decision would not affect their standard of care.  Interested 
participants could contact the researcher or alternatively they gave their consent for their 
clinical team to make contact.  The researcher contacted them, gave them an opportunity to 
ask questions and ensured that they were able to give their informed consent.  This was 
repeated at the assessment session.  Participants that were able to give their informed consent 
were asked to sign the consent form.  It was reiterated that they could withdraw at any time 
when their information would be destroyed.   
The study sought an independent rater for the DEX questionnaire in the brain injury 
group.  This was someone who knew the participant well.  An information sheet explaining 
the study, what was required from them, consent form and the questionnaire were either 
given in the session, if the identified person was present, or sent to them with contact details 
for the researcher and stamped addressed envelope.  They were asked to return the 
questionnaire and consent form to the researcher.   
 
2.6.2 Coercion 
To ensure the study was free from coercion, the participants were informed about the 
study by people unconnected to it.  They were given a participant information sheet, time to 
consider the information (at least 24 hours) and contact numbers for further details.  It was 
reinforced that their decision would not affect their standard of care.    
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2.6.3 Managing risk and distress 
 The researcher carefully considered possible areas of risk and psychological distress 
and implemented strategies to manage this. 
Steps were taken to minimise the burden on participants.  Every participant was asked 
to read an information sheet which explained what they would be asked to do in the study.  
This was to ensure all the participants were fully informed about the length, duration, and 
tasks involved in the study before they were asked to give their informed consent to it.  They 
were informed at the beginning that they could withdraw from the study at any point if they 
changed their mind.  To minimise fatigue and ensure the participants were able to perform at 
their best, the researcher offered regular breaks.  The researcher also explained that in the 
event of fatigue, she could visit on another day to complete the task or alternatively the 
questionnaires could be completed outside the session and returned by post, in a stamped 
addressed envelope.   
 The researcher did not anticipate that the nature of the assessments was likely to cause 
distress for participants.  However, she was aware that participants might become distressed 
if they perceived underperformance on neuropsychological assessments.  The researcher 
reiterated phrases to minimise this distress including “I would not expect anyone to get 
everything right”.  “I can see you are trying really hard, well done”.  If the participant became 
distressed at any point, it was planned that the session would be terminated, data destroyed, 
and clinical team informed.  For participants in the comparison group they would be 
encouraged to contact their GP.  This was not necessary in any assessment session.  If the 
participant wished to make a complaint about the conduct of the study they were given a 
number on the participant information sheet to do so. 
 To reduce the burden on participants, the researcher conducted the assessment 
sessions in the homes of the participants.  To ensure her safety and minimise any risk, the 
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researcher adhered to the lone worker policy for Cambridge and Peterborough NHS 
Foundation Trust (CPFT, 2008). 
 
2.6.4 Confidentiality  
Several steps were taken during the course of the study to ensure confidentiality.  These were 
fully explained to the participants on the participant information sheets.  Firstly, the 
participant had to agree and sign a consent form to allow their details to be given to the 
researcher.  Secondly, participants in the study were assigned a unique participant number to 
retain anonymity under which all data were entered on the computer database.  This was 
stored on an NHS encrypted memory stick.  Thirdly, the consent forms were stored in a 
locked filing cabinet separate from the assessment data which had the unique participant 
number to ensure data could be destroyed if consent is withdrawn.  Fourthly, a locked 
briefcase was used to transport data during visits.  Finally, data will be stored for a minimum 
of 5 years (Good practice guidelines of psychological research within the NHS; British 
Psychological Society, Cooper, Turpin, Bucks & Kent, 2005). 
 
2.4 Procedure 
Participants for the study were recruited by the methods outlined in the recruitment 
section.  At the assessment sessions, the researcher revisited the participant information sheet 
with the participants, they had an opportunity to ask questions and were reminded they could 
take a break and/or withdraw their consent at any time.  They were asked to sign a consent 
form, (Appendix D), after reading the participant information sheet.  Participants in the TBI 
group were asked for their consent to inform their clinical team about their participation and 
share the summary of standardised measures with the clinical team.  Participants in the 
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healthy comparison group were asked for their consent to inform their GP that they have 
participated in this research study.  A copy of this letter can be found in Appendix F. 
All participants were asked their age, sex and details about their occupation or parents 
occupation.  Following this the assessments were administered, WASI (20 minutes), SRM-SF 
(20 minutes), CWI (5 minutes), VF (5 minutes) IRT (25 minutes), EQ (10 minutes) and DEX 
(10 minutes).  The administration of these measures was counterbalanced across participants 
to reduce fatigue, interference, and potential practise effects which can arise when 
assessments are administered in the same order.  The counterbalanced test order was based on 
a Latin square design; this can be found in Appendix H.  The anticipated duration of the 
assessments was between 90 and 120 minutes.   If it took longer or if the participant required 
several breaks, they were offered the opportunity to return the questionnaires by post and 
given a stamped addressed envelope, or alternatively the researcher visited for another 
session.  As a consequence the questionnaires were removed from the counterbalanced test 
order to enable them to be completed outside the assessment session. 
It was planned that if at any time the participant experienced distress, the session 
would be stopped, reasons for distress explored, and the participant would be encouraged to 
contact the clinical team or their GP, or the researcher sought permission to do this.  This did 
not happen at any of the sessions. 
Consent was sought from the TBI group to contact a family member to complete the 
DEX.  If given, a participant information sheet (Appendix C), consent form (Appendix D) 
and DEX (10 minutes) was sent by post or given in the session if the selected person was 
present.   
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2.5 Plan for analysis 
 All the data including demographic information and scores on the assessments were 
entered onto a database on PASW version 18 statistics programme.  The demographic 
information recorded was sex, age, and SES.  The scores recorded into the database for each 
participant were the total scores for SRM-SF, DEX, and EQ.  The age-adjusted scaled scores 
were recorded for WASI II, VF and CWI.  The total selections from profitable decks minus 
unprofitable decks were recorded for the IRT. 
 
2.5.1 Preliminary analyses  
Preliminary analyses were conducted to check parametric assumptions of: normal 
distribution; homogeneity of variance; interval data; and independence.  The interval data and 
independence of test scores were decided by the study design.  Data were, therefore, 
examined to ensure that they were normally distributed and had equality of variance.  This 
included checks on the SRM-SF, EQ, CWI, VF, the DEX and IRT scores for each group 
separately. 
To check whether the data were normally distributed, the histograms for the data for 
each measure were inspected (Appendix J and K).  The researcher also conducted an 
objective test, the Shapiro- Wilk test, to decide whether the sample data for each test were 
normally distributed.  If the test was non significant (p>.05), the distribution was not 
significantly different to a normal distribution.    
To check the assumption of homogeneity of variance, the variance in each group 
needed to be roughly equal.  This was performed using the Levine’s test.  If the test was 
significant (p<.05) then the variances were significantly different.   
The study aimed to control the confounding variables of age by recruiting individuals 
between 17 and 25 years in both groups and tried to ensure an equal distribution of sex.  The 
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researcher conducted further preliminary checks to see if there were any significant 
differences between the groups on the other confounding variables age and IQ.  The 
assumption of normal distribution was met for IQ but not the assumption of equal variance, 
therefore, an independent t-test was conducted to compare the difference between the two 
groups, equal variance not assumed.  Parametric assumptions were not met for age, and 
therefore the difference between the groups was explored using a non parametric equivalent, 
a Mann Whitney test.  In either case, a significant finding indicated there were differences 
between the groups on these variables.   
   Other potential confounding variables were sex and SES.  These data sets were 
categorical and, therefore, were analysed using a Chi-Square test. 
 
2.5.2 Hypothesis 1  
The sample data for each group SRM-SF were normally distributed and had equal 
variance therefore the parametric test assumptions were fulfilled.  The difference between 
group 1 (TBI group) and group 2 (healthy comparison group) were analysed using a between-
subjects t-test.  There were significant differences between the groups on the confounding 
variable, IQ, and IQ significantly correlated with the dependent variable in each group 
separately.  An ANCOVA was used to eliminate the confounding variable, IQ, from the 
analysis.  An ANCOVA was still used, despite the Levine’s test indicating the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance had been violated.  This decision was based on two reasons, an 
ANCOVA is considered quite robust against these violations (Field, 2009).  T-tests and F 
tests have been shown to be robust against violations of assumptions of parametric tests.    
Boneau (1960) has demonstrated accurate t-test results when assumptions of homogeneity of 
variance and normality have been violated in several different situations.  Furthermore, the 
difficulties of skewed data were overcome in sample sizes of 25 to 30.  Boneau (1960) 
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concluded that t-tests and f-tests were robust providing the sample sizes and variance were 
roughly equal.  Furthermore, an additional test of homogeneity of variance, the variance ratio 
(Pearson & Hartley, 1954), conducted by comparing the variance in both groups, indicated 
that the ratio was within the necessary limits to imply equal variance (Field, 2009).   
 Exploratory analyses were conducted to see if there were differences across the 
domains of moral reasoning, using t-tests.  The normal distribution assumption was violated 
in the TBI group across Truth, Life, Property, Law and Legal Justice domains (SRM-SF).  
Despite the findings from Boneau (1960) caution was applied and the differences between the 
groups on these domains were explored using, non-parametric equivalent, Mann-Whitney 
test.  In order to use an ANCOVA to explore the differences, controlling for IQ, 
bootstrapping was applied as it was a robust way to overcome violations to a normal 
sampling distribution (Efron & Tibshurani, 1993; Field, 2013).  Normality in the data 
provides information on the shape of the sampling distribution, as this is unknown in small 
samples.  Bootstrapping works by empirically deriving the sampling distribution from the 
sample, by treating the data as a population and taking several smaller samples from this, 
calculating the mean from each sample and the sampling distribution.  From this standard 
error can be computed and robust calculations of the confidence interval and significance 
level are determined.  There was a significant difference if the confidence interval does not 
cross zero (Field, 2013) and has a significant p value.  Bootstrapping was applied to 5000 
samples, using bias corrected accelerated 95% confidence intervals.  Bootstrapping is not 
applied to the F value but to the confidence intervals and statistical values. 
 
2.5.3 Hypothesis 2-6 
Each of these hypotheses were concerned with determining whether there was a 
relationship between moral reasoning and executive function, cognitive flexibility, inhibition, 
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empathy and emotion-based decision making.  For each hypothesis the data were analysed to 
see if there was a correlation between the scores on the SRM-SF and scores on DEX and its 
sub domains, VF, CWI, EQ, and IRT.  These analyses were conducted separately for both 
groups.  A Pearson’s correlation was conducted to explore these correlations.  A non-
parametric equivalent, Spearman’s Rho correlation, was used for the analyses where the 
variables did not meet the parametric assumptions, these included CWI in both groups; IRT 
in the HC group, and DEX Metacognition in the TBI group.  These correlations were 
exploratory and preliminary given the small sample size, and required cautious interpretation.     
 
2.5.4 Additional analyses 
Further information was collected on the TBI group.  This included age at injury and 
the severity.  The researcher performed correlations between the age at injury/ time since 
injury and moral reasoning in the TBI group.  The information on severity was considered in 
relation to the findings. 
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Chapter Three 
Results 
 
3.1 Introduction to this chapter 
 This chapter presents the findings of the study.  It will summarise the data preparation 
and preliminary analyses including the parametric assumption checks and the matching of the 
groups.  It will then present the findings for the primary research question.  Following this it 
will present the finding for the exploratory secondary research questions before concluding 
with a summary of the main findings from the study. 
     
3.2 Data preparation and preliminary analyses 
 The data were entered on a database on PASW statistics 18.  The data were explored 
for missing values and assumptions of parametric data. 
 
 3.2.1 Missing data 
 Every participant completed the SRM-SF, VF, and CWI.  One participant in the TBI 
group was unable to complete one of the subtests on the WASI II due to physical limitations, 
however could complete the other subtests and therefore was included in the study. Five 
participants in the TBI group did not complete the IRT, one declined participation and four 
asked to finish the task early.  A DEX questionnaire was sent to an independent rater, i.e. a 
relative, carer or partner.  Sixteen questionnaires (80%) were returned and the missing data 
were attributed a missing value and recorded as missing in the database.  
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 3.2.2 Testing assumptions of parametric data 
 To use parametric analyses, the data had to be explored to ensure it satisfied the 
parametric assumptions of normal distribution and homogeneity of variance.  The data were 
explored for normality by inspecting the histograms.  It was further confirmed by a non 
significant Shapiro Wilk Test (S-W) result.  Homogeneity of variance was assumed by a non 
significant Levine’s test.  The results from these analyses can be found in the Appendix I.  
 These preliminary analyses revealed that the SRM-SF, VF, EQ, DEX, DEX OTHER 
and DEX sub domains Executive cognition and Behavioural-emotional self-regulation data 
met the parametric assumptions.  The data on WASI II Full Scale IQ (FSIQ), Verbal 
comprehension index (VCI) and the Metacognition sub domain of the DEX violated the 
assumption of equal variance.  
 The normal distribution assumption was violated in the healthy comparison group for 
age, CWI and IRT; and the Truth, Property, Law and Legal Justice domains (SRM-SF).  The 
normal distribution assumption was violated in the TBI group for CWI; and across Truth, 
Life and Legal justice domains (SRM-SF).  For these caution was applied and non-parametric 
equivalent tests were used.   
  
 3.2.3 Matching the groups  
 The age of the TBI group (M= 21.70; SD = 2.32) did not significantly differ to the age 
of the healthy comparison group (M = 20.76; SD = 2.51), U = 269, p = .20.  The sex 
difference between the groups was not significant, χ2 (1) = 0.40, p = .53.  In addition, there 
was no significant difference between groups in socioeconomic status χ2 (1) = .848, p = .93.  
These findings indicated the groups were matched on age, sex and SES.  There are several 
different categories within the SES and, therefore, caution should be taken as the sample size 
may have not had sufficient power to detect a difference.   
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 An independent t-test indicated that FSIQ was significantly lower in the TBI group 
FSIQ (M = 92.37; SE = 2.98) compared to the healthy comparison group (M = 100.59; SE = 
1.59), t (28.47) = - 2.43, p < .05.     
 One participant in the TBI group was unable to complete the whole WASI II and was 
omitted from the above analysis.  The difference between the groups on the Verbal 
Comprehension Index (VCI) domain was, therefore, explored.  Any difference on this 
variable is likely to confound performance on the SRM-SF measure.  The TBI group were 
significantly lower on the VCI, (M = 88.8; SE = 2.67) relative to the healthy comparison 
group (M = 99.94; SE =1.31), t (28.2) = - 3.72, p< .01.  This difference was likely attributable 
to the severity of TBIs.   
 As expected, intellectual functioning, FSIQ and VCI, and moral reasoning (SRM-SF) 
significantly correlated in the TBI group rs = .592, p < .01 (FSIQ), rs   = .523, p < .01 (VCI), 
and in the healthy comparison group, rs = .409, p < .01(FSIQ), rs = .473, p < .01 (VCI).  This 
indicated that variance in IQ shared 35% of the variance in moral reasoning in the TBI group 
and 17% of the variance in the healthy comparison group.  Given the relationship between 
intellectual functioning and SRM-SF, and the significant differences between the groups on 
these variables, the FSIQ, and VCI were included as covariates in the analysis for the primary 
research question. 
 
 3.2.4 TBI group – preliminary tests 
 
 3.2.4.1 DEX and DEX Independent rater 
 There was no significant difference between the DEX completed by individuals with 
TBI (M = 31.75; SE = 2.76) and DEX completed by an independent rater (M = 36.63; SE = 
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5.27), t (15) = -1.16, p = .26.  The DEX completed by self was, therefore, used throughout the 
subsequent analysis. 
 
3.3 Main Analysis 
  
 3.3.1 Primary research question 
Literature indicates that TBI is commonly associated with damage to the fronto-
temporal regions (Bigler, 2007, Salmond et al., 2006; Wallesch et al., 2001).  Given the 
involvement of the PFC in moral reasoning (Raine & Young, 2006), the late maturation of 
these structures (Samango-Sprouse, 2007), and the findings from the literature review, the 
first hypothesis was that survivors of TBI aged 17 – 25 years will have lower scores on the 
SRM-SF (moral reasoning) than the healthy comparison group.   
  
 3.3.1.1 Hypothesis 1  
 The means and standard errors of the SRM total score and sub domains are shown in 
Table 9.  As predicted, moral reasoning, measured by the SRM-SF total score, was higher in 
the healthy comparison group than the TBI group, this difference was significant t (52) = -
7.17, p < .001.  The groups also appeared to differ by a moral development stage, with the 
healthy comparison group mean falling within Stage 3, mature stage of moral reasoning, and 
the TBI group within the transition stage 3 (2) suggestive of lower moral reasoning.  . 
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Table 9 Mean SRM-SF total score and sub-domain scores for each group.  Data are means 
and standard error of the mean. 
 
SRM-SF domains 
 
TBI group 
Mean (SE) 
HC group 
Mean (SE) 
SRM-SF (total) 260.50 (7.29) 315.85 (4.11) 
Contract 266.67 (9.37) 314.22 (6.26) 
Truth 277.78 (7.26) 307.81 (9.55) 
Affiliation 257.89 (8.34) 312.50 (6.18) 
Life 261.25 (8.79) 324.26 (5.01) 
Property 237.50 (15.34) 287.50 (6.74) 
Law 255.26 (17.48) 328.13 (9.77) 
Legal Justice 262.50 (18.45) 331.82 (9.93) 
TBI = Survivors of TBI group, HC = Healthy comparison group, SE = Standard error of the 
mean, SRM-SF = Sociomoral Reflection Measure- Short Form.    
   
 3.3.1.1.1 Intellectual functioning and Moral reasoning 
 An ANCOVA was conducted to explore the difference in moral reasoning between 
the TBI and healthy comparison groups whilst controlling for FSIQ and VCI.  The means and 
standard errors for the SRM-SF total scores, adjusted after controlling for FSIQ and VCI, are 
displayed in Table 10.  An ANCOVA revealed that the main effect of brain injury on moral 
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reasoning remained after controlling for FSIQ, F (1, 50) = 35.54, p < .001 and VCI, F (1, 51) 
= 26.08 p < .001. 
  
 3.3.1.2 Differences across moral reasoning domains 
 Further exploratory analyses were conducted on the differences between the groups 
on the domains of moral reasoning.  Means and standard errors are displayed in Table 9.   
Independent t-tests revealed significant differences between the TBI group and healthy 
comparison group across the domains, on Contract, t (52) = -4.62, p < .001 and Affiliation, t 
(51) = -5.27, p < .001.  Mann Whitney tests revealed significant differences on domains of 
Truth, U = 390.50, p < .05; Life, U = 613. 50, p < .001; Property, U = 470, p < .01; Law, U = 
470.00, p < .01 and Legal Justice, U = 490.50, p < .05.  These analyses revealed that the 
healthy comparison group had higher moral reasoning, as measured by the SRM-SF, than the 
TBI group across the seven moral reasoning domains of Contract, Truth, Affiliation, Life, 
Property, Law and Legal Justice.  
 
 3.3.1.2.1 Intellectual functioning and domains of moral reasoning 
 An ANCOVA was conducted to the difference in the moral reasoning domains 
between the TBI group and comparison group whilst controlling for IQ.  As the mean values 
on the sub-domains had violated the assumption of normality, bootstrapping was applied 
across all domains, using 5000 samples and bias corrected accelerated confidence intervals at 
95%.  The adjusted means and standard error are displayed in Table 10.  The adjusted means 
remained in the same developmental stage.  There was a significant effect of brain injury 
after controlling for FSIQ, on domains of Contract, F (1, 50) = 11.29, p < .01, BCa 95% CI 
[13.29, 66.54]; Affiliation, F (1, 49) = 20.33, p < .01, BCa 95% CI [24.13, 73.41]; Life, F (1, 
50) = 32.02, p < .001, BCa 95% CI [34.24, 76.85]; Law, F (1, 47) = 9.50, p < .001 BCa 95% 
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CI [19.53, 97.22] and Legal Justice, F (1, 49) = 4.48, p < .05, BCa 95% CI [1.14, 71.07].  The 
main effect of brain injury was not retained after controlling for FSIQ on the domains of 
Truth, F (1, 46) = 2.62, p = .07, BCa 95% CI [-1.26 to 51.84] and Property, F (1, 48) = 4.15, 
p = .06, BCa 95% CI [2.67, 55.73).   
 There was a significant main effect of brain injury after controlling for VCI, on 
domains of Contract, F (1, 51) = 10.34, p < .01, (BCa 95% CI = 12.14 to 69.61); Affiliation, 
F (1, 50) = 15.28, p < .01, (BCa 95% CI = 17.12 to 71. 32); Life, F (1, 51) = 23.71, p < .001, 
(BCa 95% CI = 27.10 to 74.90) and Law, F (1, 48) = 5.76, p < .05 (BCa 95% CI = 6.41 to 
88.24).  The main effect of brain injury was not maintained after controlling for VCI on 
Truth, F (1, 47) = 2.30, p = .05, (BCa 95% CI = 1.90 to 47.82); Property, F (1, 49) = 3.05, p = 
.08, (BCa 95% CI = -2.68 to 60.31) and Legal Justice, F (1, 50) = 1.68, p = .20, (BCa 95% CI 
= -13.10 to 63.08) domains.   
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Table 10 Adjusted means and standard error of means for SRM-SF in both groups 
(controlling for FSIQ and VCI). 
 
 FSIQ VCI 
SRM-SF TBI HC TBI HC 
 Mean (SE) Mean (SE) 
Total Score 267.67 (5.84) 312.15 (4.29) 269.06 (6.18) 310.82 (4.57) 
Contract 272.49 (10.98) 311.45 (6.59) 271.28 (11.44) 311.50 (6.67) 
Truth 281.37 (8.05) 305.79 (9.18) 281.85 (7.60) 306.52 (10.01) 
Affiliation 260.62 (10.87) 310.56 (6.34) 263.58 (11.56) 309.32 (6.55) 
Life 265.91 (9.47) 321.26 (5.14) 269.26 (9.43) 319.55 (5.50) 
Property 251.26 (13.52) 280.50 (7.57) 250.65 (13.44) 279.28 (8.15) 
Law 263.58 (17.36) 322.05 (10.53) 270.30 (17.05) 319.20 (10.46) 
Legal Justice 285.51 (14.10) 321.98 (11.24) 290.53 (15.25) 314.83 (11.86) 
FSIQ = Full Scale IQ, WASI II; VCI = Verbal Comprehension Index, WASI II; TBI = 
Traumatic brain injury group; HC = Healthy comparison group; SRM-SF = Sociomoral 
Reflection Measure- Short Form; SE = standard error of the mean 
  
 3.3.1.3 Further analyses in the TBI group 
 Given the variability of a TBI group, the relationships between age at injury and time 
since injury and moral reasoning, as measured by the total SRM-SF, were also explored.  
76 
 
Injury severity was not explored due to missing data and lack of variability in the data (see 
Methods Section, most patients had severe TBI).  Preliminary analyses revealed that the data 
on age at injury and time since injury were not normally distributed (see Appendix I) so non 
parametric, two-tailed correlations were used to explore these relationships.  There was a 
significant positive correlation between moral reasoning and age at injury, rs = .75, p < .001.  
This suggested that moral reasoning was higher in individuals with a later age at injury.  
Consistent with this finding, an additional analysis revealed a significant negative correlation 
between moral reasoning and time since injury, rs = -.50, p < .05 which suggested that moral 
reasoning increased as time since injury decreased.   
  
3.3.2 Secondary research questions 
Research studies have provided mixed evidence to support the notion that moral 
reasoning (measured by SRM-SF) is associated with executive functioning and emotion.  
This study aimed to explore these relationships further.  After consideration of the literature, 
this study predicted that moral reasoning would be associated with these processes.  It made 
directional hypothesis, as detailed below, and explored the correlations using one-tailed tests 
of significance.  Pearson’s correlation or Spearman’s Rho correlation tests were selected 
based on earlier preliminary tests of parametric assumptions. 
 
 3.3.2.1 Preliminary analyses   
 Prior to conducting the correlations, the data were compared to explore differences on 
each variable between the groups.  Significant differences confirmed that the correlations 
were to be performed separately in the groups. 
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 3.3.2.1.1 Cognitive Flexibility and Inhibition across both groups 
 There were significant differences between the groups on domains of inhibition 
(CWI) and cognitive flexibility (VF).  The means and standard errors are displayed in Figure 
1.  The healthy comparison group  performed significantly better on the CWI than the TBI 
group , U = 547, p < .001.  This was significant when the effects of colour word reading were 
controlled for F (1,51) = 5.54, p < .05.  This finding was repeated in VF, the healthy 
comparison group mean was significantly higher than the TBI group , t (52) - 4.3, p < .005.  
This suggested that the healthy comparison group had significantly higher levels of inhibition 
and cognitive flexibilty than the TBI group. 
 
Figure 1 Performance on Color Word Inference (CWI) and Verbal Fluency (VF) for each 
group.  Data are means and standard error of mean. 
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3.3.2.1.2 Empathy across the groups 
             Empathy was measured by the empathy quotient (EQ).  The means and standard error 
scores are displayed in Figure 2. The healthy comparison group had significantly higher 
levels of empathy than the TBI group, t (52) = -3.30, p < .01. 
 
Figure 2 Mean and standard error scores on the empathy quotient (EQ) for each group 
 
 3.3.2.1.3 Executive function difficulties across the groups 
Executive function difficulties were captured by the DEX.  Recent research has 
suggested that this measures three constructs, Executive cognition, Behavioural-emotional 
self-regulation, and Metacognition (Simblett & Bateman, 2011).  The means and standard 
errors for both groups on the total DEX and sub domains were calculated and are displayed in 
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Figure 3.  The TBI had higher scores on the total DEX questionnaire than the healthy 
comparison group, t (52) = 1.90, p = .06, suggestive of greater number of everyday executive 
function difficulties, this was near significance.  The TBI group had significantly higher 
scores than the healthy comparison group on Executive Cognition sub domain, t (52) = 2.55, 
p < .05.  The TBI group did not have significantly higher difficulties on the Behavioural-
emotional self-regulation , t (52) = 1.96, p =.06 or on the Metacognition, t (29.16) = 1.70, p 
=.14 sub domains. 
 
Figure 3 Mean total score on the DEX and sub-domains for both groups.  Data are means and 
standard error of the mean. 
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3.3.2.1.4 Emotion based decision making across the groups 
This was captured by the Intuitive Reasoning Task.  There were no significant 
differences between the TBI group (M = 23.67; SE = 10.18) and the healthy comparison 
group (M = 16.91, SD = 5.80), across the 100 trials, U = 214, p = .37.  The deck selections 
were also examined over five blocks, each consisting of 20 trials, to examine intuitive 
learning ability.  The means and standard error of profitable minus unprofitable deck 
selections are displayed in Figure 4. The mauchly’s test indicated assumptions of sphericity 
had been violated, χ2 (9) = 34.02, p < .05, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using 
the Huynh feldt estimate of sphericity (Ɛ = .87).  The results show no main effect of block 
(time) on performance F (3.48; 163.28) = .67, p = .59.  There was also no main effect of 
group on performance F (1, 47) = .43, p = .52 and no interaction of block (time) and group F 
(3.47; 163.27) = .28, p = .88.   
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Figure 4 Profitable minus unprofitable deck selections across the blocks for each 
 group.  Data are mean and standard error bars. and standard error bars. 
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 3.3.2.2 Correlations between moral reasoning and variables  
 
Table 11 Correlations between mean SRM-SF and the mean CWI, DEX, DEX other, EQ, 
IRT and VF for each group separately.  Data are Pearson’s correlation (r) values unless 
otherwise specified 
  
Variable 
SRM-SF 
TBI HC 
CWI .18
ᵃ
 .47
ᵃ
** 
DEX -.26 -.28* 
DEX EC -.21 -.36* 
DEX BE -.30 -.19 
DEX MC -.16
ᵃ
 -.25
ᵃ
 
DEX OTHER .15 - 
EQ .11 .34* 
IRT .38
ᵃ
 .23 
VF .43* .30* 
Note. 
ᵃSpearman’s Rho (rs) * p < .05; ** p < .01 
HC = Healthy Comparison Group.   TBI = Survivors of traumatic brain injury.  CWI = Color 
word inference, (DKEFS, Delis et al., 2001); VF = Verbal Fluency, (DKEFS); DEX = Dys-
executive questionnaire, (BADS, Wilson et al., 1996); DEX EC = DEX Executive Cognition; 
DEX BE = DEX Behavioural-emotional self-regulation; DEX MC = DEX Metacognition; 
EQ = Empathy Quotient, (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) HC N = 34, TBI N = 20.   
DEX OTHER = DEX proxy rater (TBI N = 15); IRT = Intuitive Reasoning Task (Dunn et al., 
2010; HC N = 34; TBI N = 15).   
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3.3.2.2.1 Hypothesis 2 – Moral reasoning and executive function difficulties 
The study predicted that moral reasoning would be related to executive function 
difficulties and hypothesised a negative correlation between the SRM-SF and DEX, a 
measure of executive function difficulties in everyday life.  The correlations and level of 
significance are displayed in Table 11.  There was a significant negative correlation between 
DEX and the SRM-SF in the healthy comparison group.  This suggested that 8% of the 
variance in moral reasoning was explained by the variance in the DEX, difficulties in 
executive functioning.  It suggested that fewer executive function difficulties were associated 
with higher moral reasoning.  There was no significant correlation in the TBI group (p = .14).   
 
3.3.2.2.1.1 Further analysis of the DEX. 
The relationships between the constructs of the DEX and moral reasoning were also 
explored in both groups.  The correlations and level of significance are displayed in Table 11.    
 
3.3.2.2.1.2 Executive Cognition Domain 
A significant negative correlation was found between moral reasoning and the 
Executive Cognition domain in the healthy comparison group.  This suggested that in the 
healthy comparison group, fewer Executive Cognition difficulties were associated with 
higher moral reasoning  
 
3.3.2.2.1.3 Behavioural-emotional self-regulation Domain 
There were no significant correlations between moral reasoning and Behavioural-
emotional self-regulation scores in either group.   
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3.3.2.2.1.4. Metacognition domain 
No significant correlations were revealed between moral reasoning and scores on the 
Metacognition domain for either group. 
 
3.3.2.2.2 Hypothesis 3 – Moral Reasoning and Cognitive flexibility 
It was predicted that individuals with higher cognitive flexibility would have higher 
moral reasoning (positive correlation, VF).  A significant positive correlation was found in 
the TBI group and the healthy comparison group supportive of the hypothesis.  The values 
are displayed in Table 11.  It suggested that 18% of the variance in moral reasoning was 
accounted for by variance in cognitive flexibility in the TBI group.  9% of the variance in 
moral reasoning was accounted for by variance in cognitive flexibility in the healthy 
comparison group.  This supported the hypothesis that individuals with higher cognitive 
flexibility had higher moral reasoning. 
 
3.3.2.2.3 Hypothesis 4 – Moral reasoning and Inhibition 
The study predicted that individuals with higher inhibition would have higher moral 
reasoning (positive correlation, CWI).  The correlations are displayed in Table 11.  A 
significant positive correlation was found in the healthy comparison group. This suggested 
that 22% of the variance in the ranks of moral reasoning was shared by the variance in 
inhibition and supported the hypothesis that individuals with higher levels of inhibitory 
control would have higher moral reasoning.  No significant correlation was found in the TBI 
group.    
Performance on the CWI is believed to be confounded by colour naming speed (Delis 
et al., 2001).  The CWI incorporates a test for colour word reading speed (colour naming).  
The TBI group (M = 6.75; SE = 0.85) performed significantly slower on this colour word 
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naming than the HC group (M = 9.85, SD = 0.38), t (26.68) = -3.34, p < .05.  This was held 
constant in a partial correlation.  There were still significant positive correlations between 
CWI and moral reasoning in the healthy comparison group r = .33, p < .05 but not in the TBI 
group r = .03, p = .49.  The degree of variance the CWI had on moral reasoning appeared to 
reduce in both groups, however, it still suggested that individuals with higher levels of 
inhibition had higher moral reasoning. 
 
3.3.2.2.4 Hypothesis 5 – Moral reasoning and empathy 
The study aimed to explore the relationship between moral reasoning and empathy, 
measured by the Empathy Quotient.  It made a further hypothesis that individuals with higher 
empathy would have higher moral reasoning (positive correlation).  The correlation values 
can be found in Table 11.  A significant positive correlation was reported between SRM-SF 
and EQ in the healthy comparison group, supportive of the hypothesis.  This indicated that 
12% of the variance in moral reasoning was accounted for by empathy and suggested that 
individuals with higher levels of empathy had higher moral reasoning.  A significant 
correlation was not revealed in the TBI group probably due to insufficient power.    
 
3.3.2.2.5 Hypothesis 6 – Moral reasoning and emotion based decision making 
The IRT was used to capture emotion-based decision making.  The study predicted a 
positive correlation between the IRT and SRM-SF (moral reasoning).  The analyses revealed 
near to significant positive correlations for both groups, (p = .09), as displayed in Table 11.  
This was probably due to insufficient power. 
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3.4 Summary of findings 
 The findings were supportive of the primary hypothesis.  As predicted, the study 
revealed that the age- , sex-, and SES-matched-healthy comparison group performed 
significantly better on the assessment of moral reasoning than the TBI group, and across all 
the domains of moral reasoning.  This finding was maintained in the total moral reasoning 
measure when variance in IQ, which was shown to correlate with moral reasoning, was 
accounted for by the analysis.  As predicted, this suggested that the difference between the 
groups on moral reasoning could not be explained by differences in intellectual functioning, 
age, sex or socioeconomic status.  Additional exploratory analyses of the sub domains of 
moral reasoning revealed there were differences across all the sub domains of moral 
reasoning.  These differences were maintained when IQ was controlled in analyses in the 
Contract, Affiliation, Life and Law domains.  Interestingly, these differences were not 
maintained across the Truth, Property and Legal Justice domains, once IQ was removed from 
the analysis.  This exploratory finding implied that the difference between the groups in the 
Truth, Property and Legal Justice domains were accounted for by differences in variance 
between groups in intelligence. 
 In addition, the findings, in part, supported the secondary research questions.  These 
were, however, preliminary given the small sample sizes and therefore caution should be 
applied when interpreting these findings.  It was predicted that moral reasoning would relate 
to cognitive and emotion processes, including executive functioning, inhibition and cognitive 
flexibility, empathy and emotion based decision making.  As predicted, all correlations were 
in line with the directional hypothesis.  The hypotheses were not fully supported, however, as 
there were not significant correlations in both groups.  The findings in the healthy 
comparison group provided support for these hypotheses.  Consistent with the hypotheses, 
significant positive correlations were found between moral reasoning and assessments of 
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inhibition, cognitive flexibility and empathy.  Furthermore a significant negative correlation 
was revealed between moral reasoning and everyday executive functioning difficulties.  
Individuals with higher levels of inhibition, cognitive flexibility and empathy had higher 
levels of moral reasoning.  In addition, individuals with better executive functioning had 
better moral reasoning.  The study also explored the sub-domains of executive function 
difficulties.  The analyses revealed significant negative correlation between moral reasoning 
and the Executive Cognition domain but no significant relationships with the other domains.  
Unexpectedly, there was not a significant correlation between moral reasoning and emotion 
based decision making.  The significant findings of correlations between moral reasoning and 
executive function, but not between moral reasoning and emotion-based decision-making 
could suggest that the relationship may be stronger between moral reasoning and executive 
cognitive skills.  There were positive correlations, however, between emotion-based decision 
making and moral reasoning, and therefore the failure to reach significance may be a 
consequence of insufficient power rather than an absence of relationship between these 
variables.  Therefore a conclusion cannot be made given the small sample size.   
 Similarly, the TBI group had a smaller sample size and therefore the results would 
have been compromised by insufficient power.  The findings from the TBI group revealed a 
significant positive correlation between moral reasoning and cognitive flexibility, suggesting 
individuals with higher levels of cognitive flexibility had higher moral reasoning.  However 
no other significant correlations were revealed in the TBI group.  
 Overall, these findings suggest that some of the variance in moral reasoning may be 
accounted for, in part, by difficulties in executive functions, such as cognitive flexibility and 
inhibition, and also empathy.  The co-existing finding of differences between the groups on 
these variables may indicate that the differences between the groups on moral reasoning may 
be explained, in part, by these variables.  The lack of significant correlations in the TBI 
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group, prevent these from being explored by further analyses such as an ANCOVA.  The 
interpretations, therefore, are limited by non-significant findings in the TBI group which may 
be explained by the insufficient power to detect significant relationships due to the relatively 
small sample size.  
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Chapter Four 
Discussion 
 
4.1 Overview 
 Moral reasoning is considered vital for social function (Gibbs, 2010).  It is dependent 
on cognitive, emotion and social experience.  These processes are believed to be dependent 
on the frontal brain region, in particular the PFC, and a moral reasoning task has been shown 
to activate the frontal lobe in a neuroimaging study (Raine & Young, 2006).  This area of the 
brain is vulnerable to damage from a TBI (Bigler, 2007; Salmond et al., 2006).  TBI causes 
damage to brain structures and deficits in areas of cognitive, behavioural, emotional and 
social functioning.  More recently, it has been associated with offending behaviour.  
Consequentially, it may be that moral reasoning is disrupted by a TBI and this contributes to 
some of the behavioural and social difficulties commonly reported.  A consideration of the 
literature outlined in the introduction concluded that the impact of a TBI on moral reasoning 
warranted closer examination.  In addition, it highlighted the necessity to explore the 
processes which underpin moral reasoning to provide greater clarity of this area to inform 
interventions.   
 This study sought to explore these research gaps with its main aim being to consider 
the impact of TBI on moral reasoning.  A specific age group, 17 to 25 years, was selected to 
capture a time when moral reasoning is suspected to reach maturity (Gibbs et al., 1992).  In 
addition, it captures a period of later development than previous studies, when individuals are 
gaining their independence, separating from the family network, a time of increasing 
responsibility (Morton & Wehman, 1995; Turkstra et al., 2008).  This is a time when true 
deficits from TBI are often recognised (Eslinger et al., 1992).  The study made a hypothesis 
that moral reasoning would be lower in the TBI group than the healthy comparison group.  It 
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also had secondary aims to explore the relationships between moral reasoning and aspects of 
executive function, empathy and emotion-based decision making in both groups.  The study 
made several hypotheses that better performance on these areas would correlate with higher 
moral reasoning. 
 This chapter will first consider the findings from this study in relation to each 
hypothesis and previous research.  It will then consider the theoretical and clinical 
implications.  It will proceed with a consideration of the strengths and limitations of the study 
before highlighting areas for future research.  The chapter will conclude with a summary of 
the main findings of this study, strengths and limitations and main areas for future research. 
 
4.2 Summary of the findings 
 The study compared 34 individuals in the healthy comparison group with 20 
individuals in the survivors of TBI group on a measure of moral reasoning; SRM-SF (Gibbs 
et al., 1992).  In addition, it explored the relationship between moral reasoning, as measured 
by the SRM-SF, and cognitive and emotion processes, based on theories of moral 
development.  These included inhibition, measured by the CWI, cognitive flexibility, 
measured by the VF, and executive function difficulties, measured by the DEX.  It also 
included empathy, measured by the EQ, and finally emotion based decision making, 
measured by the IRT.  This chapter will now present the findings from these analyses and 
consider each one in relation to previous research. 
 
 4.2.1 Hypothesis 1 
 The primary aim and hypothesis was to explore whether survivors of TBI aged 
between 17 and 25 years demonstrated lower moral reasoning relative to the comparison 
group.    
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 This hypothesis was supported by the findings.  The healthy comparison group 
performed significantly better than the TBI group on the SRM-SF total score suggesting 
higher moral reasoning.  In fact, the healthy comparison group were functioning at a higher 
moral developmental stage than the TBI group and demonstrated mature moral reasoning, at 
stage 3.  This is consistent with the proposal that mature moral reasoning is reached by late 
adolescence/ early adulthood (Gibbs et al., 1992).  The TBI group did not demonstrate 
reasoning at this stage, and therefore, is suggestive of a moral developmental delay, 
consistent with previous research.  Several case studies have demonstrated moral reasoning 
difficulties in adults who have experienced a brain injury during childhood (Anderson et al., 
1999; Gratton & Eslinger, 1992; Price et al., 1990).  Additionally, the findings from this 
present study support evidence from group studies.  For example, Anderson et al. (2009) 
showed difficulties with complying with moral standards, laws and rules following a brain 
injury.  Similarly, moral reasoning difficulties were shown in children with frontal lobe 
injuries (Couper et al., 2002) and adolescents with TBI (Beauchamp et al., in press).  In 
summary, therefore, the findings from this study, alongside those from previous research 
using different individuals and different measures of moral reasoning, demonstrate a 
consistent finding, of moral reasoning difficulties following a TBI in childhood to young 
adulthood.   
 The study used an age, sex, and SES matched comparison group.  These variables had 
not been controlled for in all the previous studies (Couper et al. 2002).  As expected, there 
was a correlation between moral reasoning and intellectual functioning (Hoffman, 1977; 
Johnson, 1962).  The study found a significant difference in intellectual functioning between 
the groups, however, the difference in moral reasoning between the groups was retained 
when intellectual functioning was accounted for by the analyses.  This suggested that the 
difference between the groups on moral reasoning could not be explained by the variance in 
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IQ, and is consistent with case studies showing moral reasoning deficits in the context of 
average intelligence (Anderson et al., 1999; Anderson et al., 2009; Price et al., 1990). The 
current study findings implied that difficulties in moral reasoning could not be explained by 
sex, age, SES or intellectual functioning which is consistent with Beauchamp et al. (in press).  
This implication highlighted the need to identify other factors that may underpin difficulties 
in the area of moral reasoning. 
 This study also explored the sub-domains of moral reasoning, captured by the SRM-
SF, which has not been previously researched in a TBI group (Couper et al., 2002).  The 
study revealed that the healthy comparison group performed significantly better than the TBI 
group, across all the domains of Contract, Truth, Affiliation, Life, Property, Law and Legal 
Justice.  Both groups displayed a relative lower moral reasoning stage in the Property domain 
compared to performance in the other domains.  Furthermore, these exploratory analyses 
revealed that the differences remained between the groups on the Contract, Affiliation, Life 
and Law domains, once IQ had been removed from the analysis.  The differences did not, 
however, remain in the Truth, Property and Legal Justice and, therefore, suggested that these 
could be accounted for by the variance in IQ between the groups.  These findings may imply 
that the TBI group may have greater difficulties in some areas of moral reasoning.  It may 
also suggest that different aspects of moral reasoning may depend on different functions. 
 This study has also provided evidence of moral reasoning difficulties at a later stage 
in the developmental trajectory - young adulthood.  Studies exploring the impact of TBI 
during adulthood have reported that moral reasoning is intact, aside from the proposed 
relationship between VMPFC damage and disruption to personal moral dilemmas. These 
studies, however, have focused on injuries sustained during mid-adulthood.  In this current 
study, the TBI group included individuals who had sustained injuries in early adulthood and, 
therefore, may suggest that young adults who had sustained a TBI were still vulnerable to 
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moral reasoning difficulties.  A few of the participants, however, had sustained their injuries 
earlier in life.  The negative correlation between age at onset and moral reasoning is 
suggestive of greater disruption to moral development for individuals with an earlier injury 
and this may account for the absence of moral reasoning difficulties from adulthood injury 
research studies (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007; Martins et al., 2012; Moretto et 
al., 2009; Saver & Damasio, 1991; Thomas et al., 2011).  It may also support the research 
suggestive of greater residual deficits after a childhood TBI (Catroppa et al., 2008). 
  The age group captured in this study had not been examined before.  Previous studies 
have queried whether the difficulties in moral reasoning were reflective of a delay or arrested 
development (Anderson et al., 1999; Couper et al. 2002; Grattan & Eslinger, 1991).  Couper 
et al. (2002) showed children with frontal lobe injuries had moral justifications within the 
stage 2/ stage 2 (3) levels.  In this study, using the same measure, the young adults 
demonstrated a higher stage of moral development, Stage 2 (3) stage, than the younger 
participants in the Couper et al. (2002) study.  Whilst this was a separate group of 
individuals, it may suggest that moral development following brain injury may be delayed in 
comparison with their peers but perhaps not arrested.   
 The study did not obtain sufficient information about the damage for further analyses 
on the impact of severity and localisation on moral reasoning deficits.  A previous study 
attributed the absence of significant moral reasoning difficulties to the mild severity of the 
TBIs in the sample (Dooley et al., 2010).  More recently, Beauchamp et al. (in press) has 
demonstrated greater moral reasoning deficits in adolescents with mild and moderate/severe 
TBI when compared to a healthy comparison group.  This current study was unable to 
explore this further, as the majority of the sample had sustained a severe TBI.  Nevertheless, 
it did reveal moral reasoning difficulties following a severe TBI which was consistent with 
previous research (Beauchamp et al., in press).    
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 It was not possible to explore the impact of specific localisation on moral reasoning as 
the scan data were only available for eight individuals.  Nevertheless frontal lobe damage was 
reported in six scans consistent with previous studies suggesting frontal/temporal lobe 
damage was common after a TBI (Bigler, 2007; Salmond et al., 2006).  Given the moral 
reasoning deficits in this group of survivors of TBI and previous groups (Beauchamp et al., in 
press), it may support the suggestion that moral reasoning is dependent on processes 
conducted by the frontal lobe.  This is consistent with the study by Raine and Young (2006) 
which revealed neuro-imaging findings of activation in the prefrontal cortex during moral 
reasoning.   
 In summary, the study revealed that the young adult TBI group had significantly 
lower levels of moral reasoning than the healthy comparison group.  The study indicated that 
age, sex, SES and IQ could not account for these differences in overall moral reasoning.  This 
finding supported the hypothesis and is consistent with previous research.  Further 
exploratory analyses revealed differences between the groups in the sub-domains of moral 
reasoning, Contract, Truth, Affiliation, Life, Property, Law and Legal Justice.  Interestingly, 
some of these differences, however, could be accounted for by variance between the groups 
in IQ, i.e. sub domains of Property, Truth and Legal Justice.  The performance on the 
domains after a TBI has not been previously explored. 
    
 4.2.2 Research question 2 
 The study aimed to explore what factors relate to moral reasoning in both groups 
separately.  The power equation suggested a sample size of thirty individuals in each group to 
explore these relationships.  Data were available for thirty-four participants in the healthy 
comparison group and twenty participants in the TBI group.  The proposed sample size was 
therefore not reached in the TBI group.  Given the exploratory nature of these research 
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questions and the power issues, these findings should be interpreted with caution and treated 
as preliminary.  
 
 4.2.2.1 Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4 - Moral reasoning and Executive Functions 
 Based on previous studies and taking into account theory, it was hypothesised that 
moral reasoning would be related to executive function difficulties and that greater executive 
function difficulties and lower inhibition and cognitive flexibility would be associated with 
lower moral reasoning scores. 
 A significant negative correlation was revealed between executive function 
difficulties and moral reasoning in the healthy comparison group and this was a medium 
effect size.  This suggested executive function difficulties explained some of the variance in 
moral reasoning and that fewer difficulties in executive function were associated with higher 
moral reasoning which supported the hypothesis.   
 It has been suggested that the DEX questionnaire, is better understood by three 
individual constructs; Executive cognition, Behavioural-emotional self-regulation and 
Metacognition (Simblett & Bateman, 2011).  The study revealed a significant negative 
correlation in the healthy comparison group between moral reasoning and the Executive 
cognition domain.  This finding may indicate, therefore, that the Executive cognition domain 
may be the particular aspect of executive functioning important to moral reasoning.  The 
Executive cognition domain captures controlled processes such as planning, monitoring, 
switching and directing automatic function.   
 This was consistent with findings from the comparisons between moral reasoning and 
other measures of executive function.  Cognitive flexibility and Inhibitory control are 
processes within the Executive cognition domain.  Significant positive correlations were 
revealed between moral reasoning and cognitive flexibility in both groups with medium and 
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medium to large effect sizes reported in the healthy comparison and TBI group respectively.  
This suggested that cognitive flexibility accounted for some of the variance in moral 
reasoning and indicated individuals with higher cognitive flexibility had higher moral 
reasoning.  A significant positive correlation of medium effect size was also revealed 
between moral reasoning and inhibition in the healthy comparison group.  This indicated that 
some of the variance in moral reasoning was shared by inhibition.  In addition, it supported 
the hypothesis that individuals with higher levels of inhibitory control would have higher 
moral reasoning.  Significant correlations were not reported in the TBI group, between 
inhibition and moral reasoning, and this may be because many participants underperformed 
on this subtest and there was a lack of variability in the dataset. 
 The findings from the healthy comparison group supported the hypotheses and were 
supportive of studies which have shown correlations between moral reasoning and cognition 
(Cottone et al., 2007; Lee, 1971; Tomilinson-Kearsey & Kearsey, 1974) and specific 
correlations between moral reasoning and inhibition (Cottone et al., 2007).  It was also 
consistent with the case studies which have demonstrated executive function deficits 
alongside moral reasoning deficits (Gratton & Eslinger, 1992; Price et al., 1990) and in 
contrast, no deficits in either domain following adult brain injury (Saver & Damasio, 1991).  
Furthermore, it was in line with others studies that have shown co-existing cognitive 
flexibility deficits and moral reasoning deficits in brain injury samples (Price et al., 1990; 
Anderson et al., 1999).  The current study reported larger correlations between these domains 
and moral reasoning in the healthy comparison group than previous studies but could not 
account for all of the variance in moral reasoning. 
 Significant correlations between executive functioning domains and moral reasoning 
were not reported in the TBI group, apart from cognitive flexibility.  It is likely that given the 
small sample, the study did not have enough power to detect significant relationships.  The 
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study did reveal coexisting differences, however, between the groups on moral reasoning and 
cognitive flexibility, inhibition and executive-cognitive domain.  The healthy comparison 
group performed significantly better on all of these domains.  This may infer that the aspects 
of executive function captured by this study may contribute to moral reasoning, thereby 
supporting the link between moral and cognitive development (see theoretical implications 
section), and encourage future research.   
 
 4.2.2.2 Hypothesis 5 - Moral reasoning and Empathy 
 The study also aimed to explore the relationship between moral reasoning and 
empathy, as measured by the EQ, and predicted a positive correlation between empathy and 
moral reasoning. 
 The hypothesis was supported in the healthy comparison group, where a significant 
positive correlation of a medium effect size was revealed between empathy and moral 
reasoning.  This suggested that empathy may explain some of the variance in moral 
reasoning.  There was no significant correlation between these variables in the TBI group. 
 The finding in the healthy comparison group was consistent with previous research.  
This was in line with the finding of co-existing moral reasoning and empathy deficits in brain 
injury studies (Graffton & Eslinger, 1992; Price et al., 1990).  It was also consistent with a 
similar finding in individuals with intellectual disabilities (Langdon et al., 2011).  The non 
significant correlation in the TBI group may be explained by the smaller sample size.  This 
study did reveal significantly higher levels of moral reasoning and empathy in the healthy 
comparison group compared to the TBI group and this may suggest they are related.  Indeed a 
larger study has revealed a significant positive correlation between empathy and moral 
reasoning in a TBI population (Beauchamp et al., in press).   
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 4.2.2.3 Hypothesis 6 – Moral reasoning and Emotion-based decision making 
 Based on theoretical background suggestive of the role of intuition and emotion-based 
decision making in moral reasoning (Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001), a final hypothesis was 
made that there would be a positive correlation between moral reasoning and emotion-based 
decision making.  These did not quite meet significance.  In addition, there was not a 
significant difference between the groups in their performance on this task across the 100 
deck selections or across the five blocks.  Furthermore, there was no learning curve over the 
five blocks for either group.   
 In addition no significant difference was reported between participants on the 
Behavioural-emotional self-regulation sub domain of the DEX which may tap into a similar 
function.  This is not consistent with previous research that has indicated individuals who 
have sustained a brain injury have difficulties with emotional processing.  Anderson et al. 
(1999) demonstrated that individuals with a brain injury did not demonstrate anticipatory skin 
conductance responses (SCRs) in a similar gambling task and inferred this represented 
difficulties in emotion based decision making.  Furthermore, Adlam, Turnbull, Yeates and 
Gracey (submitted; personal communication) found that adults with TBI showed poorer 
performance on an emotion-based decision-making task (the Bangor Gambling Task; BGT, 
Bowman & Turnbull, 2004), as reflected by a delay in learning to select the profitable 
stimuli. 
 
4.3 Theoretical implications  
 The findings from this study have a number of theoretical implications.  The 
implications for moral reasoning and brain development theories will be reviewed in turn. 
 This study has contributed to the understanding of the impact of brain injury on moral 
reasoning.  The significant finding of delayed moral development in the TBI group, 
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combined with the correlations with cognitive components of executive function, provides 
support for the cognitive developmental theories of moral development.  These theories 
suggest that moral reasoning is a construct which develops in stages, alongside brain 
development (Gibbs et al., 1992; 2010; Kohlberg, 1969, 1976; Piaget, 1968).  Mature moral 
reasoning requires an individual to move their focus from salient features to incorporate the 
wider societal and cultural context (Gibbs et al., 1992).  The differences between immature 
and mature moral reasoning were demonstrated between the groups.  The TBI group would 
often consider the personal consequences of the act or pragmatic reciprocity and some were 
beginning to consider the emotional states of others to make their decisions.  The healthy 
comparison group made more justifications incorporating the pro social understanding of 
care, emotional states and wider society, demonstrating more mature moral reasoning.  This 
study has, therefore, supported the suggestion that moral development is a staged process 
which may be delayed by disruptions to brain development.  Furthermore, it indicated that 
disruption leads to global delay across all the constructs of moral reasoning.  The finding of 
stage 3 (and not stage 4) reasoning in the healthy comparison group supports the suggestion 
that moral reasoning continues to develop into early adulthood (Gibbs et al., 1992).  This is 
contradictory to the earlier suggestion that development is complete by adolescence (Piaget, 
1968; Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971).  Moreover, this may support the importance of brain 
development for moral development as the brain continues to develop up until the third 
decade (Gogtay et al., 2004; Lenroot & Giedd, 2006).   
 The study may also have implications for the understanding of the processes that 
underpin moral reasoning.  Traditional cognitive developmental theories suggest the 
importance of cognitive maturation and social experience to moral development (Kohlberg, 
1969, 1976; Piaget, 1968).  These factors are considered to enable opportunities for conflict 
and resolution in interactions with others (Selman, 1971) and require cognitive maturity to 
100 
 
support this process (Walker & Taylor, 1991).  Cognitive processes enable options to be 
considered, allow inhibition of inappropriate responses (Eslinger et al., 2004; Gibbs et al., 
1992; 2010; Kohlberg, 1969, 1976; Piaget, 1968) and encourage an awareness of wider 
societal issues alongside empathy (Gibbs et al., 1992; Hoffman, 2000; 2008).  Contrary to 
this view is the social intuitionist model of moral judgement (Haidt, 2001), which suggests 
moral judgements and actions are based on intuition; a sudden automatic and effortless 
decision.  Similarly, the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994) suggests signals from 
the body indicative of emotional response, somatic markers, trigger rapid decisions in the 
absence of cost-benefit analysis.  A further suggestion is the dual-process theory, which 
implies cognitive and emotion processes are important for moral reasoning (Greene & Haidt, 
2002).  The findings in the healthy comparison group appeared to support the role for 
cognitive processes.  Some of the variance in moral reasoning was accounted for by 
intellectual function, inhibition, cognitive flexibility, and empathy.  In addition, there was a 
significant correlation between cognitive flexibility and moral reasoning in the TBI group.  
Furthermore, the healthy comparison group demonstrated higher levels than the TBI group in 
areas of inhibition, empathy and fewer executive function difficulties, alongside higher levels 
of moral reasoning.  These findings appeared to support Gibbs et al. (1992; 2010) and Greene 
and Haidt (2002) theories which suggest moral development is dependent on cognitive and 
emotional constructs.  The non significant correlations in the TBI group may be reflective of 
the smaller sample size and lack of variability in the data set. 
 Exploratory analyses revealed group differences across all the domains of moral 
reasoning, with the healthy comparison group consistently demonstrating higher levels of 
moral reasoning than the TBI group.  Interestingly, there were differences in performance 
across the individual constructs of moral reasoning.  The healthy comparison group reached 
stage 3, mature stage of moral reasoning, across all the domains, apart from the Property 
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domain.  This finding is consistent with Gibbs et al. (1992) proposal that moral reasoning 
develops until early adulthood.  Similarly, the TBI group demonstrated a lower moral 
reasoning stage in this domain compared to other domains.  Furthermore, variance in 
intelligence between the groups appeared to impact on the domains differently.  Variance in 
IQ, accounted for the differences between the groups, across the domains of Truth, Property 
and Legal Justice but not in the other domains.  This is the first study to examine these 
domains in a TBI population and no prior hypotheses were made about the individual 
domains.  These findings suggest that the differences between the groups varied across the 
domains.  It may also suggest that the different aspects of moral reasoning should be explored 
separately, as they may develop differently and may be dependent on different processes.  
Future research is suggested.  Nevertheless, it is consistent that intellectual functioning is a 
construct underpinning moral reasoning, supportive of the cognitive development theories 
(Gibbs et al., 1992; 2010; Kohlberg, 1969, 1976; Piaget, 1968). 
 Unexpectedly, the study did not reveal significant differences between the groups on 
the IRT or on the behavioural-emotional self-regulation construct on the DEX.  Furthermore, 
there were no significant correlations between these measures and moral reasoning in either 
group.  This study did not, therefore, support the role of intuition and automatic decision 
making in moral reasoning (Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001).  This may indicate that the 
findings provide more support for the cognitive developmental theories, (Piaget, 1968; 
Kohlberg 1969, 1976; Gibbs et al., 1992; 2010) implying that moral reasoning has a greater 
dependence on cognitive processes than intuition or emotion based decision making.  This 
finding was unexpected and is not consistent with previous research and may be explained by 
the small sample size or the selection of the measure (see Strengths and Weaknesses section 
below).  Therefore, the role of these processes in moral reasoning cannot be ruled out.   
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 Another perspective may be that there were no significant differences in emotion-
based decision-making because the study captured moral reasoning during development.  It 
might be that whilst moral reasoning is still developing, it is more effortful and dependent on 
cognitive processes.  In contrast, by adulthood, it may be less effortful, more automatic and 
have greater dependence on emotion based decision making.  In adulthood, moral reasoning 
may be more dependent on the signals from the body, somatic markers, indicative of 
emotional response, which trigger rapid decisions in absence of cost benefit analysis (e.g. 
Somatic marker hypothesis; Damasio, 1994).  These two different processes mirrors the 
distinction between Type I and 2 systems in decision-making (e.g. Kahneman, 2003).  This 
may explain the divide in studies examining moral reasoning following childhood/ young 
adolescence and adulthood TBI.  Studies have consistently shown moral reasoning deficits 
following childhood/ adolescence injuries (Anderson et al., 1999; 2009; Beauchamp et al., in 
press; Couper et al., 2002; Dooley et al., 2010; Graffton & Eslinger, 1992; Price et al., 1990).  
Conversely research to date has not shown moral reasoning deficits following adulthood 
injury (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007; Martins et al., 2012; Moretto et al., 2009; 
Saver & Damasio, 1991; Thomas et al., 2011).  Instead adult studies have presented specific 
moral reasoning deficits in relation to personal moral dilemmas when there has been damage 
to the ventro-medial PFC, an area hypothesised to be vital for emotion processes.  This 
requires further examination.  This current study captured individuals at a single time point 
and moral reasoning would have to be measured at various points through the development 
trajectory, in the same individuals, to ascertain how this relates to cognitive and emotion 
functioning. 
 Whilst this study has indicated that some of the variance in moral reasoning was 
accounted for by executive functioning and empathy, these factors did not account for all the 
variance.  There are, therefore, other factors which impact on moral reasoning that this study 
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did not capture.  This may be other unmeasured executive functions or emotion-based 
decision making.  Another possible factor may be social experience as Kohlberg (1969, 1976) 
suggested that social opportunities for conflict and resolution were important to moral 
reasoning.  This is believed to be dependent on cognitive maturity to support this process 
(Walker & Taylor, 1991), but also having these social experiences would be necessary.  It 
may be that disruption in quality and quantity of social experiences following a brain injury 
may impact on moral reasoning development.  This disruption may be caused by pre-morbid 
factors, the result of the adjustment to the brain injury, the level of support available and 
familial factors.  Studies have revealed increased family burden and stress; increased levels of 
parental psychological difficulties; and problematic peer relationships following TBI in 
childhood (Stancin et al., 2010; Tonks et al., 2010; Wade et al., 1996).  In keeping with this, 
family factors have been shown to mediate outcome from TBI (Crowe et al., 2012; Rivera et 
al., 1994; Yeates et al., 2010).   
 The finding of lower moral reasoning in young adults following a TBI may have 
implications for the understanding of brain development.  Although specific localisation 
information was not obtained for every participant in the TBI, the majority of the available 
information revealed frontal lobe damage.  This supported the widely accepted understanding 
that TBI causes damage to the frontal lobe, in particular the PFC (Bigler, 2007; Salmond et 
al., 2006; Wallesch et al., 2001) due to the close proximity of this area to the bony aspects of 
the skull (Bigler, 2007) and the acceleration-deceleration force of the incident (Donders, 
2006; Yeates, 2010).  Consequentially, the finding of this study revealed moral reasoning 
deficits following this damage and, therefore, may support the role of the PFC in moral 
reasoning.   
 Furthermore, the study revealed moral reasoning deficits in young adults who had 
sustained a TBI.  Most of the TBIs had been sustained in late adolescence/ early adulthood.  
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This was consistent with previous research which has revealed moral reasoning deficits 
following brain injury during childhood and adolescence.  The study also revealed moral 
reasoning difficulties after injury in early adulthood and it is the first study to have examined 
this part of the developmental trajectory.  This is consistent with the understanding that 
structural brain development completes in the frontal lobes in the early twenties for females 
and mid twenties for males (Belsky & de Haan, 2011; Sowell et al., 2004).  This is the area 
considered important for moral reasoning as it is responsible for executive function and 
emotion processing (Gogtay et al., 2004).  The findings from this study support, therefore, the 
theory that injury to the brain during development causes deficits.  The study did find a 
correlation between age at injury and moral reasoning deficits which suggested that earlier 
damage was associated with greater deficits in moral reasoning.  There were only two 
participants, however, who had sustained their injury in early childhood and therefore 
conclusions about this are tentative.  Nevertheless, it may contradict the traditional theories, 
namely the Kennard Principle (Finger & Wolfe, 1988; Kennard, 1936) which has suggested 
that the young brain is resilient to damage due to plasticity and adapts to counteract the 
lesions (Buchwald, 1990).  The findings were also in line with more recent  theories 
suggesting the developing brain is more vulnerable to damage due to the neck to head ratio; 
thinner cortex (Catroppa et al., 2008), limited cognitive reserves to aid recovery (Savage, 
2009); and disruption to the prolonged development of the brain (Gogtay et al., 2004; Lenroot 
& Giedd, 2006).  Likewise it was consistent with the crowding hypothesis that suggests that 
early damage disrupts the brain structural development by distorting the creation of new 
structures and limiting the elaboration and usage of earlier ones (Black et al., 1998; Cicchetti, 
2002; Greenough & Klintsova, 1999).  Furthermore, some argue brain development is 
moulded by experience and genes and therefore, it could be suggested that a TBI disrupts 
these experiences, thereby altering the development (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998, 2006; 
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Westermann et al., 2007).  Further research is required to examine moral reasoning in a 
greater number of participants at various ages on the developmental trajectory to make more 
robust conclusions. 
 Although the study indicated that an early injury was associated with greater moral 
reasoning deficits, it was unable to explore the impact of an injury at different stages in this 
trajectory on moral reasoning.  Nevertheless, the TBI group in the current study demonstrated 
a higher level of moral reasoning ability than the group in the Couper et al. (2002) study.  In 
fact, using the same measure, the individuals in the current study were at a later stage in the 
developmental trajectory; young adulthood, than the individuals in the Couper et al. (2002) 
study.  Together, these studies may support the theory that early injury leads to greater 
difficulties or the “neuro-cognitive stall” hypothesis that injury slows the rates of cognitive, 
social and motor development (Chapman, 2007) but may not limit development to pre-injury 
skills (Ewing-Cobbs et al., 2003).  These conclusions are tentative as they captured different 
individuals.  A future study assessing moral reasoning at different stages of the 
developmental trajectory in the same individuals would provide more robust conclusions as 
to whether the difficulties were a consequence of a delay or plateau.     
 This study also has implications on the understanding of brain-behaviour links.  The 
PFC is considered responsible for executive functions and emotional responsivity (Knabb et 
al., 2009).  This may be supported by the findings that the healthy comparison group 
performed better than the TBI group on assessments of executive function and empathy.   
 Overall, to summarise the theoretical implications, the study does support the 
suggestion that moral development is dependent on frontal system functioning.  In keeping 
with this, disruption to brain development, through TBI, appeared to delay moral 
development.  It suggests that cognitive processes, in particular executive functions and 
empathy, may be important for this.  The impact of emotion-based decision making and 
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intuition needs to be revisited as this study did not provide support for this which may be 
explained by limitations in the methodology.  Furthermore, the variables captured by this 
study did not account for all of the variance in moral reasoning, which suggests there may be 
other processes that explain this difference between the groups.   
 
4.4 Clinical Implications  
 This chapter will now consider the clinical implications for understanding the impact 
of brain injury, and for the wider legal justice system.  The findings from this study, 
alongside previous research, have indicated that brain injury during childhood/ adolescence 
and early adulthood may cause moral reasoning deficits.  This has important clinical 
implications, as links between moral reasoning and offending behaviour and social 
difficulties have been consistently reported in offending populations (Nelson et al., 1990; 
Palmer & Hollins, 1998; Stams et al., 2006; Van Vugt et al., 2011) and a direct correlation 
between moral reasoning, legal order and society function has been suggested (Beauchamp & 
Anderson, 2010).  Moral reasoning deficits may therefore underpin the widely reported 
behavioural and social functioning difficulties following a TBI.  Several studies have 
consistently demonstrated that a TBI can have negative impact on social functioning 
(Anderson et al., 2000; 2005), behavioural regulation (Yeates, 2010); emotional wellbeing 
(Tonks et al., 2010) and peer relationships (Bohnert et al., 1997).  Young adult survivors of 
TBI have been shown to have a significant reduction in friendships (Morton & Wehman, 
1995).  TBI has also been associated with conduct problems (Anderson & Catroppa, 2006), 
higher levels of violence and antisocial behaviour (Damasio, 1996; Stoddard & Zimmerman, 
2011) and greater behavioural difficulties (Catroppa et al., 2012).  In addition, there is 
growing research which has suggested TBI is related to an increased risk of offending 
behaviour (Leon-Carrion & Ramos, 2003; Luiselli et al., 2000; Timonen et al., 2002) and a 
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high prevalence of TBI history reported in prison samples (Barnfield & Leathe, 1998; Perron 
& Howard, 2008; Slaughter et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2010).   
 Given the fact there appears to be deficits in moral reasoning following TBI and the 
possibility that these may contribute to these difficulties in social function, behavioural 
function, and even offending behaviour, it is important to consider how these relate to clinical 
implications.  The literature understanding difficulties to moral reasoning is still developing 
and therefore it is not suggested that everyone following TBI will have deficits.  However, 
brain injury services should be aware of these potential difficulties in moral reasoning, so 
they can assess them on an individual basis and provide appropriate support. The study 
findings have suggested TBI in earlier life may lead to more difficulties in moral reasoning 
which would suggest that a particular focus on monitoring and assessing individuals with a 
brain injury sustained during childhood could be useful.  The study also supports the 
inclusion of regular assessments at different points throughout the developmental trajectory 
in order to recognise areas of difficulties and intervene.  It may also indicate a need for extra 
caution and support during the period from adolescence to later adulthood when there is 
greater independence as the protection from familial structure disperses alongside greater 
social challenges (Eslinger et al., 1992).  In addition, it may suggest a requirement for 
interventions to target possible deficits.  It may be possible to use adaptations of the EQUIP 
programme (Gibbs et al., 1995).  Furthermore, the study has suggested these difficulties may 
be due to a developmental delay, and therefore, interventions may support further 
development.  It may be that greater recognition of these difficulties and targeted 
interventions may enable better social functioning and even reduce the risk of criminal 
behaviour in survivors of TBI    
 The study aimed to examine specific factors that may impact on the relationship 
between moral reasoning and TBI.  This is important for economic and criminal interest (Zak, 
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2004) as knowledge of these factors can inform psychological, medical and environmental 
interventions to promote pro-social behaviour in wider society (Moll et al., 2005).  This was 
the first study to examine the relationships between moral reasoning and cognitive and 
emotional factors in a TBI group design.  Unfortunately, it did not reveal significant findings 
in the TBI group and this has limited the generalisability to this population.  However, it did 
reveal, with the data available, that TBI resulted in damage to the frontal lobe and moral 
reasoning deficits, suggesting these are important factors impacting on the relationship 
between moral reasoning and TBI.  Furthermore, processes commonly associated with the 
frontal lobe, executive function, inhibition and cognitive flexibility; did explain some of the 
variance in moral reasoning, in the healthy comparison group.  This may have implications 
for the general population and legal justice system.  Programmes designed to target anti-
social behaviour and increase pro-social behaviour in offending populations, for example the 
EQUIP (Gibbs et al., 1995) may benefit from focusing on improving these functions.  It may 
be that these programmes could be adapted to improve moral reasoning difficulties in the 
brain injury population. However, it is important to consider that this study did not identify 
all of the factors underpinning moral reasoning and therefore, future research is required to 
explore this further to inform adaptations of these intervention programmes. 
  The findings from the study may have other implications for the wider legal justice 
system.  It demonstrated that overall moral reasoning within the healthy comparison group 
was within stage 3 - a mature stage of moral reasoning (Gibbs et al., 1992).  The study 
examined individuals in late adolescence and early adulthood and supported a previous 
suggestion that moral reasoning does not reach maturity until this age (Gibbs et al., 1992).  
Given the link between moral reasoning and offending behaviour and the late onset of the 
moral reasoning, this area warrants further examination as at the moment in this country, 
individuals can be tried for a criminal offence at the age of ten.   
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4.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of the study 
 The findings of this study need to be interpreted in relation to an evaluation of the 
methodology.  Methodological strengths and weaknesses of the design, participants, 
measures, procedure and data analysis will be considered in turn.   
 
 4.5.1 Design  
 There were a number of strengths in the study design.  The between group design 
enabled the study to explore the difference in moral reasoning between the age, sex, and SES-
matched healthy comparison group and TBI group.  The design also enabled this difference 
to be explored whilst controlling for intellectual functioning across the groups.  There were, 
however, some limitations to this finding, the study captured individuals at a single time point 
and, therefore, cannot make conclusions about the impact on later moral development.  In 
addition, the between group design and small sample size did not enable within group 
analyses about severity, localisation and age at injury in the TBI group.  This information 
would have enabled more specific conclusions to be drawn about the impact of type and age 
of TBI on moral reasoning. 
 The correlational design enabled the study to draw conclusions about the relationships 
between moral reasoning and other variables.  Significant findings in the healthy comparison 
group could be considered in relation to theory and previous research.  Due to the nature of 
the correlational design, however, there are limitations on the interpretations that can be 
made.  The study could conclude that the variables accounted for some of variance in moral 
reasoning but were unable to conclude which accounted for more or make any causal links as 
it does not mean that these variables definitely caused this variation.    
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 4.5.2 Participants  
 The strict eligibility criteria and the exclusion of mental health diagnoses and 
developmental disorders helped reduce the confounding variables in this study.  In addition, 
the tight age range for recruitment reduced further variability.  A further strength of the study 
was the heterogeneity of the comparison group.  The sample was recruited from several 
places and the study collected information on age, sex and occupation.  This enabled the 
study to demonstrate the groups were matched in age, sex and SES.  The measures thus taken 
will have reduced confounding variables and enhanced the internal validity of the findings.        
 Furthermore, the study managed to recruit a sufficient number of participants in the 
TBI group to enable enough power to detect a difference in moral reasoning between the 
groups.  They were recruited from various NHS and brain injury organisations in East Anglia 
to increase variability in the sample and maximise recruitment.  In addition, the study 
examined moral reasoning in survivors of brain injury in early adulthood, aged between 17 
and 25 years of age.  This was a particular time point of interest which had been missed in 
previous studies.  A focus on a particular age range may have reduced some variability within 
the groups.   
 The study also focused specifically on individuals who had sustained a TBI.  There 
are difficulties pinpointing the exact localisation of the damage as CT scans are the most 
readily available method and they often do not have sufficient spatial resolution to detect 
frontal or temporal damage (Salmond et al., 2006).  Nevertheless, research with more 
advanced technology has suggested TBI is associated with damage to these areas (Bigler, 
1997).  The focus on a TBI group was a strength as it may have increased the likelihood of 
examining damage in the frontal regions than would have been achieved in a wider acquired 
brain injury group.  This was supported by the study, as when scan data was available; it 
mostly reported damage to the frontal regions.    
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 There were, however, some factors within the study that may have limited the 
conclusions and generalisability of these findings.  Whilst there were no significant 
differences found between the groups on age, sex or SES, there may have been some subtle 
differences.  The healthy comparison group had a greater number of females, were slightly 
older and consisted of more professionals.  These factors may have contributed to the higher 
level of moral reasoning.  They may have been further in their moral development.  It may 
have been helpful to have collected more information on the participants in order to 
understand about other potential differences between the groups which may have accounted 
for some of the other variance in moral reasoning.  Areas for future focus should be familial 
factors and information on social and academic functioning for both groups.    
  It may have been useful to have collected further information in the TBI group to 
increase the understanding of the impact of TBI on moral reasoning.  Specifically, this may 
have included information on support received, the impact and adjustment to the brain injury 
by the individual and family.  It also would have been helpful to obtain further details on the 
localisation and severity of the brain injury.   
 There are some factors which may have limited the conclusions and generalisability 
of these findings to the wider population.  The focus on a specific age range, one 
geographical area and individuals in receipt of service, for recruitment may have limited the 
generalisability to the wider population.  In addition, a key limitation was the small sample 
size in the TBI group.  Many participants underperformed on the measures and this reduced 
the variability in the data set.  This may be due to the study capturing a group with severe 
TBIs with two participants within the first year of recovery this  may have reduced the power 
to detect significant correlations between moral reasoning and the other variables in the TBI 
group.  Furthermore, a larger sample size would have enabled more conclusions to have been 
made about the impact of TBI at different points along the developmental trajectory.   
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 A final consideration about the participants in both groups is the fact they were able to 
consider whether they participated in this study for obvious ethical reasons.  The fact every 
participant made this decision to participate and give up their time; potentially shows 
prosocial behaviour and empathy; and may suggest the study recruited individuals with 
higher moral reasoning for their population. 
   
 4.5.3 Measures  
 A strength of this study was the fact the measures were selected based on greater 
reliability and validity where possible.  A further strength was the use of varied methods of 
assessment.  This may have made the session more interesting and may have contributed to 
the paucity of missing data, thus increasing the reliability and validity of the findings. 
 There were some limitations in the measures.  Some were timed tasks and the TBI 
group may have been compromised by fatigue, attention, language and slow processing 
difficulties rather than difficulties in the assessed domain.  It was not possible to assess for all 
these confounding factors as it would have increased the burden for participants.   
 There were some further limitations in relation to specific measures.  The study used a 
validated and reliable measure of intellectual functioning.  It was, however, an abbreviated 
measure, WASI II, and this may have less validity than the full assessment of intellectual 
functioning such as the WAIS IV.  Nevertheless this measure was chosen to reduce the time 
demand and it has been shown to demonstrate high levels of reliability with the WAIS IV.  In 
addition, there may be some limitations in relation to the assessment of cognitive flexibility.  
The verbal fluency task, in particular category switching, has received criticism due to its 
level of internal consistency for this age group (Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen, 2006).  This 
may have limited the reliability of the findings.  This measure was selected because it was a 
verbal measure of cognitive flexibility (Delis et al., 2002), and short in duration, reducing the 
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burden on participants.  An alternative measure of cognitive flexibility, for example the 
DKEFS Trails making task, has also received the same criticism about its reliability (Strauss 
et al., 2006).  Executive function measures are still developing and current measures are 
criticised for their impurity as they often tap into several processes (Burgess, 2005).  The 
development and use of a more robust measure would improve this study methodology, 
enhance reliability and lead to stronger conclusions.  The limitations of this measure need to 
be considered when interpreting these findings.       
 There are some limitations in relation to the measure of socioeconomic status in this 
age group.  Firstly, the sample size may have been too small to detect differences given the 
number of categories.  Furthermore, there may be possible limitations of determining 
socioeconomic status by occupation in this particular age group.  Some of the participants 
were undecided about their future career and were working in temporary employment.  They 
may have much higher socioeconomic status than dictated by their occupation.  In addition, if 
they were at University, their parent’s occupation may not concur with their socioeconomic 
status.  For the TBI group, they were asked their occupation at the time of the injury and 
some did not remember their parents’ occupation therefore resulting in missing data.  It also 
did not capture changes in SES or occupation since the injury.  It may be more beneficial in 
future studies to capture the SES at both time points or to use another measure or incorporate 
a measure of pre-morbid individual and familial social and economic function.   
 In addition, the study used two self report measures, the DEX to capture executive 
function difficulties and the Empathy Quotient to measure empathy.  The use of self report 
measures in brain injury populations has been criticised.  It has been suggested that there can 
be problems with insight following a brain injury and as a consequence there is sometimes a 
distortion in an individual’s awareness of difficulties (Bond, 2008).  This study did not ask an 
independent rater to complete the EQ for the TBI group as previous studies have shown it to 
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be validated in the brain injury population without an independent rater (de Souza et al., 
2010).  In addition, another study did not report any significant difference between the self 
and independent rater in a brain injury group (Adlam et al., 2009).  In this study there was no 
difference between the DEX self and independent rater.  This may suggest they were aware 
of their situation and support the use of self report measures.  An alternative view is that these 
findings may be due to the independent rater not fully understanding their relative’s 
difficulties and a standardised objective measure of executive functioning may be a more 
valid assessment. 
 A further point is surrounding the reliability of the findings on the IRT in this study.  
A quarter of the TBI group terminated the task early and this resulted in missing data.  
Several participants in both groups criticised the measure for being slow and long.  This may 
have affected the performance on the task as participants in the healthy comparison group 
described making guesses due to boredom and reduced concentration.  The validation of this 
task provided participants with a small monetary token dependent on their outcome (Dunn et 
al., 2010) and this may have enhanced the performance.  This study was unable to offer this.  
The possible loss of interest in the task may have reduced the optimal performance and may 
question the validity of the absence of significant differences between the groups and 
significant correlations with moral reasoning.  Nevertheless, other measures of emotion-based 
decision making have limitations, the IGT is costly and has high cognitive load (Dunn et al., 
2006), and an alternative, the BGT, has not demonstrated evidence of psycho-physiological 
correlates to performance.  It may be worth re-examining the IRT in future studies, using 
monetary tokens or examining this measure in a shorter assessment battery, these 
modifications may overcome the difficulties in this study. 
 Another point for consideration is the selection of the moral reasoning measure, the 
SRM-SF.  The methodology was strengthened by the use of this measure.  It was a 
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production measure, thereby reducing the risk of social desirability bias (Langdon et al., 
2010).  It has also demonstrated reliability and validity across many different cultures and age 
groups (Gibbs et al., 2007), in a learning disability population (Langdon et al., 2010) and has 
been used in children with a brain injury (Couper et al., 2002).  In addition, it can be 
delivered as an interview which enabled time and support.  Scorable scripts were produced by 
every participant and this supports the use in the brain injury population.  The researcher also 
achieved a high inter-rater reliability with an expert rater.  There may, however, be some 
limitations.  It may have been difficult for an individual with a brain injury to provide their 
full answer on the spot as a result of cognitive or language problems.  The study tried to 
minimise the possible confounding problems by excluding individuals with language 
difficulties, however, there may have been some subtle difficulties and this must be 
considered when interpreting the results.  Nevertheless, no measure of moral reasoning has 
been validated in the brain injury population and moral reasoning difficulties have been 
revealed in other studies where other measure have been used (Beauchamp et al., in press).  
The possible difficulties with the assessment may be similar to those encountered in everyday 
moral decision making.  Another possible limitation is the fact this measure is based on Gibbs 
et al., (1992; 2010) theory.  This may explain the absence of the correlation between the 
performance on this measure and emotion-based decision making.  It may have been helpful 
to incorporate an additional measure of moral reasoning, i.e. the hypothetical scenarios 
measure which tapes into personal scenarios which may be more dependent on emotion 
processes.     
 Finally, the study would have benefited from assessments of social function.  This 
would have enabled the relationship between the difficulties in moral reasoning and social 
function to have been explored in the TBI group.  The assessments conducted in this session 
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took about two hours to complete and it was, therefore, not possible to be included, opening 
yet another avenue for future research.   
  
 4.5.4 Procedure 
 The study demonstrated a number of strengths.  The assessments were 
counterbalanced to manage practice and fatigue effects which enabled other confounding 
variables to be controlled.  In addition, breaks and number of sessions were determined by 
the individuals, who were visited at a place of convenience to them.  This ensured the study 
measured the individual’s best performance.  This would have, however, created differences 
in the assessment sessions and may have limited the internal validity of the study. 
  
 4.5.5 Data analysis 
 Another strength of this study was the limited amount of missing data.  Furthermore 
several of the variables met the assumptions for parametric tests.  A couple of variables, 
however, did not meet the assumptions for parametric tests and these tests did not appear to 
have much variability in the data.  For example, the data collected on the CWI lacked 
variability in the TBI group.  Many participants underperformed on this subtest and this lack 
of variability may explain the non-significant correlations in the TBI group.  In addition, 
violations in the parametric assumptions in the data meant non-parametric equivalent tests 
were used, these have been criticised for having less power to detect significant findings 
(Field, 2009).  A larger sample size may have overcome this.  The analysis failed to reveal 
significant findings in the TBI group.  This is probably because there was not sufficient 
power to detect significant findings and hence a definite limitation in this study. 
 This study revealed a number of interesting findings but some of these need to be 
considered in the light of sample and data analysis limitations.  Firstly a significant positive 
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correlation was revealed between age at injury and moral reasoning.  This indicated that there 
were greater moral reasoning difficulties following an earlier injury.  Caution needs to be 
applied, however, in interpreting this finding as the majority of the sample sustained their 
injury later in life and only two participants had early childhood injuries.  This correlation 
was questionable, therefore, given the limited range of age at injury.    
 There were further limitations in relation to the secondary research question findings.  
The secondary research questions were exploratory as several correlations were conducted 
between moral reasoning and variables in small samples.  Given the number of variables the 
sample size would have had to have been much bigger to accord with recommendations in 
this scenario.  A sample size of 50 is recommended to examine relationships between two 
variables and it is suggested that this should be increased for each additional variable 
(Wilson, Van Voorhis & Morgan, 2007).  Therefore the study did not meet the case variable 
ratio.  Consequently, the small sample size due to recruitment difficulties may have 
compromised the reliability of the correlation coefficient as under these circumstances 
correlations can be unreliable possibly leading to larger results than the real effect (Field, 
2003).   In addition the small sample size may have increased the likelihood of inaccurate 
non-significant results due to insufficient power (type II error).  Thus there were limitations 
in the correlations and the findings should therefore be treated as preliminary with caution 
applied in their interpretation.   Nevertheless this was an exploratory study and the first to 
examine the relationships between moral reasoning and other variables in a TBI group.  It has 
highlighted several areas for future research. 
 In summary, this section has reviewed several strengths in the study methodology.  
There are also some weaknesses, however, which need to be considered when making 
interpretations about the findings and may limit their generalisability whilst suggesting areas 
for further research.  
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4.6 Further research 
 The findings in this study have been consistent with previous research, that brain 
injury during childhood and adolescence impacts on moral reasoning development.  The 
study assessed individuals during early adulthood.  Some of the injuries were sustained 
within this period and, therefore, it has suggested that injury in early adulthood may lead to 
difficulties.  It also indicated, however, that an earlier onset of the injury was associated with 
lower moral reasoning.  This area needs to be explored further.  It would be helpful to explore 
the differences in moral reasoning ability when injury is sustained at different ages which 
could be established by between group comparisons or by a longitudinal design.  It would 
also be helpful to explore the different processes underpinning moral reasoning following 
childhood and adulthood injury.   
 The conclusions that could be drawn from this study have been limited by sample size 
and it would be helpful to consider these relationships in a larger sample which would enable 
more within group analyses.  The study has suggested several possible areas to consider 
including localisation, age at onset, severity and the cause of injury.  This would both help 
identify the factors which lead to moral reasoning deficits and help ensure assessment of 
those at highest risk, proving very beneficial given the demands on the current services.   
 This research area would benefit from a study comparing the different measures of 
moral reasoning and establishing the validity and reliability in this population.  This would 
support future research and be useful to clinical practice.    
 The study has examined the relationship between moral reasoning and a few variables 
of cognitive and emotion processes.  These variables, however, did not appear to account for 
all the variance in moral reasoning.  Furthermore, the selected measures may have impacted 
on the reliability of the findings.  Further research is required to develop more robust 
assessments of executive function.  The study would encourage future research to explore 
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other possible variables and may also benefit from future studies which examine these 
variables with other measures for emotion-based decision making and intuition.   
 The study makes some suggestions about other variables to explore in future research.  
These suggestions are in relation to pre- and post- injury personal and familial characteristics.  
In this study, there was variability in the degree of impact the injury had had on their social 
functioning and on their family in the TBI group.  It may be helpful to consider the pre- and 
post- injury personal and familial impact on moral reasoning.  These factors may be 
important to examine as they may alter the social opportunities for conflict and resolution.  
These social opportunities for conflict and resolution have been highlighted by the social 
perspective taking theory as being an important contribution to moral development.  
Similarly, another factor which may impact on social experience and may be important to 
capture is level support following the brain injury.  A brain injury can create a lot of distress 
for individuals and their families which, without the correct guidance, may not be managed in 
the most effective way.  One example of this could be over-protection.  The level of support 
the family receive from outside agencies, therefore, may have an impact on factors, in this 
particular situation, moral reasoning.  They may not have opportunities for conflict and 
resolution, which in addition to their cognitive difficulties, may hinder their moral 
development.  Finally it may be helpful to examine the, the amount of rehabilitative support 
they have received as this may have an impact on the factors considered to underpin moral 
reasoning, including cognitive factors.  It appears important, therefore, to capture the impact 
these familial and support factors have on the relationship between moral reasoning and brain 
injury.  If these are found to be important they could highlight a specific area for intervention. 
 The study also presented differences between the relationships between TBI and 
domains of moral reasoning and the impact of IQ.  This was the first study to explore the 
different domains following brain injury.  It may be helpful to pinpoint the different areas of 
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moral reasoning and consider the difficulties in each domain and look at variables 
underpinning each domain.  This may help indicate where the difficulties may be, inform 
clinical assessment and enable targeted interventions.  Future research is suggested as this 
was beyond the scope of this study.    
  Another area for future research is to examine the relationship between brain injury, 
moral reasoning, and social difficulties and / or offending behaviour.  It has been implied that 
moral reasoning difficulties are likely to impact negatively on social and behaviour 
functioning and are related to antisocial behaviour and offending behaviour.  This study has 
revealed moral reasoning difficulties after a TBI which may contribute to the social and 
behavioural difficulties and possible offending behaviour reported after a TBI.  This warrants 
closer examination and it would be helpful to explore the relationship between moral 
reasoning and social and behavioural functioning in the TBI population.  It may also be 
helpful to explore the relationship between TBI and anti social and offending behaviour and 
examine the role for moral reasoning.  This could be examined in the offending population.  
It is hypothesised that moral reasoning would be a predictor of this relationship and if this is 
found it will create an avenue for intervention for offenders and preventative work for non 
offenders with a TBI.  It may be that programmes such as EQUIP (Gibbs et al., 1995) could 
be adapted to improve moral reasoning following brain injury.  A study has revealed good 
outcomes when this has been unveiled to three survivors of brain injury (Manchester et al., 
2007) and the study would encourage further exploration.   
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 This study has revealed moral reasoning difficulties, as measured by the SRM-SF, in 
a group of young adults who have experienced a TBI when compared to healthy comparison 
group.  These findings suggest that moral reasoning deficits may be likely following a TBI 
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during childhood, adolescence, and early adulthood.  They were also suggestive of greater 
difficulties following a TBI sustained early in life.  The difference between the groups could 
not be attributed to differences in age, sex, SES or general intellectual function.  Further 
analysis has revealed intellectual functioning, inhibition, cognitive flexibility and empathy 
may explain some of the variance in moral reasoning.   
 These findings have theoretical and clinical implications.  They provided some 
support for the cognitive developmental theories of moral reasoning and for involvement of 
the frontal lobe in moral reasoning.  They also suggest the need to be aware of possible moral 
reasoning difficulties following a TBI.  These difficulties in moral reasoning following a TBI 
may contribute to the behavioural and social difficulties commonly reported after TBI.  
Further studies are also encouraged to examine the relationship between TBI, moral 
reasoning and social functioning, in particular offending behaviour.  These areas for future 
research may help identify targets for intervention. 
 The findings from this study are limited by methodological weaknesses, in particular 
a small sample size and selection of measures.  Further studies with larger samples are 
suggested to help pinpoint the underlying factors of moral reasoning.  Furthermore the factors 
measured in this study did not account for all the variance in moral reasoning which may be 
useful to explore in further studies.  Other areas for consideration are suggested; pre and post 
social and behaviour factors and specific injury characteristics including age at injury, 
severity and localisation.  Furthermore, exploratory analyses indicated that there may be 
differences in performance across the domains of moral reasoning, this requires further 
research.   
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Appendix A Ethical Approval 
This section includes the approvals from NHS Ethics.  They also include an approval of the substantial 
amendment 2 to include extra documents for the Norfolk Community Health and Care Trust, Colman 
Centre.  The study sought approval to widen the criteria to Acquired Brain Injury.  This was not acted 
on.  It also includes the approval from Brain Injury Rehabilitation Team (BIRT) ethics committee. 
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Appendix B Permissions 
This appendix section contains the letters of approval from the Research and Development departments 
for Norfolk Community Health and Care NHS trust, Cambridge and Peterborough NHS Foundation 
trust, Cambridge Community Services NHS trust and Addenbrookes, Cambridge University Hospitals 
NHS foundation trust (scanned versions).  I have also added a copy of permission from Oak Farm, 
Select Healthcare Group. 
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Appendix C Participant information sheets 
This section contains the participant information sheets for the TBI group, healthy comparison group 
and the information sheet for relatives. They had the appropriate trust logo and patient advice liaison 
service details for each site. 
This section also includes the study summary requested by the Colman Centre for recruitment. 
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 Participant Information Sheet 
  “Exploring the impact of brain injury on thinking and reasoning” 
My name is Lucy Wigg.  I am a trainee clinical psychologist at the University of East Anglia who is 
undertaking a doctorate in clinical psychology.  As part of this I am required to conduct a research 
study.  I would like to invite you to take part.  Before you decide whether or not you would like to 
participate, please take time to read this information sheet.  It will tell you why the study is being done 
and what you can expect if you take part.  Please talk to others about it if you wish and feel free to ask 
any questions.    
Part 1 tells you about why this study is happening and what would be asked from you. 
Part 2 gives you more information about the conduct of the study. 
Part 1 
What is the purpose of this study? 
Sometimes when individuals experience a brain injury there can be changes to the way they reason or 
think about topics and situations.  I am interested in understanding this further.  In particular whether 
there are changes and what may influence these.  I plan to do this by comparing individuals who have 
had a brain injury with a group of individuals of a similar age that have not had a brain injury.   
Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been invited to participate in this study because you have experienced a brain injury.  I am 
inviting anyone between the ages of 17 and 25 years who has experienced a brain injury to participate 
in this study. 
Do I have to participate? 
No.  It is entirely up to you to decide whether or not you wish to take part.  This information sheet is to 
give you more information about the study to help you make a decision either way.  You will be asked 
to sign a consent form if you decide to participate in the study.  If you do decide to participate in the 
study, you will be free to change your mind, withdraw your consent at any time, without giving a 
reason.  Your decisions will not affect your standard of care.  
 
Norwich Medical School 
Postgraduate Research Office 
2.30 Elizabeth Fry Building 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich Research Park 
Norwich.  NR4 7TJ 
Email:clinpsyd@uea.ac.uk 
Tel:  +44 (0) 1603 593076 
Fax: +44 (0) 1603 591132 
Web: www.uea.ac.uk/foh 
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What happens to me if I take part? 
If you decide you would like to participate you will be asked to sign a consent form for your clinical 
team to share your contact details with me.   I will then contact you and give you an opportunity to ask 
any further questions about the study.  If you would like to participate we will arrange a convenient 
time and place for the one-off session.  
In the session you will be asked to complete a range of tasks.  These involve answering questions, 
filling in questionnaires and participating in tasks pinpointing your thinking skills.  The session will 
take between 90 and 120 minutes.  It would be helpful for the researcher to gather some more details 
about your injury, the date on which it occurred and the severity and with your permission she would 
like to contact your clinical team to answer these questions and to inform them you have participated in 
this study.  Also with your consent, she would also like to contact a close relative to ask them to fill in a 
short questionnaire.  
On completion the information collected will be kept locked in a filing cabinet at the university.  This 
will be transported by the researcher in a locked brief case.  The data will be entered onto a database 
protected by university password protected systems.  If it is accessed on another computer it will done 
so through an encrypted memory stick.  The data will never be saved to another computer.  This data 
will not be identifiable, your responses will be entered under a number not by name.  Your clinical care 
will not be affected due to this study. 
Will my taking part be kept confidential? 
Yes.  All the information about you will be kept confidential.  Any data entered onto a computer will be 
done so under a unique code given to you.  Your consent form and the list which links codes to 
people’s identity will be locked separately from the completed assessment measures.   No identifiable 
data will be collected.  In accordance with publishing guidelines, the data needs to be kept securely for 
5 years. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
This study aims to contribute to understanding of whether changes occur in thinking processes 
following a brain injury.  It aims to do this to inform rehabilitation programmes.  Whilst this study may 
not help you, the information from the study will contribute to an understanding of impact of brain 
injury on individuals.  The researcher is happy to complete a short report on the session for your 
clinical team if you would like this. 
Risks and Burdens 
The researcher cannot envisage any disadvantages or risks for taking part.  In the unlikely event that 
you experience any distress completing the questionnaires the session will be terminated, reasons 
explored, and the researcher will inform your clinical team.   
What happens when the research stops? 
The data collected in this study will be analysed and a report detailing the findings will be produced.  If 
you would like a summary of the report – I am happy to send you one after the work has been 
completed.  
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You will be asked if you would like to be added to a Research Volunteer Register hosted by Dr Anna 
Adlam (Clinical Senior Lecturer) at the University of East Anglia to inform you of opportunities to 
participate in ethically approved studies conducted by her and her team. This is voluntary and you can 
withdraw this consent at any time.  All data will be kept on local encrypted disk drives as per 
University of East Anglia data protection policy (see http://www.uea.ac.uk/is/strategies/infregs/dp) and 
they will contact you after 5 years elapses to ask if you wish to remain on the Register. 
If the information in part 1 has interested you and you are considering participation please read the 
additional information in part 2 before making a decision. 
Part 2 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on the study? 
You are free to withdraw your consent at any time.  You have to just let us know but you do not have to 
give a reason.  You can decide whether you are happy for data already collected to be processed or if 
you would like it to be destroyed. 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this research please contact me and I will do my best to 
answer your questions.  Alternatively you can contact my supervisor.  If you remain unhappy and wish 
to complain formally, you can do this through the University of East Anglia.  Each of these actions can 
be taken by telephoning the number under the address on the first page.  You can also use the NHS 
formal complaints procedure, for more advice on this process you can contact Patient Advice and 
Liaison Service at Elliott House, 130 Ber Street, Norwich, Norfolk, NR1 3FR or telephone 0800 088 
4449 or POhWER on 0300 456 2370. 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
This research is being conducted as part of a Doctorate of Clinical Psychology course at the University 
of East Anglia (UEA).  There is no additional funding for this research. 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been reviewed by the East of England, Hertfordshire NHS ethics committee and relevant 
research governance for participating agencies. 
Further information and contact details 
Lucy Wigg (Trainee Clinical Psychologist)   
Supervised by Dr Anna Adlam (Clinical Psychologist and tutor on UEA Doctorate) 
Room 2.30, Elizabeth Fry Building 
Norwich Medical School 
Norwich Research Park 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich.  NR4 7TJ 
Tel: 01603 593076  Email: l.wigg@uea.ac.uk 
 
Thank you very much for the time you have taken to read this information sheet it is much 
appreciated!! 
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Participant Information Sheet 
      “Exploring the effects of brain injury on thinking and reasoning” 
     
My name is Lucy Wigg.  I am a trainee clinical psychologist at the University of East Anglia 
where I am undertaking a doctorate in clinical psychology.  As part of this I am required to 
conduct a research study.  I would like to invite you to take part.  Before you decide whether 
or not you want to participate, please take time to read this information sheet.  It will tell you 
why the study is being done and what you can expect if you take part.  Please talk to others 
about it if you wish and feel free to ask any questions.    
Part 1 tells you about why this study is happening and what would be asked from you. 
Part 2 gives you more information about the conduct of the study. 
Part 1 
What is the purpose of this study? 
Sometimes when individuals experience a brain injury there can be changes to the way they 
reason or think about topics and situations.  I am interested in understanding this further, in 
particular whether there are changes and what may influence these.  I plan to do this by 
comparing individuals who have had a brain injury with a group of individuals of a similar 
age that have not had a brain injury.   
Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been invited to participate in this study because you are within the age range of my 
selected brain injury group.  I am seeking individuals between the ages of 17 and 25 years 
who have not had a brain injury to act as my comparison group. 
 
Norwich Medical School 
Postgraduate Research Office 
2.30 Elizabeth Fry Building 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich Research Park 
Norwich.  NR4 7TJ 
Email:clinpsyd@uea.ac.uk 
Tel:  +44 (0) 1603 593076 
Fax: +44 (0) 1603 591132 
Web: www.uea.ac.uk/foh 
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Do I have to participate? 
No.  It is entirely up to you to decide whether or not you wish to take part.  This information 
sheet is to give you more information about the study to help you make a decision either way.  
You will be asked to sign a consent form if you decide to participate in the study.  If you do 
decide to participate in the study, you will be free to change your mind and withdraw your 
consent at any time, without giving a reason.   
What happens to me if I take part? 
If you decide you would like to participate you will be invited to attend a one off session with 
the researcher at a time and place that is convenient to you.  At this session you will have an 
opportunity to ask any further questions about the study.  If you are happy to participate you 
will be asked to sign a consent form.  You will be asked your age and sex.   
In the assessment session you will be asked to complete a range of tasks.  These involve 
answering questions, filling in questionnaires and participating in tasks pinpointing your 
thinking skills.  The session will take between 90 and 120 minutes.   I will ask you for your 
consent to send a letter to your GP to inform them of your participation in this research but no 
further details.  On completion of these tasks, the information collected will be kept locked in 
a filing cabinet at the university.  This will be transported by the researcher in a locked brief 
case.  The data will be entered onto a database protected by university password protected 
systems and saved on an encrypted memory stick if accessed on other computers.  The data 
will never be saved to another computer.  This data will not be identifiable as your responses 
will be entered under a number not by name.   
Will my taking part be kept confidential? 
Yes.  All the information about you will be kept confidential.  Your data will be given a code 
number and will be entered using this onto the computer.  Your consent form and the list 
which links codes to people’s identity will be locked separately from the completed 
assessment measures.   No identifiable data will be collected.  In accordance with publishing 
guidelines, the data needs to be kept securely for 5 years. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
This study is seeking to explore changes in thinking following a brain injury.  It aims to do 
this to inform rehabilitation programmes.  Whilst this study may not help you, the 
information from the study may contribute to an understanding of impact of brain injury on 
individuals. 
Risks and Burdens 
The researcher does not envisage any disadvantages or risks through taking part. In the 
unlikely event that you experience any distress completing the questionnaires the session will 
be terminated, reasons explored, and the researcher will inform your GP.   
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What happens when the research stops? 
The data collected in this study will be analysed and a report detailing the findings will be 
produced.  If you would like a summary of the report – I am happy to send you one after the 
work has been completed.   
If the information in part 1 has interested you and you are considering participation please 
read the additional information in part 2 before making a decision. 
Part 2 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on the study? 
You are free to withdraw your consent at any time.  You have to just let us know but you do 
not have to give a reason.  You can decide whether you are happy for data already collected 
to be processed or if you would like it to be destroyed. 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this research you can contact me and I will do my 
best to answer your questions.  Alternatively you can contact my supervisor.  If you remain 
unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this through the University of East 
Anglia.  Each of these actions can be taken by telephoning the number under the address on 
the first page. You can also use the NHS formal complaints procedure, for more advice on 
this process you can contact Patient Advice and Liason Service on www.pals.nhs.uk or 
POhWER on 0300 456 2370. 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
This is being conducted as a thesis, as part of a Doctorate of Clinical Psychology course at 
the University of East Anglia (UEA).  There is no additional funding for the research. 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been reviewed by the East of England Hertfordshire NHS ethics committee 
and relevant research governance for participating agencies. 
Further information and contact details 
Lucy Wigg (Trainee Clinical Psychologist)   
Supervised by Dr Anna Adlam (Clinical Psychologist and tutor on UEA Doctorate) 
Norwich Medical School 
Postgraduate Research Office, 2.30 Elizabeth Fry Building 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich Research Park 
Norwich.  NR4 7TJ 
Email: l.wigg@uea.ac.uk 
Thank you very much for the time you have taken to read this information sheet, it is 
much appreciated!   
Participant information sheet – group 2 (version 2: 9th August 2012) 
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Participant Information Sheet 
      “Exploring the impact of brain injury on thinking and reasoning” 
My name is Lucy Wigg.  I am a trainee clinical psychologist at the University of East Anglia  
who is undertaking a doctorate in clinical psychology.  As part of this I am required to 
conduct a research study.  I would like to invite you to take part.  Before you decide whether 
or not you want to participate, please take time to read this information sheet.  It will tell you 
why the study is being done and what you can expect if you take part.  Please talk to others 
about it if you wish.  Feel free to ask any questions.    
Part 1 tells you about why this study is happening and what would be asked from you. 
Part 2 gives you more information about the conduct of the study. 
Part 1 
What is the purpose of this study? 
Sometimes when individuals experience a brain injury there can be changes to the way they 
reason or think about topics and situations.  I am interested in understanding this further in 
particular whether there are changes and what may influence these.  I plan to do this by 
comparing individuals who have had a brain injury with a group of individuals of a similar 
age that have not had a brain injury.  This also involves collecting some information from a 
close relative of the individual with the brain injury. 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been invited to participate in this study because you are a close relative of an 
individual who has experienced a brain injury and has agreed to participate in this study.   
Do I have to participate? 
No.  It is entirely up to you to decide whether or not you wish to take part.  This information 
sheet is to give you more information about the study to help you make a decision either way.  
Norwich Medical School 
Postgraduate Research Office,  
2.30 Elizabeth Fry Building 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich Research Park 
Norwich.  NR4 7TJ 
Email:clinpsyd@uea.ac.uk 
Tel:  +44 (0) 1603 593076 
Fax: +44 (0) 1603 591132 
Web: www.uea.ac.uk/foh 
Participant information sheet – relatives (version 2: 9th August 2012) 
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You will be asked to sign a consent form if you decide to participate in the study.  If you do 
decide to participate in the study, you will be free to change your mind, withdraw your 
consent at any time, without giving a reason.   
What happens to me if I take part? 
If you decide you would like to participate, you will be asked to complete the consent form 
and the questionnaire that I have sent you.  The questionnaire asks about behaviours that can 
occur after a brain injury and you will be are asked to answer the questions in relation to your 
relative.  It asks you to rate whether they engage in the suggested behaviour and if so how 
often.  This should take you between 5 and 10 minutes and on completion I would ask that 
you return the questionnaire in the stamped addressed envelope. 
On receipt of this information, it will be kept in a locked filing cabinet at the university.  This 
will be transported by the researcher in a locked brief case.  The data will be entered onto a 
database protected by University password protected systems.  If accessed on other systems it 
will be done through an encrypted memory stick if accessed on other computers.  The data 
will never be saved to another computer.  This data will not be identifiable as your responses 
will be entered under the number assigned to your relative.   
Will my taking part be kept confidential? 
Yes.  All the information about you will be kept confidential.  Your data will be linked to that 
of your relative and entered under their unique assigned code number.  Your consent form 
and the list which links codes to people’s identity will be locked separately from the 
completed assessment measures.   No identifiable data will be collected.  In accordance with 
publishing guidelines, the data needs to be kept securely for 5 years. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
This study is aiming to explore changes in thinking following a brain injury compared to 
individuals of the same age without a brain injury.  It aims to do this to inform rehabilitation 
programmes.  Whilst this study may not help you, the information from the study will 
contribute to an understanding of impact of brain injury on individuals 
Risks and Burdens 
The researcher does not envisage any disadvantages or risks for taking part. In the unlikely 
event that you experience any distress completing the questionnaires, please stop and if it 
continues please contact your GP. 
What happens when the research stops? 
The data collected in this study will be analysed and a report detailing the findings will be 
produced.  If you would like a summary of the report – I am happy to send you one after the 
work has been completed.   
Participant information sheet – relatives (version 2: 9th August 2012) 
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If the information in part 1 has interested you and you are considering participation please 
read the additional information in part 2 before making a decision. 
Part 2 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on the study? 
You are free to withdraw your consent at any time.  You have to just let us know but you do 
not have to give a reason.  You can decide whether you are happy for data already collected 
to be processed or if you would like it to be destroyed. 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this research you can contact me and I will do my 
best to answer your questions.  Alternatively you can contact my supervisor.  If you remain 
unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this through the University of East 
Anglia.  Each of these actions can be taken by telephoning the number under the address on 
the first page.  You can also use the NHS formal complaints procedure, for more advice on 
this process you can contact Patient Advice and Liason Service on www.pals.nhs.uk or 
POhWER on 0300 456 2370. 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
This research is being conducted as part of a Doctorate of Clinical Psychology course at the 
University of East Anglia (UEA).  There is no additional funding for this research. 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been reviewed by an NHS ethics committee and relevant research governance 
for participating agencies. 
Further information and contact details 
Lucy Wigg (Trainee Clinical Psychologist)   
Supervised by Dr Anna Adlam (Clinical Psychologist and tutor on UEA Doctorate) 
Norwich Medical School 
Postgraduate Research Office, 2.30 Elizabeth Fry Building 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich Research Park 
Norwich.  NR4 7TJ 
Email: l.wigg@uea.ac.uk 
 
Thank you very much for the time you have taken to read this information sheet, it is 
much appreciated! 
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“Exploring the effects of brain injury on thinking and reasoning” 
 
You have been invited to participate in a research study.    I have been asked to give you this 
(participant information sheet) which tells you about the study.   I will give you a brief 
summary about it. This is not connected to your treatment here.   
The study is hoping to understand the impact of brain injury a little further.  It is being run 
by Lucy Wigg, a trainee Clinical Psychologist at the University of East Anglia.  It looks at 
whether brain injury affects how people reason and think about things.  She hopes this will 
help inform future rehabilitation programmes.   
She is looking for volunteers, aged between 17 and 25 years to help with her study, so that’s 
why I am asking you.  She would visit them at home or wherever is easiest.  She should only 
need to visit once and it will take about 2 hours.   In the session you would be asked to 
participate in a range of tasks – paper and pen tasks, computer task. 
Your performance on these tasks would be anonymised and it would not be identifiable that 
it was you.  Your data would also be kept securely in a locked filing cabinet at the University 
of East Anglia.  If you were happy, she could inform us how you did on these tasks.   
Would you be interested in hearing more about this study?   
Would you be happy in me giving Lucy your contact details so she could contact you? 
 
Contact details 
Email: l.wigg@uea.ac.uk 
Telephone number: 01603 591507 
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Appendix D Consent forms 
This section includes the consent to share contact details form for TBI group and the consent 
forms for the TBI group, healthy comparison group and relatives. 
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Norwich Medical School 
Postgraduate Research Office 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich NR4 7TJ 
United Kingdom 
Email:clinpsyd@uea.ac.uk 
Tel:  +44 (0) 1603 593076 
Fax: +44 (0) 1603 591132 
Web: www.uea.ac.uk/foh 
 
Participant Number: 
Consent Form 
 
Title of project: Exploring the impact of brain injury on thinking and reasoning. 
 
Name of researcher:  Lucy Wigg 
1) I confirm that I have read the information sheet dated the 12th September 
2012, version 3.   
 
2) I give my consent for my clinical team to share my contact details with the 
researcher. 
 
 
 
 
 
    Name of participant           Date             Signature                    
 
   Name of person taking            Date             Signature 
   consent 
(Please initial boxes) 
Participant consent form– contact details (version 3: 12th September 2012) 
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                 Norwich Medical School 
Postgraduate Research Office 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich NR4 7TJ 
Email:clinpsyd@uea.ac.uk 
Tel:  +44 (0) 1603 593076 
Fax: +44 (0) 1603 591132 
Web: www.uea.ac.uk/foh 
Participant Number: 
Consent Form 
Title of project: Exploring the impact of brain injury on thinking and reasoning. 
Name of researcher:  Lucy Wigg 
 
1) I confirm that I have read the information sheet dated the 12th September 2012, 
version 3.  I have asked any questions and had these answered satisfactory. 
 
2) I understand my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time without my care being affected. 
 
3) I give my consent for my clinical team to be contacted to obtain the relevant 
information as detailed in the information sheet. 
 
4) I give my consent for a close relative to be contacted and provide their details. 
 
5) In the event that I no longer have capacity to consent to this study, I consent to  
data collected prior to this time being used in this study. 
 
6) I give my consent for my clinical team to be provided with a short summary 
of the session. 
 
7) I give my consent to receive a study summary at the end of the study. 
 
8) I understand relevant section of my medical notes and data collected during the 
study may be looked at by individuals from regulatory authorities or from the  
NHS Trust where it is relevant to my taking part in this research. I give permission 
for these individuals to have access to my records. 
 
9) I give my consent to take part in this study 
 
10)  I agree for my contact details, date of birth, sex, and nature/date of injury to be 
kept on a secure Volunteer Research Participant Register, hosted by the UEA and 
Dr Anna Adlam, so that I can be contacted about future research studies  
conducted by Dr Anna Adlam’s research team (optional) 
  
Name of participant            Date             Signature                    
 
 
    
Name of person taking            Date             Signature 
   consent 
(Please initial boxes) 
Yes / No 
(Please 
circle) 
Participant consent form– group 1 (version 3: 12th September 2012) 
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Norwich Medical School 
Postgraduate Research Office 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich NR4 7TJ 
United Kingdom 
Email:clinpsyd@uea.ac.uk 
Tel:  +44 (0) 1603 593076 
Fax: +44 (0) 1603 591132 
Web: www.uea.ac.uk/foh 
 
Participant Number: 
Consent Form 
Title of project: Exploring the impact of brain injury on thinking and reasoning. 
Name of researcher:  Lucy Wigg 
1) I confirm that I have read the information sheet dated the 9th August 2012, 
version 2.  I have asked any questions and had these answered satisfactory. 
 
2) I understand my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time without giving a reason. 
 
3) I give my consent for the researcher to send a letter to my GP to inform them 
of my participation in this study. 
 
4) I give my consent to receive a study summary report at the end of the study 
summarising the main group findings. 
 
5) I understand relevant data collected during the study may be looked at by 
individuals from regulatory authorities or from the NHS Trust where it is 
relevant to my taking part in this research. I give permission for these 
individuals to have access to my records. 
 
6) I give my consent to take part in this study 
 
 
 
    Name of participant           Date             Signature                    
   
 Name of person taking            Date             Signature 
   consent 
(Please initial boxes) 
Participant consent form– group 2(version 2: 9th August 2012) 
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Norwich Medical School 
Postgraduate Research Office 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich NR4 7TJ 
United Kingdom 
Email:clinpsyd@uea.ac.uk 
Tel:  +44 (0) 1603 593076 
Fax: +44 (0) 1603 591132 
Web: www.uea.ac.uk/foh 
 
Participant Number: 
Consent Form 
Title of project: Exploring the impact of brain injury on thinking and reasoning. 
Name of researcher:  Lucy Wigg 
Name of relative: _________________________ 
 
1) I confirm that I have read the information sheet dated the 9th August 2012, 
version 2.  I have asked any questions and had these answered satisfactory. 
 
2) I understand my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time without giving a reason. 
 
3) I give my consent to take part in this study 
 
4) I understand relevant section of my data collected during the study may be looked at 
by from regulatory authorities or from the NHS Trust where it is relevant to my 
taking part in this research. I give permission for these individuals to have access to 
my records 
 
 
 
    Name of participant           Date             Signature                    
 
   Name of person taking            Date             Signature 
   Consent 
(Please initial boxes) 
Participant consent form– relatives (version 2: 9th August 2012) 
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Appendix E – Recruitment poster 
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Can you help  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Are you aged between 17 and 25 years? 
 
Would you like to be part of a study hoping to 
develop our understanding of how people 
reason? 
 
I would like to recruit healthy volunteers to compare the 
way they reason to a group of individuals who have 
experienced a brain injury. 
  
Are you willing to participate in a one-off session at a time 
and place convenient to you? 
 
If you are interested, please contact  
Lucy Wigg (Trainee Clinical Psychologist) on l.wigg@uea.ac.uk  
 
Recruitment poster version 2: 09/08/2012 
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Appendix F – GP letter. 
A copy of this letter was sent to GPs for the participants in the healthy comparison group. 
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Department of Psychological Sciences 
Postgraduate Research Office 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich NR4 7TJ 
United Kingdom 
Email:clinpsyd@uea.ac.uk 
Tel:  +44 (0) 1603 593076 
Fax: +44 (0) 1603 591132 
 
 
Dear  [insert GP/ clinical team] 
 I am writing to you to inform you that [insert name] has participated in a research 
study.  The research study is entitled “Exploring the impact of traumatic brain injury on 
moral reasoning and how this relates to executive functioning, empathy and emotion based 
decision making”.  They participated in a one off assessment session on the [insert date].   
This research is being conducted as my thesis project which is part of my Doctorate of 
Clinical Psychology at the University of East Anglia. It is supervised by Dr Anna Adlam.  If 
you require any further information about the research please feel free to contact myself on 
the details above or by email on l.wigg@uea.ac.uk. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Lucy Wigg 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
University of East Anglia. 
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Appendix G  
This section contains a scanned copy of the SRM-SF reflection measure and the Empathy 
Quotient. 
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1. I can easily tell if someone else wants to 
enter a conversation.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree 
2. I prefer animals to humans.  strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
3. I try to keep up with the current trends and 
fashions.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
4. I find it difficult to explain to others things 
that I understand easily, when they don't 
understand it first time.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
5. I dream most nights.  strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
6. I really enjoy caring for other people.  strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
7. I try to solve my own problems rather than 
discussing them with others.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
8. I find it hard to know what to do in a social 
situation.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
9. I am at my best first thing in the morning.  strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
10. People often tell me that I went too far in 
driving my point home in a discussion.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
11. It doesn't bother me too much if I am late 
meeting a friend.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
12. Friendships and relationships are just too 
difficult, so I tend not to bother with them.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
13. I would never break a law, no matter how 
minor.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
14. I often find it difficult to judge if 
something is rude or polite.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
15. In a conversation, I tend to focus on my 
own thoughts rather than on what my 
listener might be thinking.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
16. I prefer practical jokes to verbal humour.  strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
17. I live life for today rather than the future.  strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
18. When I was a child, I enjoyed cutting up 
worms to see what would happen.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
19. I can pick up quickly if someone says 
one thing but means another.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
20. I tend to have very strong opinions about 
morality.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
21. It is hard for me to see why some things 
upset people so much.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
22. I find it easy to put myself in somebody 
else's shoes.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
23. I think that good manners are the most 
important thing a parent can teach their 
child.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
Empathy Quotient 
Below are a list of statements. Please read each statement very carefully and rate 
how strongly you agree or disagree with it by circling your answer. There are no right 
or wrong answers, or trick questions. 
 
 
 199 
 
24. I like to do things on the spur of the 
moment.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
25. I am good at predicting how someone 
will feel.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
26. I am quick to spot when someone in a 
group is feeling awkward or uncomfortable.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
27. If I say something that someone else is 
offended by, I think that that's their problem, 
not mine.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
28. If anyone asked me if I liked their haircut, 
I would reply truthfully, even if I didn't like it.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
29. I can't always see why someone should 
have felt offended by a remark.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
30. People often tell me that I am very 
unpredictable.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
31. I enjoy being the centre of attention at 
any social gathering.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
32. Seeing people cry doesn't really upset 
me.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
33. I enjoy having discussions about politics.  strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
34. I am very blunt, which some people take 
to be rudeness, even though this is 
unintentional.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
35. I don’t tend to find social situations 
confusing.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
36. Other people tell me I am good at 
understanding how they are feeling and what 
they are thinking.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
37. When I talk to people, I tend to talk about 
their experiences rather than my own.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
38. It upsets me to see an animal in pain.  strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
39. I am able to make decisions without 
being influenced by people's feelings.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
40. I can't relax until I have done everything I 
had planned to do that day.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
41. I can easily tell if someone else is 
interested or bored with what I am saying.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
42. I get upset if I see people suffering on 
news programmes.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
43. Friends usually talk to me about their 
problems as they say that I am very 
understanding.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
44. I can sense if I am intruding, even if the 
other person doesn't tell me.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
45. I often start new hobbies but quickly 
become bored with them and move on to 
something else.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
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46. People sometimes tell me that I have 
gone too far with teasing.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
47. I would be too nervous to go on a big 
rollercoaster.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
48. Other people often say that I am 
insensitive, though I don’t always see why.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
49. If I see a stranger in a group, I think that 
it is up to them to make an effort to join in.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
50. I usually stay emotionally detached when 
watching a film.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
51. I like to be very organised in day to day 
life and often make lists of the chores I have 
to do.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
52. I can tune into how someone else feels 
rapidly and intuitively.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
53. I don't like to take risks.  strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
54. I can easily work out what another 
person might want to talk about.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
55. I can tell if someone is masking their true 
emotion.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
56. Before making a decision I always weigh 
up the pros and cons.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
57. I don't consciously work out the rules of 
social situations.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
58. I am good at predicting what someone 
will do.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
59. I tend to get emotionally involved with a 
friend's problems.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
60. I can usually appreciate the other 
person's viewpoint, even if I don't agree with 
it.  
strongly 
agree  
slightly 
agree  
slightly 
disagree  
strongly 
disagree  
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Appendix H 
 
5 condition balanced Latin Square Design  
1- WASI II 
2- SRM-SF 
3- VF 
4- CWI 
5- IRT 
 
Participant Order 
1 1 2 5 3 4 
2 2 3 1 4 5 
3 3 4 2 5 1 
4 4 5 3 1 2 
5 5 1 4 2 3 
6 4 3 5 2 1 
7 5 4 1 3 2 
8 1 5 2 4 3 
9 2 1 3 5 4 
10 3 2 4 1 5 
 
This was repeated in each group. 
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Appendix I - Results from Shapiro-wilk and Levine’s test for both groups 
Variables HC TBI  
 
Levine’s 
 
 
p 
  
S-W 
 
P 
 
S-W 
 
P 
Age .93 .05 .95 .30 0.12 .73 
Age at injury - - .74 .001 - - 
Time since injury - - .84 .01 - - 
SRM SF .96 .18 .94 .21 0.96 .33 
Contract .97 .41 .94 .21 0.003 .96 
Truth .92 .02 .74 .001 4.38 .04 
Affiliation .94 .31 .94 .08 0.001 .98 
Life .93 .16 .91 .01 3.97 .01 
Property .83 .001 .92 .09 5.58 .02 
Law .87 .001 .94 .28 0.56 .46 
Legal .89 .03 .81 .001 1.89 .18 
WASI FSIQ .96 .18 .94 .26 6.57 .05 
WASI VCI .97 .50 .95 .31 7.51 .01 
VF .96 .20 .99 .69 .11 .74 
CWI .93 .05 .86 .01 12.98 .001 
CWI colour 
Naming 
.96 .22 .91 .07 5.03 .03 
DEX .99 .43 .98 .96 1.44 .24 
DEX EC .95 .13 .93 .13 1.75 .28 
DEX BE .96 .19 .96 .65 2.65 .11 
DEX MC .96 .31 .96 .65 5.18 .03 
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DEX other   - - .94 .41 - - 
EQ .99 .98 .97 .74 0.47 .50 
IRT total .85 .001 .90 .11 0.84 .37 
Block 1 .95 .10 .83 .05 3.03 .09 
Block 2 .91 .01 .95 .45 0.34 .56 
Block 3 .91 .009 .87 .03 1.24 .27 
Block 4 .89 .002 .88 .04 1.29 .26 
Block 5 .93 .02 .93 .27 0.06 .81 
 
HC = Healthy Comparison Group.   TBI = Survivors of traumatic brain injury group. S-W = Shapiro 
wilks.  P = significance level.  SRM-SF (Sociomoral Reflection – short form, Gibbs et al., 1992); 
WASI FSIQ (Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, full scale composite score); WASI VCI 
(Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, verbal comprehension composite score); VF (Verbal 
Fluency, DKEFS); CWI (Color word inference, DKEFS, Delis et al., 2001); DEX (Dys-executive 
questionnaire, BADS, Wilson et al., 1996); DEX EC (DEX Executive Cognition); DEX BE (DEX 
Behavioural-emotional self-regulation); DEX MC (DEX Metacognition); DEX OTHER (DEX proxy 
rater); EQ (Empathy Quotient, Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004); IRT (Intuitive Reasoning Task, 
Dunn et al., 2010)  
Significant results are in bold. 
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Appendix J - Histograms for each variable in TBI group 
SRM-SF 
 
SRM-SF Contract domain 
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SRM-SF Truth domain 
 
SRM-SF Affiliation domain 
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SRM-SF Life domain 
 
SRM-SF Property domain 
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SRM-SF Law domain 
 
SRM-SF Legal Justice domain 
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WASI-FSIQ  
 
WASI VCI  
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VF  
 
CWI  
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CWI – Colour Word Reading 
 
DEX 
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DEX – Executive Cognition domain 
 
DEX – Behavioural-emotional self-regulation domain 
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DEX – Metacognition domain 
 
Empathy Quotient 
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IRT 
 
 
IRT – BLOCK 1 
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IRT – BLOCK 2 
 
IRT – BLOCK 3 
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IRT – BLOCK 4 
 
IRT – BLOCK 5 
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Appendix K - Histograms of variables in the Healthy Comparison group 
SRM-SF  
 
SRM-SF Contract domain 
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SRM-SF Truth domain 
 
SRM-SF Affiliation domain 
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SRM-SF Life domain 
 
SRM-SF Property domain 
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SRM-SF Law domain 
 
SRM-SF Legal Justice domain 
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WASI FSIQ 
 
WASI VCI 
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VF 
 
CWI 
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CWI – Colour Word Reading 
 
DEX 
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DEX – Executive cognition domain 
 
 
DEX – Behavioural-emotional self-regulation domain 
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DEX – Metacognition domain 
 
Empathy Quotient 
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IRT 
 
IRT – BLOCK 1 
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IRT – BLOCK 2 
 
IRT – BLOCK 3 
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IRT – BLOCK 4 
 
IRT – BLOCK 5 
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